

# ORGANIZED DEMOCRACY

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ALBERT STICKNEY

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
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# ORGANIZED DEMOCRACY

BY

ALBERT STICKNEY



BOSTON AND NEW YORK  
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY  
The Riverside Press, Cambridge  
1906

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*Published October 1906*



"Gon said, I am tired of kings,  
I suffer them no more;  
Up to my ear the morning bringe  
The outrage of the poor.

. . . . .  
"I will have never a noble;  
No lineage counted great;  
Fishers and choppers and ploughmen  
Shall constitute a State."

EMERSON.

"But a democratic nation may be imagined, organized differently from the American people. Is it, then, impossible to conceive a government really established upon the will of the majority, but in which the majority, repressing its natural instinct of equality, should consent, with a view to the order and stability of the State, to invest a family or an individual with all the attributes of executive power? Might not a democratic society be imagined in which the forces of the nation would be more centralized than they are in the United States; where the people would exercise a less direct and less irresistible influence upon public affairs, and yet every citizen, invested with certain rights, would participate, within his sphere, in the conduct of the government?" — TOCQUEVILLE.



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# ORGANIZED DEMOCRACY

## CHAPTER I

### MACHINE POLITICS

MODERN political history, in its most important aspect, has been the story of the struggle for political freedom, freedom of thought, speech, and action; for the right of each people to govern itself in its own way; to make its own free choice of its political institutions, and its rulers. Putting the statement in a slightly different form, the most important feature of modern political history has been the struggle of democracy against monarchy.

The struggle has not yet ended. It has, however, already reached such a stage of advancement that democratic institutions have fully vindicated their right to survive, by the practical results which they have achieved, after the severest test in the laboratory of experience. Democratic institutions have already proved, to the satisfaction of the most competent judges, that they accomplish

the end of government, the greatest good of the greatest number, better than institutions of any other kind.

Democratic institutions, however, are still in their infancy, are still almost in their rudimentary stage of development. Only during the last century can they be said to have been put to the test of actual experiment on any large scale. Prior to our National Constitution of 1787 democratic institutions had been in operation only in small communities; generally in single cities, in peoples of small numbers. Their form with us, to-day, is almost the same as the earliest that was ever put in use. There has been slight change in the matter of form.

Consequently, it is a virtual certainty that the political institutions of this American people — to-day — are susceptible of improvement. It can hardly be, that the first experiments in democracy were a final complete success. Human inventions are always at first imperfect. At first, they take imperfect forms. They require repeated modification before they can accomplish their best results. Democratic institutions furnish no exception in this respect to the universal law. They are still imperfect. They still have defects. Those defects can be ascertained, and remedied.

In recent times, we have attached too little importance to political institutions. Institutions are the machinery of politics. The political results that any people can accomplish are limited by its political machinery. We cannot get a speed of sixty miles an hour with a two-wheeled ox cart on an old-fashioned corduroy road. No more is it a possibility for us to get wise and efficient administration of our public affairs from our present form of democratic government. It served our political needs passably in our early days, when we were a small people, with small aggregates of men and money; when public treasuries were small; when public affairs throughout were on a small scale. But it is no longer equal to our political needs.

We can go further. Not only do our political institutions require improvement, but we may almost say that our present political institutions are not genuinely democratic. It is the very essence of democracy, that a people should be able to make its own free choice of its rulers. If it cannot do that, it can hardly be said that its institutions are really democratic. But who will say that this American people to-day really makes its own free choice of its rulers? Do what we will, toil as hard as we may, we do not get the men of our own free choice for the high places in our different

governments. No doubt, we do occasionally succeed in electing, to some single office, some one man who happens, for the time, to be "popular." No doubt, too, we do occasionally defeat one or the other political "party," at some single election. But we never succeed in putting the control of our public affairs in the hands of any large number of men of our own choice; men who in our judgment are the fittest men to be charged with the responsibilities of government. Democracy means, if it means anything, a government where the supreme power in the State is the will of the people. But who would venture to say that the will of the people is with us—to-day—the supreme power in the body politic?

What is the reason?

We must concede that, under our present form of government, we have enough of the process of popular election. Indeed, it might almost be said that we have little else. One election is hardly finished, with its distribution of the spoils of victory, when we begin preparation for the next. Our political "campaigns" come but once a year. But they seem never to end. Our political life is a perpetual series of popular elections. The work has already become so burdensome, and so mechanical, that it is now gravely proposed to have the



citizen's part in the process done by the mere pressing of a button. Under the old theory of democratic institutions, voting was supposed to call for the exercise of thought, of intelligence, of judgment, on the part of the citizen. He was supposed to pass his judgment on the fitness of men for high public station, when he exercised the elective franchise and deposited his ballot at the polls. But we have now at last succeeded in reducing the function of the citizen to the act of placing "his mark" against one of several lists of names, in the making of which he has virtually no voice. It is now further proposed, to make his action even more completely mechanical, and reduce it to the touching of a button. Verily, "machine politics" could no further go.

What is the reason for this situation?

We turn government into an election machine. Our political life is a never-ending series of popular elections — so-called. Each year we put up a large number of our highest public offices to be filled by the process of popular election. These public offices constitute so many election prizes. They bring into being large organizations of men, which we term "parties," which are really formed for the purpose of capturing these annual collections of election prizes. The fact that elections

come every year, with each year a fresh collection of official vacancies, makes the work of these organizations continuous. Thereby the organizations are made permanent. Their leaders come to possess what amounts to a power of appointment — of all public officials. We please ourselves with the fancy, that our high public officials are chosen by the people, through the process of popular election. In fact, they are selected by the machine politicians, through what amounts to a power of appointment. The citizen becomes a mere attachment to some party “machine.” The process of popular election becomes little more than a form. No doubt the people, that is, the mass of citizens, does have an option between two or more “tickets,” each made by some group of machine politicians, or by their leaders. But that is all. That is far from giving to “the people” its own free choice. The process of popular election, as we now operate it, fails to fulfill its legitimate function, that of securing an expression of the will of the people. The action of the citizen, and of the people, becomes almost mechanical.

The cause of the difficulty will be found to lie — mainly — in our use of the separate individual ballot, in combination with our system of short fixed terms of office.

The separate ballot virtually compels the citizen to vote for the candidates of some large organization. Otherwise his vote will be lost.

The system of fixed terms of years for the tenure of our high public officials furnishes our large collection of annual vacancies; and thus calls into existence these standing armies of professional politicians, that we term "parties." The ordinary citizen, if his vote is to count, is — in practice — compelled to vote for the candidates of one or another of these "parties." He joins one. Under all ordinary circumstances, he votes his regular party ticket.

The theory of our present political system is, that the use of the process of popular election, at short fixed intervals of time, for large numbers of high public officials, by the separate individual ballot, keeps the supreme control of public affairs directly in the hands of the citizens; and in that way ensures "government of the people."

Under this theory, the highest public officials are elected by the separate secret ballot, for fixed terms of years, — usually short, — on the idea that the mass of voting citizens, at the end of each official term, are to signify their approval, or disapproval, of the public action of each separate official; by reëlecting him, if his action meets

their approval; by electing some other man in his place, if his action meets their disapproval. In this way, the citizens are supposed to keep the supreme control of public affairs directly in their own hands; to enforce responsibility to the people; and secure "government by the people."

The theory is plausible. Some such form of democratic government is practically the only one that has ever been tried. Even to-day it is the only form of democratic government which is considered practicable by the large majority of believers in democracy.

The soundness of the theory could not have been successfully challenged, until its practical results had been made evident by our own large political experience.

Let us see what that experience shows.

In small communities, with small numbers of voting citizens, and small numbers of public officials, where public affairs are on a small scale, the results are endurable.

Large communities, however, with their large numbers of voting citizens and elective offices, put the theory to a different test. The work of operating the election machinery becomes so extensive, and so intricate, that the ordinary citizen cannot take the time required for its performance.

When we consider these large constituencies of hundreds of thousands of voting citizens, such as we now have in many of our cities, of millions, such as we have in some of the states, of fifteen millions and upwards, such as we have in a presidential election, then it is easily seen that the operation of the process of popular election, by separate direct individual ballot, where the entire body of citizens vote in their own persons, gets far beyond the powers of the ordinary busy members of the community. Large constituencies involve the necessity of equally large organizations, for the purpose of nominating candidates and influencing votes for the support of those candidates. City and county elections require organizations covering the cities and counties. State organizations must cover the states. National organizations must cover the entire nation. The practical result is, that the work of operating the election machinery attains such magnitude and intricacy, that it far transcends the capacities of the community's workers, whose time always is, and must be, given mainly to their private affairs. Consequently, the work of operating the election machinery falls into the hands of men who make it their special occupation, who give to it substantially their entire time. Those men become pro-

professionals. The rest of the citizens, with their best efforts, are only amateurs. The professionals beat the amateurs. The main body of the citizens, in the hands of these professional operators of our election machinery, become mere attachments to one or the other part of the great election machine. In practice, the professionals have the entire control of the selection of candidates. The utmost that the voting citizen can do, if he wishes his vote to count, is to vote for one or another "ticket," made by one or another group of these professionals. He joins one or another of these large election organizations. As a rule, he follows its leaders, regularly and loyally. In general, men do not like to desert. Nor do they like deserters. It becomes, therefore, the almost universal rule, that each individual citizen adheres, under all ordinary circumstances, to one or the other of these permanent organizations of professionals; and votes mechanically — year after year — his regular "party ticket." Occasionally, in his disgust with the acts of his own "party," he may vote for the candidates of the other "party." But this seldom happens. Almost invariably he will vote his regular "party ticket." The result is that the citizen has no real power, no real weight, in the selection of public officials,

or in the control of their policies. Practically he becomes a mere political puppet, in the hands of the machine politicians. Practically he surrenders his political freedom, with the exercise of his political judgment, and his political conscience.

The theory is, that by the direct separate secret ballot we secure to the citizen complete political freedom, and complete political power. The fact is, we have established the most wonderful and ingenious system of political slavery that the world has yet seen. Framed by the citizens themselves, for the express purpose of keeping the supreme control of public affairs in their own hands, in order to ensure direct governmental responsibility to the citizens in their own persons, the actual practical result is, to create an irresponsible oligarchy of machine politicians; an arbitrary office-holding class; composed of men not selected by the people, and not responsible to the people. In substance, in its practical operation, our government is not democratic.

But we have another singular feature of the situation. The men who "go into politics," as the phrase is, do so, in the large majority of cases, for the reason that they need the salaries. In other words, they are not the successful men in

the regular private callings. No doubt, a large number of single individuals enter public life from praiseworthy motives; with an earnest wish to do good public service. But the large majority of the men who do the daily work of the election machine do it because they have the time for it, because their services are not in demand in the private occupations. Our office-holding class is largely composed of men who have failed in private life. Their services are not in demand, by reason of their lack of the requisite intelligence, industry, or, it may be, honesty. The result is, to a large extent we are governed by an oligarchy of the unemployed.

It may be said that it is the duty of every citizen to take, and give, the time which is required for the operation of this elaborate machinery. But that has been found in actual experience to be impracticable. The large majority of our citizens, by reason of the limitations of time and means, are compelled to select some one line of work, and give to it their entire energies. Especially, in these modern days, it is a practical impossibility with the large majority of men, that they should give proper attention to the engrossing work of any private business or profession, and at the same time take an active part in the



operation of the election machine. Either occupation is exclusive. No doubt the citizen owes it to the state to give to public affairs the time needed for the operation of the machinery of government. The citizen should — no doubt — give to the state the time necessary for the full discharge of his civic duties. On the other hand, however, the citizen's civic duties must be established with a due regard to his individual capacities, and the legitimate demands of his private affairs. There is our present difficulty. It is with us — to-day — an impossibility for busy working men to take an active part in the operation of our election machinery, for the mere reason that our present political system puts on the citizen a burden which he cannot carry. It taxes him beyond his capacities. Many men have made the attempt to take an active part in "practical politics." Sooner or later they generally find themselves compelled to abandon either politics or the work of their own private calling. But with most men this abandonment of the work of their private calling is an impossibility.

It may be thought that the situation here stated is peculiar to the United States, and is due to exceptional conditions existing with us.

That view will not stand the test of careful examination. The results here stated are the in-

evitable consequence of any attempt, in any form, to keep the control of public affairs in the hands of the entire mass of citizens, in any large community, by any combination of the separate ballot and the system of term elections.

Let us give it further consideration.

No means has ever yet been devised, nor, as it seems to me, is it possible that any can be devised, whereby the final supreme control of public men and public measures can be kept directly in the hands of the entire mass of citizens, except the process of periodic popular election by the citizens' direct individual votes. No way exists for controlling an employee except the possession of the power to discharge him. If that power is to be exercised by the citizens in their own persons, it can only be by the use of the direct separate ballot. In order to give to that control any practical value, the opportunity for such a discharge must come with a fair degree of frequency. But it is impossible that the citizens should be voting on their public servants every day, or at irregular intervals. They are compelled to make such voting periodic. They are compelled to adopt the term system. Consequently, the only method by which we can make so much as a formal attempt at keeping public servants and public affairs under

the direct control of the citizens in mass, is, that the highest public servants should be elective, and should submit to the process of reelection, periodically, at the end of short fixed terms of years. So far as my reading goes, no other way has ever been tried, or suggested. No other seems possible.

The result which has come in this country must necessarily come in any large community, where the attempt is made to keep the final control of public men and public measures in the hands of the citizens in mass. As matter of fact, that result has come, whenever, and wherever, the system of short elective terms has been tried. Whenever in large communities the attempt is made to keep the control of public officers and public affairs directly in the hands of the citizens, it must be through the process of frequent periodic popular election; in other words, by a term system, where the citizens vote directly, in their own persons, for high public officials in considerable numbers, at short fixed intervals of time. The inevitable result is the establishment of these large election organizations of professional politicians, which are formed, and exist, in order to capture the control of the public work and the public treasuries.

It may be said that under this system of short terms the citizens do, at least, have it in their power to remove any elective public official at the end of his term.

But of what practical value is the possession of that power, when the new men, who will be put in the places of the officials removed, will always — or practically always — be the nominees of the same body, or some other body, of professional politicians? The decisive point is that, in the long run, at all ordinary times, the highest public officials will necessarily and certainly be selected by the machine politicians. One body of machine politicians is no better and no worse than another. They may give themselves different names. They may give us different “platforms.” But the men in all these organizations are necessarily of the same kind. They are trained in the same school. They use the same methods. Consequently, it makes little or no practical difference that the citizens have it in their power, at short intervals of time, to oust one set of professionals and put another in its place. It still remains the fact, that the term system does not give to the citizens the real choice of their own rulers, and the control of their own public affairs.

No doubt to a certain extent public officials are

kept under some degree of restraint by the possibility of removal through an adverse election at the end of their term.

But what real value is to be attached to that? The fact still remains, that the successors will be the appointees of the machine politicians. Our public officials have now well learned that fact. No man — in ordinary times — can get a nomination, or an election, to public office, except by the permission of the machine politicians. All public officials, therefore, are under their control. Occasionally it will happen that a mayor, a governor, or even a president, may for a time attempt to resist the will of the professionals, in an effort to serve the highest public interests. But in the long run, in the vast majority of instances, the politicians will control. Public officers are well aware of that fact. They have well learned that, when the annual election comes, the citizen must, and will, “rally,” around one or another “party standard.” If some single official has made himself obnoxious to the voters by his especially bad record, the professionals lay him aside, and put in his place some other man, of good general reputation, who is generally as submissive to their control as his predecessors. Our public officials know that political advancement is, in general, possible only by the permis-

sion of the operators of the election machine. Consequently, our public officials are controlled by those operators.

Another result follows.

The operation of these large election organizations requires the expenditure of large amounts of money, running each year into many millions of dollars. Naturally, and inevitably, the party managers who are compelled to raise these large amounts of money procure them from the large financial and industrial interests that are subject to legislative and other official action. The great campaign funds come from those large interests. The result is, that legislation, with other public official action, in all our governments, local, state, and national, one just as much as another, is largely controlled by the men who supply the money for the "legitimate campaign expenses," as the phrase is, of these great election organizations. There is no express contract to that effect. It is seldom that money is paid directly to a public official, to pay for any specific official act. Such payments are needless. The action of public officials is controlled through payments of money to the managers of the election machine. It is quite unnecessary to buy the servant, when one has in his regular pay the master. We give ourselves

much alarm over the occasional purchase of a few individual voters. But what are we to say of the purchase — in effect — of votes by the hundred thousand — by the million? Yet that is what is actually accomplished, when men purchase the “influence” of the powerful machine politicians. Single politicians, or single groups of politicians, who control the selection of our highest public officials, practically buy and sell the votes of us citizens, by the hundreds of thousands and the millions. Under such circumstances, it is childish, trifling, for us to consider the matter of buying and selling a few individual votes, of individual voters. We talk to-day of “party government.” “Party government” with us to-day means nothing more or less than government by one or the other part of the election machine. Government by the election machine means government by money. In short, what we have accomplished at the present day, in the way of establishing democratic institutions, may almost be summed up in one phrase: We have achieved, not democracy, but plutocracy.

Let me not be misunderstood. In most cases the financial and industrial interests which thus control public officials, do so not of their own free will. They do it largely under compulsion. They are not free agents. In general, capitalists would pre-

fer to secure their lawful rights by lawful means. These large amounts of money, which they pay to the machine politicians, they pay by virtue of necessity, generally in self-defense. Most moneyed men would prefer not to make the payments, if they could avoid it; if they could secure the rightful protection of the law by other means. Our machine politicians are the successors, under new names and new conditions, of the old feudal barons, who levied blackmail as payment for peace; for permission to the working portion of the community to follow their daily occupations, and do their daily work, in peace.

It may be conceded, and it is my belief, that even our present form of plutocracy, taking it as a whole, gives us better working results than any form of hereditary government. Nevertheless, plutocracy is not democracy. Our object, under our present form of government, is to secure genuine "government by the people." But "government by the people" surely means something better than government by the election machine, under the control of money, even if the machine has two parts, under the name of "parties;" and even if we have it in our power occasionally to change one "party" for the other.

Our political experience has now well estab-



lished this political law. Any attempt, in any form, to keep the selection of public servants, and the control of public affairs, directly in the hands of the citizens in mass, must necessarily and certainly bring the result which it has brought with us. Necessarily — and certainly — it will place the control of public affairs in the hands of an oligarchy of irresponsible machine politicians. Necessarily — and certainly — those politicians will be under the control of money. Practically the system will result in the virtual disfranchisement of the honest and industrious portion of the community. In short, the attempt at mass rule, in any form, gives as its practical result the tyranny of the election machine.

It is a tyranny of a new kind, the tyranny of an institution. It enslaves the entire community, governors and governed. It destroys political freedom, for both citizen and the public servant. Take our public servants as they are to-day; chosen as they are, and trained as they are, and the fact is, that the large majority of them would prefer to give us an honest and efficient administration of our public affairs. But they are not free men. They are the appointees, and the slaves, of the election machines. They are in the same position with us citizens. They have no freedom of action.

The proper name for our system of short elective terms of office is that it is a system of tenure by election.

Thereupon we may state an unfailing political law: Tenure by election turns government into an election machine.

We must seek further, then, if we expect to realize, in practice, the result which is meant by the phrase "government of the people, by the people, for the people." We must work on other lines, if we expect to make democracy a practical success.

## CHAPTER II

### ORGANIZED DEMOCRACY

EVERY people, every body politic, under government of any form, must be organized. That means that in every political community, under any form of government, public work must be specialized. Each kind of public work must be done by men specially selected for that kind of work. The degree and form of the specialization will vary in different communities. But in every community, whatever be the form of its government, public work must be specialized. In other words, there must be organization.

Democracy is no exception to this law. Even under a "government by the people," even in the smallest communities, there must be the division of labor, specialization. In other words, even a democracy must be organized.

What, then, is organized democracy?

Let us begin our attempt to answer this question by stating what it is not.

It most certainly is not government by every-

body. It is not government by rotation; government by the entire mass of citizens, turn and turn about; one man taking a hand at some kind of public work for a few years, and then some other man, equally ignorant and inexperienced, taking his place for a few later years. The attempt at government of that kind, as our experience has now demonstrated, gives "machine politics," and not democracy. We cannot get democracy by perpetual periodic changes in the persons of our public officials; by any process of perpetual periodic revolution.

Moreover, political organization, to some extent, must be had in the very smallest communities. Even in the government of a small country town, the actual daily work of administration must be done by men specially selected. Even in the smallest rural communities, if we give to the individual citizen the fullest possible share in the practical operation of the government, we shall still find that the regular daily work of government must be done by a few men specially selected; in the time-honored phrase of New England, by "selectmen." Even in the little country town, the outside practicable field for the action of the ordinary citizen is, that he shall have his one voice in the selection of those few "selectmen."

When, however, we consider the government of large communities, of large cities, states, or of a nation, then the necessity of organization becomes simply overwhelming. In all large communities, government by the entire body of citizens in mass, or government by perpetual rotation, becomes a glaring and grotesque impossibility. In small communities, public work, being on a smaller scale, and less intricate, requires a less degree of special training. Country roads do not require the same solidity and finish with the public highways in the cities; for they do not carry as heavy traffic. Country schools deal with pupils in smaller numbers; and do not require, in general, such complex educational appliances. In short, all the public work is on a smaller scale, and has less intricacy. The result is, in the small rural communities, that public work need not be specialized so highly. Nevertheless, it must be specialized. In other words, there must be organization.

These considerations clear the way for an affirmative statement of the form of organized democracy.

Its form must be decided by the application to public affairs of the methods, and the system, which human experience has shown to be best fitted for the handling of large private affairs, in the

hands of large private corporations. A city, a state, or a nation is a "body politic," a large public corporation. In handling the affairs of any large private corporation, human experience has demonstrated it to be an absolute necessity, that administration must be single headed; but that the single administrative head must be supervised — and controlled — by a deliberative body; by some kind of executive committee; by a comparatively small body of men, specially selected by the individual members of the corporation, for the work of supreme supervision and control.

The work of administration, of execution, requires that men work under single heads. Even at the head of each little "gang" of day laborers there must be a single foreman. At the head of each administrative office and department there must be some one man, who will be the head of that office or department, responsible for its operation. Over all the different departments, combined, there must be a single responsible administrative head, a "superintendent," a "president," a chief executive, under one or another name. Finally, over this single administrative head, this chief executive, there must be an executive committee, a board of directors, a deliberative body of some kind, specially charged with the work of supervision and control.

This form of organization has been found to be absolutely necessary in order to secure administrative efficiency, in all large private affairs. It has been universally adopted in the administration of the affairs of all large private corporations. It will be quite as serviceable, and it is quite as necessary, in the administration of the public affairs, — of every large municipal corporation.

There is, however, one essential difference between the two situations.

In the private business corporation the business is of a single kind, of a comparatively simple character, involving the interests of a comparatively small number of persons. Moreover, the directors, or members of the executive committee, are usually large owners in the property or business to be managed. For that reason it does no great harm, if those directors are — as matter of form — selected at an annual election by the shareholders. Moreover, the shareholders are generally able to tell with comparative ease, by an examination of the annual accounts, and by the size of the dividends, whether or not their property has been well managed. They are, therefore, in general, well able to form an intelligent judgment as to whether or not they need a change of directors.

In a large modern political community, how-

ever, the number of persons interested, and the interests involved, are extremely large and complex. Their magnitude, and diversity, far transcend those concerned in any private business. The wise and efficient handling of those large public interests requires our ablest men; and those men must have the training that comes from large experience; an experience far beyond any that can be acquired in any short term of years.

These facts make it an impossibility, in large communities, that the individual citizens, who correspond to the shareholders in the private corporation, should be able to pass an intelligent judgment on the conduct of their public affairs. The citizens have neither the time, nor the opportunity, to get the necessary knowledge. Under a proper form of election machinery, the citizens constitute, in my belief, the best available agency for the work of original selection — of the directors, who are to supervise each people's public affairs. But private citizens cannot have the time, or the knowledge, to enable them to form an intelligent judgment on the quality of the work of those directors, after those directors have once been selected. Consequently, the system of annual elections, or elections for short terms of years, which serves well enough in private business corporations, is quite



out of place, and will certainly fail to give good results, in the government of large communities. Moreover, we have already seen, that the inevitable result of any system of annual elections, when applied to the selection of the public officials of our large communities, is the election machine.

But here we face the most difficult feature in our problem. Under a democratic government, we must in some way secure due responsibility to "the people." In some way, too, we must secure the selection of able and upright men for the work of our different governmental organizations, local, state, and national. Above all things, it is essential that we should have the right men at the head. The selection of the men below, of the rank and file, is comparatively unimportant. It is the men at the head, on whom we must depend for results, in all our governmental organizations. It is at the government's head, that we must have men of exceptional capacity, with the thorough training for their official work which can come only from experience. Any government, which is to do its work rightly, in any large community, must be a thing very different from government by ordinary average untrained citizens, under any conceivable system of rotation in office. This large and intricate work, of managing large public affairs, demands

the ablest men that the community can furnish; and those men, when once chosen, must not be continually changing, but must keep their places so long as they are able to do their work efficiently. Only when they become inefficient, should new men be put in their places. Nothing can be devised, which is so certain to destroy the efficiency of any large working organization, as frequent changes in its members. Especially, any high degree of efficiency is an impossibility, under any system of frequent periodic changes in the men at the head. Such a system is one of periodic decapitation.

But how is it to be accomplished, as an actual practical fact, that we shall have public work done by a body of men selected by reason of their fitness for their work, men of special training, and large experience? In short, how are we to get a sound system of democratic organization?

In seeking the answer to this question, we shall find that our own experience in the development of democratic institutions has now established certain political laws; and if we wish to make democratic institutions a practical success, we must follow those laws.

Moreover, if anything has been made clear by our study up to this point, it is that any substantial improvement in our existing political institu-

tions must provide for a large reduction of the volume, and intricacy, of our election work; that it must put an end to the periodic permanence of that work; and that it must at the same time provide some simple, inexpensive, workable process of popular election, whereby each separate political community can make its own free choice, of the men who are to have the supreme control of its public affairs.

Bearing these things in mind, let us now consider some of the political laws, as to the development of democratic institutions, which have been ascertained by our experience of the last hundred years.

The first of these laws is this:—

#### **I. ADMINISTRATION MUST BE SINGLE HEADED.**

It need hardly be said, that every chief executive, every head of the administrative forces of a community, must himself be under constant supervision, and complete control. Moreover, under any form of government that can be termed democratic, the entire administrative force of the community, through its single head, must be, directly or indirectly, under the control of “the people.” As has already been seen, the chief practical defect of our present political system is, that the supreme con-

trol of public officials and public affairs is not now in the hands of the people, but is in the hands of the machine politicians. Indeed, the prime essential of organized democracy is, the securing, in a simple practical effective form, the control of public affairs by the people — by the whole people — acting as a unit, as a single political organism.

Subject to such control by the people, however, the first law of organized democracy is, that administration must be single headed.

That means, that every administrative office, or department, must have a single head; that it must be under the full control of some single man, who shall individually be held responsible for the efficiency of that office, or department.

In order to accomplish that result, he must have the selection, and the control, of his subordinates. Control — of his subordinates — can be secured only by vesting in him the power of removal — of those subordinates. Then, too, in order to secure his own efficiency, he must, in his turn, be subject to removal, at any time, by his immediate official superior, for any cause which prevents his effective discharge of his official duty.

It also means, that the chief executive, in every government, in the government of every city, state, and the nation, shall be held individually respon-

sible for the efficiency of all the administrative departments and offices under him; that, in order to secure such efficiency, he must have the appointment — and removal — of all his heads of departments; that, in order to secure his own efficiency, to enforce his responsibility, he shall himself be subject to removal, at any time, by the best available superior power; not merely for a crime, or a distinct violation of law; but for any cause, which makes him at the time unable to properly discharge his official duty; for physical or mental disability; for fatal defects in administrative temperament; for obstinacy; in short — for any reason which makes his removal at any time necessary for the complete protection of public interests.

It is easily seen, that single-headed administration, in this form, giving to each head of an office or department the selection of his subordinates, and to the chief executive the selection of all his heads of departments, will at once remove one of the chief causes of the existence of the election machine. It will at once sweep away a large part of its work. It will remove the greater part of the prizes, which are now to be won by success in carrying our annual elections. The chief fact, to-day, which makes the volume of our election work so vast, is, that we use the process of popular elec-

tion for so large a number of subordinate administrative offices, in our state and local governments; and, in addition, we use the process at short fixed periods. In the national government, indeed, we use the process of election only for the President and the members of our national legislature. That is reasonable. The use of the process to that extent rests on a basis of sound sense. But in our state and local governments, besides using the process for the selection of our chief executives, and the members of our different legislative bodies, we also use it for the selection of a large number of administrative subordinates. That is one of the chief causes of the present large volume of our election work. That, too, is the cause of the large number of periodic vacancies, which constitute the prizes, to be won at each of these annual election campaigns.

It is evident, then, that the adoption of single-headed administration, if it had no other effect, would at once eradicate one of the chief evils in our present political system. It would have the immediate effect, of cutting down the number of elective offices; consequently of cutting down the volume of election work. To that extent, it would take away the inducements, and the occupation, of the professional politicians.

But single-headed administration will be found to justify itself on every reasonable ground.

Every man, who has had any considerable experience in active practical affairs, is well aware, that the only administrative responsibility, which has any practical value, is the responsibility of single men. The responsibility of more men than one, even with small numbers, is worth little. The responsibility of men in large numbers is worth nothing.

When, then, we talk of the administrative responsibility of one of our large political "parties," with its large numbers, and shifting personalities, we talk of responsibility which has no practical value; which has, indeed, no practical existence. We might almost as well talk of the responsibility of a swarm of bees.

We may lay it down as a universal political law, that the division of power means the division of responsibility; and the division of responsibility means its destruction.

Conversely, we may lay it down as the same political law, in another form, that the conservation of responsibility requires its concentration; and the concentration of responsibility means the concentration of power.

Furthermore, there is only one way possible, by

which to enforce administrative responsibility; and that is, by giving to every administrative head the selection, and the removal, of his subordinates.

The theory of our present form of "government by the people" is, that administrative responsibility is to be enforced by "the people," through the use of the process of popular election, at short fixed terms, by the entire body of citizens in mass, as to large numbers of officials in mass. It is an attempt to enforce responsibility — of public officials in mass, to the citizens in mass. It is the very quintessence of the attempt at mass rule.

Such an attempt inevitably results in the utter destruction — of administrative responsibility, and administrative efficiency. It is fundamentally and fatally vicious. Every system of government, that has ever been framed on that principle, has had the same result. No other is possible.

In ancient times, the old Romans carried the system of divided responsibility to an absurd extreme, when they gave the command of their armies to one consul on one day, to the other consul on the next.

In modern times, "parliamentary government," as it is termed, has developed official responsibility in a still more remarkable, and grotesque form; that of responsibility of the heads of administrative



departments, termed a "ministry," for legislation. Under what is termed "parliamentary government," the practice is, that the heads of administrative departments, collectively, lose their administrative positions, not for failures in administration, but for a failure on the part of themselves and their followers to carry some measure of legislation. At times, the resignation of some single minister, or even of the whole of a ministry, may be enforced for reasons which concern administration. But the regular practice is, that an entire ministry resigns from their offices of administration, by reason of a failure to carry some measure of legislation. We need go no further, to find the cause of the universally conceded administrative inefficiency of the British government. Administrative responsibility, in any correct sense of the term, has no existence. The heads of administrative departments are compelled — to give their time and best efforts to work in the House of Commons; to keeping a majority in the House, not to the affairs of the Army, the Navy, or the administrative offices of which they purport to be the heads. Either work alone, the work of legislation or administration, will tax to the utmost the powers of any one man. The result is, that neither work is done well. No single minister is responsible for any one thing.

No single minister gives his time, and energies, to one thing. No single minister is judged separately, for his individual performance, of any one class of work. The result is, that the absence of individual responsibility works the destruction of administrative efficiency.

Administrative efficiency can be secured in only one way; that is, through a system of individual responsibility, for individual performance, in the work of administration alone; by having all administrative officials selected and removed separately, by reason of their success or failure in giving good administrative results.

Thereupon it follows, that the selection, and the removal, of all administrative officials must be made by some man, or body of men, who will have full and accurate knowledge of the quality of their official work.

That being so, the selection and removal of all administrative officials must be made by their immediate official superior. He is the only person, who can have the needed knowledge. Moreover, he will be led by his own personal interests to use his power of selection and removal, with a view to serving the interests of the public. For it is on the fitness and efficiency of his own subordinates, that he must depend for his own administrative success.

No doubt, there will always be the possibility, that the power in his hands may be used unwisely. But a wise use of that power in any other hands will be an impossibility.

Nor is there the possibility, that any man should get the most earnest and efficient work from his subordinates, unless they know that he has the power to discharge them at any time, for misconduct or inefficiency. What would become of the business of any one of our large private corporations, if employees were independent of their employers; if they could keep their situations for four years, or for one year, whether they did their work well or ill? Human nature is the same, in both public and private affairs. The term system, which practically allows our public servants to keep their official positions for a fixed term of years, with practically no regard to the quality of their work, or their fitness for their places, is flatly in defiance of all the principles of sound administration, and the dictates of common sense. Such a system — to an absolute certainty — destroys all possibility of high administrative efficiency. It would very quickly ruin any private business. Its effects on our public business are quite as bad, as they would be on the business of any private individual. The reason why the system does not work the ruin of

our public business is, that the resources of the entire people are so vast. The mere fact, however, that, with our vast wealth, and our peculiar conditions, we have been able thus far to endure the system, does not alter its nature. Nor does it throw doubt on the soundness of the conclusion, that the only way to secure administrative efficiency, in either public or private affairs, is to put every administrative official under the control of some single superior; and give to that superior the power of selecting men whom he judges fit for the work they are to do, and discharging those men when they show themselves to be unfit for that work.

These points are so elementary, and any other doctrine so flatly contradicts the teachings of simple common sense, that it would seem almost impossible that a system of fixed official terms for administrative officials should ever have been adopted.

The reason for its adoption is to be found in the fact, that democratic governments have thus far been regarded, rather as protections against tyranny, than as organizations for the efficient transaction of public work. The fundamental fact has been ignored, that every kind of work, public as well as private, requires special qualities and special training; especially the training that comes only from experience. All these considerations have

been practically ignored, in the framing of our present system of government; and, for that matter, in the framing of nearly every government that has ever yet existed, democratic or hereditary.

But another fact, even more important, has been disregarded in framing our present political system. It is this. In order to ensure efficient work, work of the highest order, the workman must have before him the possibility of a career for life, in which he can make for himself a reputation; with the possibility of rising to the top of his profession, if he shows himself sufficiently deserving. He must be sure of permanent employment, subject, of course, to the condition of honesty and efficiency. He must be paid reasonably in money, but largely and liberally in the possibility of an honorable reputation. Work of the highest order is paid for, in general, not excessively in money, but largely in reputation. In this respect, our public service, rightly organized, can have an immeasurable advantage over any private employment. We can, if we will, make it pay sufficiently well in money; but in reputation — far better than any private calling. In other words, we have it in our power, to a degree impossible for any private employer, so to deal with our public servants, as to make it for their own selfish individual interest to give us

the highest kind of work. But that can be done only in one way, only by one method; and that is, by abolishing the term system; by giving our public service permanence; by making the rewards of the service depend on fidelity and efficiency; by judging each man separately; by making his continuance in the service, and his advancement in the service, depend on the quality of his individual work; by removing from the service the faithless and inefficient; by weeding them out singly, whenever their inefficiency is discovered; by then putting new men in their places, and testing those new men at their work; in short, by selecting men, removing them, and promoting them, separately, according to the quality of their individual performance.

Above all, their tenure of their offices must not depend on success in carrying popular elections.

In other words, we must abolish the system of tenure by election, and substitute in its place the system of tenure during good behavior.

There is, moreover, another consideration, which bears on this same point.

If any chief executive is to be held responsible for the efficiency of the entire body of the administrative force under him, justice to him, and a due regard for the possibility of his giving the people efficient service, absolutely require, that the selection,

and control, of his heads of departments should be in his individual hands. Those department heads must not only be able and competent men; but they must be men who can work with, and under, him. We have no right to hold a man responsible for results, unless we give him a free hand in the selection of his tools, his subordinates. Moreover, he must have the control of those subordinates after they are selected; and they must know that he has it. It is not intended, that, in the use of that control, he must be absolutely free from all regulation and restriction. But his control of his subordinates must be full and complete. If he is held to a strict accountability, his own personal interests will compel him to use that control as wisely as he can. For, if he selects and removes his subordinates for reasons other than their efficiency or inefficiency, he will thereby prevent his own official success. Thereby, in time, he will compel his own removal.

In short, from whatever point of view we consider the question, we shall find, that concentration of power is the essential condition, of both administrative efficiency, and administrative responsibility.

The framers of democratic governments have generally been distrustful of the concentration of power in single hands. Their fear has been, that

the concentration of power would increase the danger of its abuse.

Directly the reverse is the fact. Our main dependence for enforcing efficiency and responsibility, with every administrative official, must always be the supervision and control of his immediate superior.

But with the few administrative chiefs, the few men at the head, there will be the operation of another force, that of public opinion. That force it is important to utilize — within its proper limits — though we can depend on it only as an occasional auxiliary, not as the power of permanent control.

Public opinion, in order to have substantial effect, must have concentration. It must be concentrated on single men. If any public official wishes to make a wrong use of his power, he is much less likely to do so, if he knows that he must face public opinion alone; if he knows that the disapproval or wrath of the public is to be poured, the whole of it, on his single solitary head. Here, again, we touch the essential weakness of any attempt to enforce the responsibility of a "party," or of any group of professional politicians. In any such attempt, the force of public opinion scatters. It wastes itself by diffusion. It strikes so many, that it hurts none. More than that, the men who are really the efficient



causes of corrupt official action, keep in the background. They are the "power behind the throne," the uncrowned kings; the political leaders, behind the scenes, who pull the wires and move the puppets. If, however, there is some single department head, or some single chief executive, who has ample power — to prevent, or remedy, abuses, who can at once discipline, or remove, corrupt or inefficient subordinates, on whom the community can at once put its finger, on whom responsibility rests with reason, who, in his turn, can be immediately removed by his own single superior, then public opinion becomes a force that can have some practical effect; that can have some real power in producing practical results. But in order to give to the lightning of public opinion any real power, it must be able to strike some single head.

Here, again, we encounter the fundamental law, that the conservation of responsibility requires its concentration; and the concentration of responsibility requires the concentration of power.

At every turn, whenever we carefully study the practical operation of administrative forces and administrative bodies, we shall find ourselves confronted with the absolute necessity, that every administrative body must be single-headed.

But when we come to the case of the chief executive,

what are we to do then? What security are we to have for official efficiency and integrity, on his part?

Here, too, we shall find, that the only practical way of enforcing responsibility on the part of a chief executive, a mayor, a governor, or a president, is to abolish the term tenure; to limit his official duty to the work of administration; to hold him individually responsible for the efficiency of the entire administrative force under him; to that end, to give him full control of all the administrative departments, through their official heads; and then, to have him removable, by a representative popular assembly; not at the end of a term of years, but at any time; not merely for crimes and misdemeanors, but for failure to give good administrative results; whether by reason of a direct violation of law, for physical or mental incapacity, or for mere inefficiency; in short, for any reason, which causes his removal to be at any time demanded by public interests.

In other words, the term system must be abolished, as to executive heads, as well as subordinates; and single-headed administration must be adopted throughout the entire administrative body, from the bottom to the top.

Here, no doubt, we find ourselves opposed by a prevailing popular belief, that governmental con-

trol by the people must be in the form of control by the entire mass of citizens, through the process of periodic popular election by the entire mass of citizens; in short, through some form of mass rule.

Mass responsibility, responsibility of officials in mass, to the citizens in mass, for conduct in mass, enforced by periodic popular elections, so called, once in one year, in two years, in four years, or in any number of years, is a delusion. It has been the cause of failure, in every attempt yet made at the formation of democratic institutions. It has been the primal cause of the primal curse, in all previous efforts to establish democracy.

Control by the people, supremacy of the people, in a practical effective form, is the essence of democratic government. The administrative forces, in a democracy, must be made responsible to the people, in some simple effective method. Such responsibility we do not now have. As we have already seen, the destruction of real responsibility to the people is the chief defect of our present political system.

Democratic organization will have for its chief end, the providing some really efficient means for enforcing such administrative responsibility.

What shall that means be?

That brings us to the statement of our second political law.

## II. THE ORGAN OF SUPREME CONTROL IN THE BODY POLITIC MUST BE THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY.

Democracy has generally been assumed to be a form of government, whereby is secured the supremacy of the people's will.

But with a people, as with an individual, the will should be under the control of the thinking faculty — of the reason, the judgment. Consequently, democracy, if it is to be a really wise form of government, should do something more than secure the supremacy of the people's will. It should secure the control of the people's will by the people's judgment.

This supremacy of the people's judgment, as the power of final supreme control, will be found to be a result quite practicable, quite attainable by human institutions; a thing quite possible of actual accomplishment; and that, too, by the use of political machinery already well proved by the tests of actual experiment.

The practical importance of this point will be more apparent, when we bear in mind the conclusion already reached, that public administration, like private, must be single-headed. The chief executive of a large community will wield great power. Consequently, if government is to be really

democratic, if we are to have a genuine "government by the people," this one man at the head of a community's entire administrative force, this chief executive, must be placed in some way under continuous effective control; under control by the whole people, thinking, judging, and acting, as one organism; in such a way as to insure, and enforce, thorough complete responsibility to the people.

How is that to be accomplished? How is it to be made an actual practical result, in the regular every-day working of a government?

Evidently, as has now been demonstrated by the experience of every people which has thus far made attempts at the development of democratic institutions, it cannot be accomplished by any term system, by any system of periodic elections by the citizens in mass.

We must, then, make some other experiment, on some other foundation.

Government, in large communities, in all its branches, must be "representative;" that is, it must be by men in some way specially selected, who will act for the entire community. In small communities, in country towns and villages, the selection of their chief public servants, together with their general supervision and control, should be in the hands of the citizens themselves, meet-

ing and acting as one body in their own persons. In large communities, however, all public functions must be in the hands of "representatives;" of men who will "represent" the people in action; who will be their agents. In the act of original selection, through some simple practical process of popular election, each citizen should have his single voice. The form and operation of that process will be the subject of our later study. But in any large community, it is a mere impossibility — for the individual citizen to take part in the work of supervision and control; an impossibility as complete, as it is for him to take part in the daily routine work of administration. Having taken his part in the work of original selection, of the men at the government's head, there the functions of the citizen must end. He cannot possibly have the time, or the knowledge, to take part in the work of supreme supervision and control.

This position does, no doubt, involve a reconstruction of current theories as to democratic government. It will, however, be seen to be fundamental, and essential. Its soundness will be found to be fully established, if we give the subject a careful consideration, in the light of the lessons to be learned from our own large experience in the last century.

Let us now give it that consideration. And at

each turn of this study, in view of its large importance, and its many-sided practical relations, the forbearance of the reader must be asked, if there seem to be somewhat of needless repetition.

Each body politic, each political community, each village, town, city, state, and the nation, is a distinct human organism. Taken together, in combination, they constitute a single, more complex, organism. But each one of them is, at the same time, a distinct organism in itself. Each must have its own distinct organic life.

Especially, every body politic must have for its power of supreme control its own brain; its own separate organ, whereby it can form, and utter, its own unified common judgment, and its own unified common will. The body politic is not to be governed by its different cells, organs, and members, taken collectively; acting, or attempting to act, in mass. In the small rural community, the little country town, we have something analogous to the plant or animal of a single cell; a single organism, which serves continuously and contemporaneously, for the performance of all the different bodily functions; those of absorption, digestion, locomotion, at one and the same time. But in the larger and more complex political bodies, we must have the differentiation of functions, with a corresponding

differentiation of organs. The larger the community, the more varied and complex must be that differentiation. That is the order of nature.

Especially, in the case of large communities, is it all the more essential, that we should have a separate organ for the work of supreme control; an organ for the people's deliberations; an organ for forming and uttering the people's thought; a body of men of superior capacity, carefully selected; men of large knowledge, and large experience in public affairs; who shall constitute the community's brain; which will supervise and control all the other organs and members of the body politic. As already stated, the attempt to vest the general control of public affairs in the citizens in their own persons, is quite practicable, in the case of small communities, in small towns and villages. When, however, we are confronted with the different conditions, which exist in our large modern communities, in our large cities and states, such control becomes an impossibility. Public questions then become larger, and more complex. Their decision demands larger knowledge, wider experience, more thorough and continuous thought. We laymen, however intelligent or well educated we may be, cannot have the knowledge, or the time, to master the facts — of important public ques-



tions. In our large modern communities, it is this work of final supervision and control, far more than the work of administration, which demands men of exceptional capacity, and exceptional experience. It is this work of supreme control, above all others, which is quite beyond the capacities of the collective mass of citizens; which must be in the hands of men carefully selected, who will constitute a distinct separate organ in the body politic, the people's brain.

This conclusion will be found all the more necessary, and unavoidable, when we consider another point to which we have already made allusion.

The essential idea, which lies at the foundation of the current notions of democracy, it is said, is that of the supremacy of the people's will. It is the people's will, it is said, which must be the supreme power in the state.

So it should.

But we must also bear in mind the vital necessity, as has been already stated, that the people's will should be guided — and governed — by the people's judgment. It will not answer for a people, any more than for an individual, to be the victim of its whims and caprices; or even of its hasty ill-considered impressions and opinions; formed without knowledge, or with insufficient knowledge;

without deliberation, or with insufficient deliberation. The interests of the entire people are larger, and more complex, than those of any individual. They involve the consideration of larger and more complex collections of facts. All the more vital and essential is it, that all large questions of public policy should be decided after the most mature deliberation, by the people's best thought, by its best judgment. It is not enough, that the action of the body politic should be the expression of mere hasty ill-considered volition, even on the part of the entire mass of the individual citizens.

Nor will it serve our needs, to have public affairs regulated by the judgment of ordinary, average men. These large public questions must be handled by men of exceptional ability, and exceptional experience. Consequently, the chief point to be kept in view, in working out the problem of democratic organization, is to devise some organ, some organ that is practicable, and available, which shall be the body politic's brain; the organ for forming and uttering the people's wisest judgment.

Here is the point of fundamental importance in our study. Here we touch the inherent weakness of any and every system of hereditary government; government by hereditary kings, or hereditary classes. Hereditary government, under what-

ever form it may exist, is not, and never can be, government by the people's brain. Under any and every system of hereditary government, the men at the head of the state are selected by birth, and not worth; by reason of the fact, that they are the descendants, actual or putative, of their ancestors. They hold the high places in the state, as property, by inheritance, instead of being selected for those places, by the people, on their own merits, to be the people's servants.

Democracy, on the contrary, in its fully developed form, implies as its chief essential, that the men at the head of the state, the men on whom the community must depend for the wise handling of large and complex public questions, shall be a body of exceptional men; selected by reason of their ability in affairs; who will constitute the organ for forming and uttering the people's best thought, the people's wisest judgment; being selected — by the people — for that very work. The people's thought, in large communities, must be by the people's brain. The people's brain must be a separate organ, a separate body of men, composed of the people's best fibre, specially selected — by a rational process of popular election.

What light do we get from the previous history of democratic institutions, as to this point — the pro-

viding this special organ — for forming and uttering a people's judgment, and a people's will?

The historic tendency, in the development of democratic institutions, has been, thus far, steadily in the direction of the supremacy of the popular assembly, of either one or two chambers; as it seems to me, of one chamber, as the power of supreme control in the state.

The principal reason, for the existence, and use, of the popular assembly, in democratic institutions, has hitherto generally been assumed to be its necessity, as a bulwark for the rights and liberties of the citizen, and the people, against the people's rulers.

This necessity was, in former times, a real necessity. It was, no doubt, the chief reason, and a sufficient reason, for the existence of the popular assembly, in times past, under the rule of hereditary kings.

But that reason ceases to have any considerable importance, when a people has once finally achieved its liberty; when it has finally overthrown the system of inheritance in matters of state control; when it has finally conquered, as every civilized people must, and will, the right to frame its own political institutions, on its own free judgment. Then it can consider the popular assembly from a different standpoint; as the means of accomplishing a dif-

ferent political purpose; as the organ for forming and uttering the people's wisest thought, on public questions of large importance; as the organ for concentrating on single questions the united thought of the entire people; giving to that thought unity; and supporting it by the concentrated forces of the entire community.

The question here to be considered is: whether it is not possible — and practicable — for the popular assembly to accomplish this result just stated, in the regular daily working of a democratic government? Has not the popular assembly here its real function, in a system of genuine democracy?

In order to answer that question, it will be necessary to consider the actual operative processes of the popular assembly, in what may be termed its natural normal form.

Here we are not remitted to conjecture, or theory, or to any kind of doubt, or uncertainty, by reason of the absence of known facts. The popular assembly, in one or another form, with its members selected in one or another way, is not a thing new, or untried. Its existence began in times of remote antiquity. It has been used, to a greater or less extent, in many forms, by many peoples. It has always been used, though roughly and crudely, for the purpose now under consideration, the forming

and uttering of a people's joint common thought; although that purpose may not at the time have been publicly proclaimed, or fully appreciated. Its practical processes, and its practical results, are well ascertained.

What are they?

They are three: Conference, deliberation, and agreement. They are not, or should not be, processes of antagonism, and contest.

In any private or public assembly, composed of a reasonable number of reasonable men, having united common interests, met for joint action on those interests, those men begin their action with conference; with a bringing together of the different individual views, of the different individual men, as to the common course of action, on which they must in the end agree, — and unite. Next, they discuss — shake out, and weigh — those different individual views. In other words, they deliberate. In the last stage of their action, they come to an agreement, as to the common course of action, which they deem the best suited to accomplish the common purpose, and protect the common interests. Throughout the entire operation, from the beginning to the end, the process should be, and easily can be, one of coöperation; of men working together; not a process of antagonism, of contest. Different individ-

nals will have different individual views. They will express those views. Often it will happen, that the expression of those views will be accompanied with more or less warmth of feeling. But in the end, reasonable men, who have common interests, will almost invariably come to an agreement, as to a united common course of action, notwithstanding their original differences of opinion. Oftentimes, they will retain to the end their differences of opinion, yet will nevertheless agree on their common course of action. Oftentimes, too, they will change their opinions. Sensible men well understand, that, in the end, in order to accomplish any practical result, they must come to an agreement. Agreement must be their aim and purpose, from the beginning. Discussion, with sensible men, is a process of agreement. It involves, no doubt, a contest between ideas. But it should not, and need not, be a contest between men. The men — whatever they may think, are, or should be, working in harmony. They know, that that is the only way to work with efficiency. Indeed, it is the only way in which they can work at all; that is, it is the only way in which they can accomplish results. Free democratic government should not consist in continuous periodic contests between men — for places and votes. If a contest at all, it

should be a contest between ideas; a search after the truth; after the measures which will best protect the interests of the largest number. So far as concerns men, it should always be a process of co-operation.

“Party government” has been generally assumed to be a contest between policies; a struggle for the victory of one policy over another, in the persons of the men who have been believers in those policies. That has been the theory.

In fact, however, and in practice, “party government” has almost always been—in the main—a perpetual periodic contest for place; between organizations of professional politicians, many of whom may have sincerely believed in the policies, or principles, which they have professed, but whose immediate moving purpose has, after all, been the acquisition of the control of government, largely for the promotion of their own personal interests.

Now, even if we assume, contrary to the fact, that an entire community can possibly be divided into two or more adverse bodies of men, who really hold distinctly diverse political beliefs, on all, or on many, important public questions, nevertheless, a wise regard for public interests requires, that the citizens who compose those organizations should unite, should agree — on the wisest course of com-



mon action, notwithstanding their differences of belief. Public interests are very imperfectly promoted, indeed, they are almost invariably injured, by these perpetual periodic contests for the offices, even if the contestants have sincere differences of opinion. Notwithstanding those differences, public interests require, that the parties so differing should always come to an agreement, as to the common course of action. A people should think, and act, as a unit, as a single body, as a single organism, notwithstanding any differences of opinion, between different individuals, or groups of individuals, as to policies, or principles. And it is an easy possibility, if we abolish these perpetual periodic contests for place, that a people should so unite, on such course of combined common action, by the use of nature's regular political processes — conference, discussion, and agreement.

The advocates of "party government" so called, have generally assumed, that differences of opinion, between different individuals, or different groups of individuals, necessitate disagreement as to a course of action. Quite the reverse is the fact, with reasonable men. It is only the small minority of unreasonable irreconcilables, who always insist on having either their own way or none. Sensible men are well aware, that their own opinions are not invari-

ably certain to be right. They are well aware, that their own opinions, even if right, must often yield to the opinions of other men; who, on their part, have the same right to hold their opinions. Practical men, men of affairs, are well aware, that concession, concession on all sides, is not only a necessity in order to get action, but that it is, in the large majority of cases, the surest way of deciding what is really right, and wise, in the way of policy.

Light will be thrown on the point now under consideration, if we revert for a moment to the conditions under which the popular assembly has generally come into existence, in the previous development of democratic institutions.

In the rough rudimentary stages of civilization, when public questions are settled by brute force, when there is an absence of the rule of law, most people take temporary refuge in the one man power, in monarchy. Large public questions are then comparatively few in number. Society is crude, and undeveloped. It lives in a condition of turmoil and strife. Public questions are settled by an appeal to arms; by armies. Armies must be under single heads. Popular assemblies are not fitted to direct the operations of war. The practical result, then, is that in the ages of lawlessness and war, men take refuge in monarchy, as the only form of

government which is practicable, under then existing conditions.

But as conditions become more settled, as property increases, as social relations become more complex, and the need becomes imperative for the rule of law, it becomes more and more impossible, that any single mind should be equal to the supreme control of the public affairs of any large community. According to the ordinary idea, the most serious objection to monarchy is, that monarchy is a tyranny; that the monarch has a tendency to use his power as the head of the state, to serve his personal interests, rather than the interests of the whole people. And as matter of fact, there is no doubt that hereditary kings in the past have, frequently, if not generally, used their power with little or no regard for the best interests of the peoples. That fact, however, constitutes by no means the most serious practical objection to the institution of hereditary monarchy, or to monarchy of any kind, as a form of practical political organization, at the present day. The vital, fatal, objection to monarchy of any kind, as a form of political organization at the present day, is to be found in its utter mental inadequacy to the work of supreme supervision and control, in any large modern community. The work is too much for the brain of any one man,

even if he be a Napoleon. "War lords" are now an anachronism, by reason of their lack of brain power. They have become a political excrescence.

The same reason is conclusive, against vesting the supreme control of the public affairs of any large modern community in any hereditary oligarchy. An hereditary oligarchy will not give us adequate brain power.

We are led, from sheer necessity, to the use of the representative popular assembly, as the organ of supreme control in any large modern community, if for no other reason, in order to secure adequate brain power. Such a body of men may do the work imperfectly, inasmuch as they will be human. Especially, when first selected, the individual members of such an assembly will show the defects which invariably come from the lack of training and experience. If, however, the individual members are carefully and wisely selected, by reason of their capacity for affairs, and are then given time — to gain knowledge and experience, if, thereafter they are not compelled to curry favor with the populace, and are free to devote their combined energies to the thorough study of public questions and public interests — they will do the work of supervision and control far better than it can be done by any other available human agency.

The higher the stage of civilization reached by any community, the more clearly pronounced has been the tendency to government by representative popular assembly. The reason for that tendency is to be found in the growing general conviction, as yet somewhat vague and unformed, of the inadequacy of any other public organ to the large needs of our large modern communities. Government by popular assembly has not yet reached its highest stage of development. But towards that form of government the tendencies are clear. By no other means, by no other political organism, is it now a possibility to concentrate in a single head the political forces of any civilized people.

Still another point is here to be considered.

However imperfect an organ the popular assembly may be in its present stage of development, it is, even now, the only power, which can ever command the confidence of any free modern community. The great mass of citizens, in any free community, may be persuaded with comparative ease to have a reasonable degree of confidence in a body of men, who are the men of their own free choice. They will have complete confidence in no other public authority. Its supremacy, in the large modern community, is therefore inevitable.

But there is, no doubt, in the minds of many

men a deeply seated conviction, that the supreme power in the state should not be vested in any single authority; that no large power in the state should be concentrated in the hands of a single man, or body of men; that every power in the state should be divided, among different men, or bodies of men; and that democratic government, especially, should be government under a system of checks and balances.

Let us examine this idea.

So far as concerns administration, this idea is now well proved to be erroneous. Thoughtful men, generally, have come to a realizing sense, that, so far as concerns administration, we must have the concentration of power in single hands.

But many men, whose minds have gone as far as that, still shrink from taking the next step, to the conclusion that the power of final supreme control should be vested in any one body of men, even in an elective representative popular assembly. In the minds of such men, such vesting of the supreme control in any one body of men would mean the establishment of a new kind of tyranny.

We must, however, bring ourselves to comprehend, and realize, that under any and every conceivable form of government that can be devised,

the ultimate practical security for able and upright public administration must always be found in men; in the calibre, and character, of the men at the government's head. The only adequate security against the abuse of official power is to be found in the quality of the men to whom we intrust the power of final supreme control. The system of checks and balances has been fully tried, and has been found wanting. We must use in our public affairs the same methods which we use in private affairs. In private affairs, we place our dependence on men. We find no great difficulty in getting men who deserve our confidence. At times, that confidence is misplaced. Nevertheless, it is a well-recognized principle, that the men at the head of every large private enterprise, the men who are responsible for results, must have a free hand. They must be trusted. In large private affairs, the wisest administrators do not resort to the method of the distribution of one power among different men, or different bodies of men. Such a system results only in the destruction of responsibility, and efficiency.

Here we need not rest on theory. We have the teachings of experience in the history of the British House of Commons.

That House, in domestic affairs, is practically omnipotent. Its powers are restricted by no con-

stitution, written or unwritten. No considerable practical evil, or inconvenience, has ever resulted from the absence of limitations and restrictions on its power. Its supremacy has not resulted in tyranny, or abuse. Its supremacy has worked no considerable evil result. No authority in the state has ever yet been found so worthy of entire public confidence as a deliberative assembly, composed of reputable representative men. Such a body of men can be trusted, without restriction or reserve, to take wise action on all large questions of public interest, if they are only free and independent, if they are really supreme. Under any form of government, our dependence for the wise control of public affairs must be on some human agency. No human agency can be trusted with that control with so great security, with such freedom from danger, as a representative popular assembly, the members of which are the free choice of the people. As a last resort, under any possible form of government, we must depend on men — on the capacity, the judgment, and the honesty — of men. Constitutional restrictions, statutes, rules, and regulations, may be multiplied without number. With them, or without them, our final dependence must always be the wisdom, and integrity of men — of those



men, in whose hands we vest the power of supreme control.

We must recognize that fact, fully and finally. We must comprehend, fully and finally, that our security for a wise and upright administration of public affairs is to be found, not in the restriction of power, but in its enlargement; not in distrust, but in confidence.

In short, democratic government means freedom, independence — combined with genuine responsibility to the people — throughout the entire body politic; for public servants, as well as for their employers; for public officials, as well as the mass of citizens. Every public servant must be carefully selected. He must be held to constant thorough responsibility, in some way which will be really effective. But he must have freedom; the same freedom that wise administrators give to their employees in private employments. In private employments, we trust men. We give them our confidence. We find that to be the surest way of making them deserve our confidence. There is no atmosphere so certain to make men dishonest and inefficient, as the atmosphere of doubt and distrust.

Especially, we must abandon the attempt to

keep the chief executive under the direct control of the citizens in mass, by means of the term system. If the term system really did keep that control in the hands of the citizens, the case would be different. If we, the mass of citizens, were capable of exercising that control wisely, the case would be different. If we were able even to know the time, when it was necessary to exercise that control at all, the case would be different. In practice, no one of these things is possible. We, the mass of citizens, cannot, by any possibility, have that knowledge of the facts, which is absolutely necessary, in order merely to know the time when it will be wise, and safe, to make a change in the person of the chief executive, who must be the head of the entire administrative force. No body of men can possibly have that knowledge, except a body of men who are continually in close touch with the daily administration of public affairs.

In the end, the final security of the individual citizen, and of the state, must always depend on the power of free thought, and free speech; the power which constitutes the foundation of free democratic institutions. That is the power, which will be the power of supreme control in our popular assemblies, if we only give to those

assemblies freedom and time. We have been placing our dependence on checks and balances, on statutes and constitutions. Constitutions and statutes are good, in their proper places, for their proper purposes. But our final dependence, for honest and efficient administration, for a wise ordering of our public affairs, must always be in men; in the men at the head. Chains and checks will not meet our needs. If we tie men's hands to prevent them from doing wrong, we at the same time destroy their power to do right. Even if we change the men at the head periodically, we are still compelled to trust the men who are in high office during their terms. During that period, even those men, never the men of our own free choice, have to be trusted. Under any and every political system, our dependence for wise and upright administration must always be the men at the government's head.

Hitherto — for the time — we have been distrusting the power of freedom, of free thought, and free action, which is, and always must be, the power of propulsion, and of control, in every free democratic government.

There is no piece of political machinery, so destructive of political freedom, of political free

thought, political free speech, and political free action, as this term system. Under it, everything is subordinated to the necessity of carrying the next election. Every citizen must join, and act with, one or another "party." The machine politicians, generally controlled by the power of money, virtually decide and control all questions of public policy. Often, if not generally, those questions are decided by the concerted action of the politicians in both great "parties," acting in combination. Public measures, to use the phrase of the day, are "jammed through." The phrase is not attractive. But, like all phrases which work their way into the language of the time, it stands for a fact. It is to-day the fact, that the most important public measures, which are—in form—adopted by our so-called popular assemblies, are "jammed through," by the commands of the machine politicians, who, in their turn, are controlled by money. Free thought, and free speech, as regular processes in the daily transaction of our public business, by our public servants, so called, have—for the time—almost fallen into disuse. The reason for that state of things is, in the main, to be found in the term system, this system of perpetual periodic "popular election," falsely so

called. It is this system of tenure by election, which is responsible for the present suppression of free thought and free speech, which ought to be the forces of supreme control in our daily political life.

We must abandon it. We must abandon the attempt, in any form, to vest the supreme control of the body politic in the entire body of citizens in mass. The supreme power in the body politic must be the popular assembly.

But then we strike another point.

If the popular assembly is to be a body of men capable of exercising this power of supreme control wisely, it must be composed of men who are able and upright; of the community's best men; men who command the confidence of their fellow citizens; men who are selected by their fellow men by reason of their superior abilities and character.

How are we to get men of that kind?

Only by the machinery of popular election. But that machinery must be so framed that the process of popular election will be really free; so as to make it practicable for the citizens to make their own free choice of their representatives on their own best judgment.

How can that result be accomplished in prac-

tice? How can the members of the popular assembly be selected in such a way as to make them really the people's free choice? What form of the process of popular election can we devise, which will insure that the selection of the men at the head of the body politic shall be really an act of the people's own deliberate judgment?

That brings us to the consideration of our next political law, the law which decides the form of the process of popular election.

It is this:—

### III. THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY MUST BE THE ORGAN FOR FORMING AND UTTERING THE PEOPLE'S JUDGMENT IN THE SELECTION OF MEN.

Popular election, in some form, as the process for the selection of the men at the head of the state, would seem to be almost a logical necessity, in any state termed democratic. No other method would be deemed possible.

The commonly accepted reason, thus far, for the use of the process of popular election in the selection of the highest public officials, has been its supposed necessity as a security for the people's rights and liberties. Many men might concede, that the process of popular election is not

the one best fitted to secure the selection of the men most fit for the public service; that it does not give any high degree of certainty for getting the right man in the right place; which must always be the first essential to efficiency of administration, and to good government in general.

My contention, however, is, that the process of popular election, used in the right form, and within right limitations, is the best available practical process, for the selection of the few men who are to be the head of every body politic. If the process can be made to take such a form, that it shall be a real act of judgment, by the people, on the fitness of single men for single places; if the process can be made to take such form as to give us the people's calm deliberate judgment, as to the character and capacity of the men for whom they vote, then, no other process can be devised, which is so certain in my belief to secure a wise selection of the men who are to fill the highest places in the government. Especially, no other process can be devised, which will insure the selection of men who will be so sure to command the people's confidence. And that is a thing of vital importance.

Of course, we must have some form of the process, which shall give us something more than

an aggregation of individual assents, to some "party ticket," in the making of which the citizens have virtually no voice. Of course, we must have some form of the process, which will make the act of popular election an act of deliberation, an act of judgment, on the part of the entire people. If, however, we can get such a form of the process — then we shall have the best means yet devised, for the selection of our chief executives, and of the men who are to hold the position of final supreme control, the men who are to be the state's brain; the men who are to control its chief executive, and through him handle the entire forces of government.

Not only should the act of popular election be an act of judgment; but that judgment, if it is to have any substantial value for the practical purposes of government, should be a judgment on the fitness of separate individuals, for the special work of their separate places. One man will be useful in a deliberative body, for advice and counsel; for the discussion and decision of large broad questions of public policy. But he may be most unfit, to be chief executive. He may be a man of weak will; a man devoid of executive force; a man without discretion, without nerve; of unsound judgment; a man with-



out practical experience in administration. For any one of many reasons, he may be extremely ill fitted to be a chief executive. Consequently, the process of popular election must have such form, as will make it possible to pass judgment on single men separately, on a due consideration of their individual fitness, for the work of special offices.

It is quite evident, that no such result as that is possible from our present combination of the separate ballot and the term system. Hardly any one would contend, that these frequent periodic elections, so called, give us anything that can be accurately termed a judgment of the people, on the fitness of individual men for special work; or, in general, on the fitness of any man for any work. At best, they give us men who chance at the time to be "popular." But such men may be most dangerous and pernicious, if put in control of the forces of the state.

We must then devise some other form of the process. We must devise a form that will be simple, easy of operation, and inexpensive; one which will make only reasonable demands on the time and energies of the individual citizen; demands which he can meet with ease, with no undue sacrifice of his own individual interests.

But, above all things, our efforts will be fruitless, unless we can devise some form of the process of popular election, which will enable a people to think, and deliberate, as a people; to form its united common judgment, as a people, at the time, and in the act, of voting, on the fitness of single men, for work of a single kind.

Can we devise a form of the process, which will meet these requirements?

My answer to this question is, that we can at once find such a form, by simply reverting to the old-fashioned natural procedure, which was in use in this country successfully, for many years, until the experiment was made quite early in our political history in the use of the separate secret ballot.

The process in use in this country before the separate secret ballot was that of *viva voce* voting in the public meeting. The use of the process of popular election was then mainly limited to the election of single men, to be the representatives of single towns, in the early colonial and state legislatures. The individual citizens came together in the town meeting. In addition to their regular town business, they would elect their representative to the colonial or state

legislature, the "general court," the body which acted on behalf of the whole people, upon all questions of general public interest. The process of election was simple, and easy. Nominations were made by any one who wished. They could be made up to the last moment, even after the voting began, or after it had continued for a long time. The process of nomination had complete freedom. There was complete freedom of discussion, at the time, and in the act, of voting. Discussion was had on the merits of candidates, on their fitness for the special work which they were to do. The discussion could concern all points, which would bear on the fitness of the men for their particular work; their ability, their character, their opinions on public questions, if those opinions had at the time any practical importance. Each individual citizen had something more than his individual vote. He had also his individual weight, in guiding and influencing the votes of other men. In reaching the final result, citizens were not merely counted. They were weighed. Their opinions were weighed. As nearly as such a result is practicable by finite human agencies, the opinions of different individual citizens got the full weight that they deserved. The practical result was,

in the large majority of cases, that the representatives so chosen by the old town meetings, were the community's ablest men, the men of character, the successful men; the men who had achieved success by steady hard work, and honesty. They were not the community's unemployed. They were not the community's refuse.

So much for the working of that process in the case of a single town, or of any small community, the numbers of which would allow all its citizens to meet, and act, in a single deliberative body.

Let us next see how the process could be adapted to the case of a community of larger numbers.

It is easy to see, that if it were the case of electing a representative of the colony or a state to a higher popular assembly, which should act for many colonies, or many states, the "general court" already chosen as stated could at once elect such new representative by the same simple process. It is easily seen, that the machinery of representation can be adapted without limit, in a succession of electoral colleges, as the machinery of the process of popular election. By changes in figures, it can be adapted to voting constituencies of any numbers.

By way of illustration, let us take a constituency, let us say, of two hundred and fifty thousand voters; which would ordinarily correspond to a total population of about one million two hundred and fifty thousand persons. A community of that size would comprise five hundred primary districts, each having five hundred voting citizens. If, then, the voters in each primary district met in one body, and elected one representative; and the five hundred representatives so chosen afterwards met in an electoral college, to elect one or more public officials, we should then have this result. At each of these two stages, the meeting of citizens in the primary district, and the subsequent meeting of the representatives in an electoral college, each process, that of nomination, of public discussion, and voting, would have complete freedom. In the primary election district, the citizens would have complete freedom — of nomination, of discussion, and voting — in the choice of their representative. In the resulting electoral college of those representatives, those representatives would in their turn have complete freedom — of nomination, of discussion, and voting — in the choice of public officials.

The entire process, from the beginning to the

end, is simple in the extreme. It is the process of nature. It has the simplicity of nature.

This was the process, by the use of which were selected the members of our colonial legislatures, our early constitutional conventions, the conventions which uttered the Declaration of Independence, the members of the Continental Congress, the members of the Convention which drafted our National Constitution, the members of the different state conventions which adopted it, the members of the conventions which drafted our early state constitutions, and the members of our early state legislatures. By this process, with unimportant variations, were selected practically all the men, who did such remarkable statesmen's work in our early political history. The men so selected were invariably the community's ablest and most upright men.

It is the process best fitted, in all ordinary cases, to insure the best practical results in the selection of men, for the highest places in the body politic.

Let us consider the reason of the thing.

With men who have reached such a degree of civilization that they demand free democratic institutions, it is simply human nature, that they

will vote as to the fitness of candidates for high public office on their best judgment. Every man, of ordinary intelligence, of ordinary common sense, when he casts his vote for the men who are to act for him, in making and enforcing laws, in providing for the protection and well-being of himself, his family, and his fellows, will, almost as matter of instinct, vote for men of ability and character, if he has the full and free opportunity so to do. He will not willingly vote for the unemployed; for men who are unknown; for men whose services are so valueless, that no one employs them. Every ordinary man, of ordinary common sense, at least intends, and attempts, to get the best servants, and the best service, that he can; in public affairs, as well as private.

It may be said, that conditions with us to-day are different from what they were a hundred years ago; that we have since that time had in our large cities a large influx of ignorant foreign immigrants; and that the same governmental methods cannot be used by our present heterogeneous urban populations, that could be used by our native population in the early part of the nineteenth century. Especially, it will be said, that in our large cities, the ignorant are

in a majority, and that they will outweigh, and outvote, the educated minority.

But the practical question is, how are we to get the best process of popular election, for our existing population, such as it is. Even ignorant and uneducated men will act more wisely, with freedom of nomination, discussion, and voting, than without it. Even ignorant and uneducated men will do better work in the process of election when free, than in the chains of the election machine. Even men who are ignorant and uneducated wish to get the best servants, and the best service, which they know how to get.

But this idea as to the ignorance and incapacity of the voters in our large cities does great injustice, in my opinion, to the population of our large communities at the present day.

Both the voters and the machine politicians, in our large cities, are of the same character, and the same quality, as in the country. The only difference is, that public affairs in the cities are on a larger scale than in the country; and, consequently, the practical results are on a larger scale. Abuses and evils in the cities are more visible to the eye. They exist, in both places, in about the same proportions. There is



as much political corruption, and political misconduct, in the one as in the other. The difference is in magnitude, not proportion.

Furthermore, as to the distinction between our population of a century ago and our population of to-day, with its increased urban majorities, the advantage, in both mental alertness and political intelligence, is in my opinion largely on the side of the population of to-day. Its stores of political knowledge, that is, of practical political knowledge, are larger than ever before. The public press is larger, abler, better equipped for public service, than ever before. Whatever may be the differences between the American people of to-day and the American people in the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has undoubtedly been a great increase in the volume of our political knowledge. It may be conceded, and it is my contention, that, for the time, we have allowed the process of united common thought, of united public deliberation, as a regular process in our daily political life, to fall into disuse. But the process is not lost. Rational public discussion of public questions is not one of the "lost arts." It will revive. It will revive soon. This American people is becoming restless — is getting weary,

of having important public measures crowded through by mere brute force, under the dictation of the machine politicians. It is beginning to yearn again for the atmosphere of free political thought, and free political action, by the process of free public discussion; the only process which is suited to the needs, or the genius, of free democratic government. We need be under no fear, as to the permanence of the power of free thought, and free speech; or as to the absolute certainty, that they will again become the forces of supreme control, in practical politics. They will do so soon.

But this consideration of possible differences between our population to-day and a century ago, either in city or country, or in both, is after all quite aside from the practical point at issue. Whether our population to-day be a little more or a little less intelligent and moral, than it was a hundred years ago, matters very little, in the consideration of the practical operation of the process of popular election. The point of practical importance is this: that the old process of *viva voce* voting, in the public meeting, by both citizens and their duly elected representatives, is the only process whereby either citizens or the community can secure genuine freedom,

of either thought or action; and that both the citizens and the community can accomplish better practical results, with such freedom of thought and action, than without it. In short, they can accomplish better working results, with a free head, and a free hand, than they can in the fetters of the election machine.

Let us next consider some others of the practical features of this simple natural machinery of the public meeting, used at each stage of the process of popular election.

In the first place, we must note its extreme simplicity. Nothing can be more simple. Citizens who can operate the process of popular election in any form, can operate it in this form. It involves no outside machinery of caucuses, and conventions, to be manipulated beforehand. Any one can comprehend the process. Any one can take his part in it. If a citizen wishes to make a nomination, all that he has to do is, to "stand up in meeting," and make his nomination. After the nominations are made, the process of voting is as simple as that of nomination. The voting can be an ordinary standing vote, if that is all that is desired. If it is desired to have something more, and generally that should be desired, then there may be the roll call of the

citizens; and each man can vote when his name is called, for the candidate of his own choice. No machinery can be more simple. It is the simplicity of nature.

In the next place, the process is inexpensive. It requires no printing of ballots, or "tickets," general or special. There need be no inspectors of election, or other officials, either for the receiving nominations, or the counting of votes. Every citizen will be an inspector of election. Every citizen can keep his own count of the votes. Money expenditure is reduced to the minimum; almost to a single item, that of the hire of a hall for each public meeting; first, of the citizens in the primary election districts; and afterwards, of conventions of delegates.

Next, the securities against fraud are simple in the extreme; and at the same time as complete as it is possible to make them. False personation, fraudulent registration, fraudulent voting, are all made so difficult of execution, and certain of detection, as to make their abolition nearly certain. The citizens who live in any one neighborhood will meet together. Thereby they will have the strongest practicable security against fraud of any kind, either in registration, personation, voting, or counting of votes.

But the chief point is, that this process is the only one, which gives us the possibility — of complete freedom of action, of both citizen and the people; which gives so much as the possibility — of getting the best judgment of both. Free, open, public discussion — at the time, and in the act — of nominating — and voting — at each stage of the process, both in the choice of delegates and in the final choice of public officials, that is the possibility — which we have with the simple, old-fashioned, well-proved process of the public meeting. It is a possibility, which we can get in no other way.

Therein we have the essential distinction between the practical operation of the process of the separate secret ballot, and the process of the public meeting. The one makes freedom of action — either for the citizen, or the community — an impossibility. The other makes that freedom complete. The distinction is essential, vital, and fundamental. The one process is that of free democratic government; the only one, whereby either the citizen or the people can secure freedom — in its selection of its public servants. The other insures — absolutely — and certainly — the supremacy of the election machine.

Have we lost sight — forever — of the essential vital necessity, of free public conference, of free public discussion, as the only practicable means of influencing men by reasonable argument, in their action on public as well as private questions; and especially, in their action in the choice of public officials?

As to the answer to this question, my own mind is free from doubt. The process of free public deliberation has, no doubt, for the time, gone into eclipse. It has, for the time, almost disappeared from our daily governmental processes. But men have not ceased to be intelligent, thinking, reasoning, and reasonable beings. Sound thought has not lost its power, as a force in practical politics. Even now, our entire machinery of popular election goes on the assumption, an assumption rightly made, that the mass of individual citizens can be influenced, in casting their votes, by reasonable argument.

But the chief practical difficulty, under which we have been laboring in late years in the operation of our election machinery has been the overwhelming strength of "party" feeling, and "party" obligations. The most powerful foe to free thought, with us to-day, is to be found in the ties and obligations of "party." No doubt

men are gradually coming to greater independence of action in voting; are gradually coming to greater independence of party influence. But the power of that influence has in late years been so great, as to almost destroy the practical value of the ballot. The chief purpose, in giving the citizen the ballot at all, is that he should vote on the fitness of candidates on his individual judgment. In practice, however, the vast majority of the citizens virtually disregard their own individual judgments. In the vast majority of cases, we vote, blindly, and regularly, for our regular "party" candidates. We find any other course impracticable, with our present political machinery. Thereby, we virtually disfranchise ourselves, and defeat the fundamental purpose for which the ballot has its existence.

This condition in affairs is due, almost entirely, to the use of the separate secret ballot. The use of the separate ballot has made conference and public discussion a practical impossibility, in the process of popular election.

No way can be devised, so far as my lights go, whereby the citizen can be emancipated from his slavery to the great "party" organizations, from his slavery to the election machine, except to return to the use of the public meet-

ing, as the organ to be used in the process of popular election.

But it will be said, any system of *viva voce* voting will destroy secrecy, and subject the voter to corrupt influences.

This view has had, now for many years, the almost unanimous support of writers on political subjects.

It is, in my opinion, radically erroneous.

Let us look at the reason of the thing.

In the first place, open public discussion, with open public voting, affords the best practicable opportunity, to enable the wise and upright, the honest and respectable men in the community, to influence the votes of their fellow citizens, by the legitimate methods of reasonable argument, by the force of their own presence, and their own example. Then, too, it is only the disreputable candidates, who will lose by the process of *viva voce* voting. No man is ever deterred by publicity, from voting for men who are reputable and respectable. Secrecy in voting is needed only by men who are ashamed of the quality of their action. Secrecy is a protection, only for action which should not be protected. It is wholly opposed to the genius of free democratic institutions.



But we have here another point. Every citizen, in deciding his own action in voting for public officials, is entitled, of right, to the advice, and example, of his fellows; especially of those who are abler and wiser than himself. Moreover, his fellows are entitled, of right, to that opportunity to advise and influence him. If it be said, that the voter, when compelled to vote openly, will be subjected to influence, the answer is, that he ought to be subjected to the influence of the wise and upright. No man has the right, in a free democratic government, to conceal his action. Publicity is the strongest possible security for purity. Publicity is political sunlight. No man wishes secrecy, who intends to vote on his convictions of the right. It is only those men who plan mischief to the state, who desire secrecy. Those men should not have that protection. They should be dragged into the open. They should be compelled to vote in the face of their fellow men. Responsibility to the people, under a democratic government, should begin with the responsibility of the individual citizen, for his individual action in casting his vote. That responsibility can be enforced in only one way — by publicity; by having the action of the individual citizen open and above

board, in the presence of his fellows. The "influence" to which the citizen will be subjected, in the process of *viva voce* voting, will be an influence only for good.

Moreover, free public discussion, at the time, and in the act, of voting, is the only means, whereby it is possible in the process of popular election to secure to each citizen his due weight—in the choice of our highest public servants. Our present machinery is a machinery for counting noses. The public meeting is a machinery for weighing brains; for weighing ideas; for giving to each man his due weight, in producing the final result; for securing to each citizen his legitimate influence over the action of his fellows. Thereby he has his legitimate opportunity for moving other men, by his advice, and his example. Of that opportunity he is almost wholly deprived by the separate secret ballot. By the secret ballot, we tend to put all men on a dead level. We make every individual count only for one. But men of weight and influence ought to count in proportion to their weight and influence. No political process can make it an absolute certainty—that they will so count. But the process of the public meeting gives a much greater possibility of that result, than the separate secret ballot.

And it gives us the greatest certainty that is practicable, under any process.

It may be said, too, that the *viva voce* process makes it possible to buy voters, and make sure of their votes.

There is no doubt, that the *viva voce* process would give the opportunity of knowing how each individual citizen voted; and would, in that way, and to that extent, make possible the purchase of votes.

On the other hand, however, the *viva voce* process in the public meeting will give to the honest citizen the possibility of knowing what voters are purchased; and of bringing to bear on those voters the full weight of public opinion, and public indignation.

But this buying of votes under our present machinery is much misunderstood. With the present methods of the machine politicians, the payment for votes is generally made contingent on results; and consists mainly in the favorable use of political power after election, not in the use of money before election.

There can be no security so complete, against the purchase of votes, as the process of voting in public. With open public voting, the buyers and sellers of votes will be known. It will sel-

dom be difficult to detect them. In the end, the security against buying and selling votes must always finally rest in the community's common conscience. That conscience will have the best field for its operation, with publicity in the act of voting.

But this danger of buying and selling votes, such as it is, will always exist, under any form of the process of voting. The method now is, to buy votes at wholesale, by buying the magnates of the election machine. The operation is made all the more easy, for the reason that we, the voters, who are bought and sold, are not aware of the fact. Under the supremacy of the election machine, the votes of all of us, in each of the "grand old parties," are bought and sold, by the thousand, and the million. We, the voting citizens, are bought and sold, in herds, like so many sheep, following year after year our old political bell-wethers. Why make such a pother about buying a few votes at retail, when our present political masters are continually selling our votes at wholesale? The purchase of votes will be decreased, by giving to the voters the fullest knowledge of the facts, so that the public conscience, and public opinion, can have their full legitimate effect upon each individual voter.

Let us sum up this branch of our study.

The act of prime importance in any system of democratic government, or in government of any kind, is the selection of the men who are to be the state's head; the power of supreme control in the daily conduct of public affairs. All other functions in the state are of comparatively slight importance in comparison with this, the selection of the people's highest public servants, their elected rulers. On those men we must always depend, for the wisdom and efficiency of our public administration.

Consequently, it is of vital importance, that our organization for the selection of those men should be as perfect as we can make it. At best, it will be imperfect. But we must make it as perfect as we can.

In order to make it as perfect as we can, we must use the well-tried process of combination, of conference, of joint deliberation, of united common thought, by the entire community, thinking and acting as one body, in the act of selecting those men. The selection of those men, above all things, must be the act of the people's combined concentrated judgment, the product of its best thought. That product, in the act of popular election, can be obtained by no possible process, by the use of

no possible organ, other than the popular assembly; the assembly of the entire community, meeting and acting in one body, in the persons of all its voting citizens, when their numbers will permit; in the persons of their elected representatives, when the numbers of the citizens are too large to permit them to meet and act as a single deliberative body.

It is to be noted at this point, that some such organization as is here considered, an electoral college of elected representatives, for the choice of the President of the United States, was evidently in the contemplation of the framers of our national constitution, when they provided for the choice of presidential electors. There was, however, this singular fundamental omission; the omission of any provision whereby these electors could meet, as one body, for joint action in the act of election. This omission was fatal. It effectually prevented the possibility of independent deliberative action on the part of those electors. If there had been such a provision, permitting independent original action by those presidential electors, as one body, we should doubtless have seen a very different course of events in the choice of our Presidents. It might then have been, that the choice of those Presidents would have been made a real act of

judgment, instead of a mere counting of the numbers of the men who could be induced to "rally" around one or another "party standard." We might not have had such a predominance of drum and trumpet politics, of politics of the brass band.

However that may be, it is evident, that in the future, in the selection of the mayors of our large cities, the governors of our states, the Presidents of the nation, and the members of our popular assemblies, we must have something better than the mere possibility of a choice between two or more "party tickets," constructed by machine politicians, in the making of which the citizens, and the people, have — virtually — no voice. We must have a process of popular election, which will insure free popular action; which will enable us to get a real judgment of the people, thinking, and acting, as one organism, on the fitness of single men, for single places.

Such thought, and action, are possible — only by the use of the popular assembly, as the organ for forming and uttering the people's judgment, on questions of men as well as measures.

The results, then, of this branch of our study as to the form of organized democracy, are the following three conclusions:—

I. Administration must be single-headed.

- II. The organ of supreme control in the body politic must be the popular assembly.
- III. The popular assembly must be the organ for forming and uttering the people's judgment, in the selection of men.

These conclusions involve the adoption of nothing new or untried in political machinery. Single-headed administration is as old as monarchy. Indeed, it is in single-headed administration, that monarchy has its one desirable feature. It is in single-headed administration, that monarchy has in all ages shown such superiority as it possesses — as a practical political institution. All human experience shows that the organization under single heads is the only form of administrative organization, which will enforce responsibility, and insure efficiency.

The popular assembly, too, is the only organ which has ever been devised, or used, whereby any people can form and utter its own free judgment, or its own free will, whether as to measures or men. The separate individual ballot may enable the mass of separate individual citizens to express their individual preferences between two or more "tickets." But it will not enable the ordinary individual citizen to have any freedom of action, or his rightful weight and influence, in the selection



of public officials. It will not enable a people to go through the process of joint deliberation, as a people; to form its own judgment, as a people. The only organ, by which it is possible, either for the citizen to have a free active part in the process of popular election, or for a people to form its own free judgment in the choice of its rulers, is the popular assembly.

These three laws, it is submitted, state the essentials of organized democracy. They are deduced from experience; mainly from our own experience, the largest in all history in the operation of democratic institutions.

Summed up in a single phrase, the entire scheme here submitted may be stated to be — the establishment of government by the people, acting as a unit in its representative popular assembly. In matters of administration, the popular assembly would act through a single chief executive, elected by the people, directly and continuously responsible to the people in its popular assembly. The popular assembly would be used as the organ for forming and uttering the people's judgment, and the people's will, as to both measures and

The forces of administration would be concentrated, and controlled, under a chief executive; who would be directly and continuously under

the immediate supervision and control of the popular assembly. Administrative responsibility would be single and complete throughout; culminating in the responsibility of the single chief executive to a body of men of exceptional ability, of full and accurate knowledge, who would be at all times closely in touch with the entire range of public affairs.

The changes here suggested strike at the very roots of the causes of the existence of the election machine.

The process of popular election, it is seen, would have its work reduced to a minimum. It would cease to be annual and continuous. It would be simple in form, easy of operation, free from the necessity of large money expenditure. It would be used only for electing the few men at each government's head; the chief executives, and the members of the different popular assemblies, national, state, and local. The form of the process used would be that of open *viva voce* action, in the act of nomination, discussion, and voting, in the successive popular assemblies; those assemblies, in the primary election districts, being composed of the voting citizens; in the higher assemblies, of their duly elected representatives.

There is the sum and substance of the entire scheme, so far as concerns its form.

The fundamental idea, on which the scheme rests, is the supremacy, in each body politic, in each town, city, state, and the nation, of the will, and judgment, of the entire community; conferring, deliberating, forming its common judgment, and its common will, in one body, as a unit, upon all public questions, whether of measures or men.

The scheme here suggested meets at once, directly and effectively, the chief practical obstacle, which now stands in the way of giving to the people the free choice of its own chief rulers, by reducing to reasonable proportions our present immense mass of election work, and simplifying its machinery.

We have seen, that the fundamental fact, which destroys the possibility of a free choice of their rulers by the people under our present system, lies in the volume, and the intricacy, of this permanent periodic mass of election work, which is forced upon us by the term system, in connection with the direct secret ballot. The votes of our large modern constituencies cannot be handled under our present system, without these correspondingly large election organizations, which we term "parties." That difficulty is met directly. It is completely obliterated from the operation of our governmental machinery. We reduce to the

lowest point, both the number of elective offices, and the frequency of elections. We destroy the periodic permanence of this election work. We simplify the election machinery. We make that machinery workable, with the expenditure by the citizens of a reasonable amount of time.

This form of electoral machinery makes it practicable for the citizen to take an active part in each separate stage of the process of popular election; nomination, discussion, and voting. The secret ballot effectually bars the citizen from taking part in the acts of nomination and common discussion. It sterilizes him. It virtually reduces him to the position, and function, of a vermiform appendix.

The scheme would make an immense reduction of money expenditure in our process of popular election. Consider the expenditure, in time, and money, involved in this never ending cycle of revolutions, which we term "popular elections." Any one of our annual elections, in only a single large city, now costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. Any one of our quadrennial presidential elections costs many millions.

Nearly all that money outlay would be avoided. We should take away the need, and to a great extent, the use, of money, in the regular manipulation of our election machinery. Instead of having

these costly annual contests between bodies of professional politicians for the control of our different governments, we should have simple inexpensive elections of their public servants by the citizens, when required to fill vacancies. The money cost of the process of popular election, when used, would be reduced to its lowest figure. In a voting constituency of two hundred and fifty thousand, which would be the approximate number of voters in a population of one million, the entire cost of an election would consist of the rent of a hall in each primary election district of about five hundred voters, for the choice of a delegate by the voting citizens in that district; with the rent of another hall, for the meeting of the assembly of the delegates so chosen, for the election of the representatives, or chief executive, to be chosen by that constituency. All expenditure for printing ballots, and for election officials, would be avoided. So, too, all the cost of campaign meetings, and general campaign operations, would be made unnecessary; inasmuch as the only discussion which would have any practical bearing on the result would be the discussion of the citizens themselves in the primary meetings, and of their representatives in the representative electoral colleges. The saving in mere money expenditure would be beyond calculation.

The larger the constituency, the larger will be the saving of money. A single additional series of representative electoral assemblies would adapt the machinery to a constituency of one hundred and twenty-five million voters; which would represent approximately an entire population of over six hundred million persons. Slight changes in the numbers, of the citizens voting in the primary districts, and of the delegates in the different electoral assemblies, would adapt the machinery to constituencies of any size. In all constituencies, large and small, the money expenditure of operating the machinery is reduced to a minimum.

In the next place, this plan of reorganization would secure the outside possible degree of political freedom — for the individual citizen, and the entire people.

Under any possible political system, the outside possibilities of the active part, which the individual citizen can take in the actual operation of the government of any large community, must be limited to his action in the selection of the men at the government's head. More than that he cannot secure, in the way of political activity, under any form of political machinery that the wit of man has yet devised.

In that process of popular election, we have

already seen the practical result, which is always certain to come from the attempt to have the citizen do too much. Such an attempt takes the process of election altogether out of his hands, so far as concerns any brain work, any substantial degree of political power, or any free political action. It limits his action to the mere deposit of a ballot. He loses his part in the more important acts, of nomination, and public discussion of the qualifications of candidates. His action becomes almost purely mechanical. He loses his political freedom.

The scheme here under consideration, however, will give to the citizen, and to the people, the most complete measure of freedom, that is possible under any political system. In the process of popular election here submitted, each individual citizen, in each primary assembly, will have complete freedom, — of combination, of nomination, of public discussion, and of voting. Machine politicians may make as many “tickets” as they see fit. Thereafter, when the citizens come together in their primary meetings, they will be able to oppose combinations made beforehand by the politicians, with combinations made on the spot by themselves. They will be able to make new nominations without limit; and support those new nominations in open public debate; with the

fullest possibility of allowing every citizen to act on his own free judgment. Greater freedom of action than that, it is impossible to secure by any process conceivable. In comparison with the slavery under which we now exist, the difference between the plan here proposed and the system we now use, is the difference between daylight and darkness.

In addition to this point, however, we have the further one, that the abolition of the term system will destroy this permanent supply of political prizes, and the permanence of occupation, which constitute the reason of the existence of the machine politician. It is this annual mass of vacant offices, this annual collection of election prizes, which furnishes the means of payment from our public treasuries, of our great standing armies of machine politicians. Take away this periodic mass of vacant offices, and the machine politicians will be compelled to betake themselves to other employments.

The disappearance of these standing armies of professionals, which must take place when we abolish their occupation, and their field of plunder, will make it possible for each body politic to make its own free choice of its public officials, upon its own best judgment of the individual fitness of those men for the special work of their special offices.



That result is an impossibility — unless the people has full freedom of action in the process of popular election. That process is the fundamental process in democratic government.

The next point is, that this scheme of reorganization will greatly enlarge the citizen's field of political activity, and the citizen's political power.

Can anything be more dismally unsatisfactory, as the aggregate of the citizen's political activities, than this present ridiculous practice, of putting "his mark" against a single name, or against a "ticket," placed before the voter by different factions of machine politicians? Can there be a more complete surrender of the elective franchise, in practice, than is involved in the actual operation of our present election machinery, under which the vast majority of the citizens become mere puppets, to be manipulated by professional politicians?

If, however, we so reduce the volume of our election work, and so simplify its machinery, as to bring its operation within the possibilities of busy workingmen, then every citizen, when he comes to act in the process of popular election, can have his full opportunity of taking part in the entire process: that of nomination, of public discussion, and the final vote. He will be able to perform the entire process at once. He can have

that degree of practical influence in the process, which is due to his capacity and character. He can do something more than count as one unit. He will have his legitimate individual weight, at the time, and in the act, of voting.

In the next place, such a reorganization will secure the wisest practicable administration of public affairs.

Every large body of men must always depend for its working capacity on the men at its head; on their calibre, their character, and their training. For the selection of those men at the head, in each and every body politic, no process is so certain to give the best practical results, in the large majority of cases, as the process of popular election, used in its proper form, and within its proper limits. Citizens who act in their public meeting, when their action is free, will not choose men who are unknown; men who have no reputations at all. Neither will they choose men whose reputations are bad. No doubt, where the entire mass of citizens vote in chains, where the only choice allowed them is one between the "tickets" of machine politicians, then we must expect that the process of "popular election," if we dignify it with that name, will give very unsatisfactory results. It will often give us men, who have either no repu-

tations or bad ones. But whenever the action of any people is free, whenever a community is free to make its own choice of men on its own judgment, then it is as near to a certainty as we can get in human affairs, that that people's choice will be of men well known, of men who have acquired reputations; consequently, of men of high calibre and character.

Here we have the essential fundamental basis of democratic institutions. It consists in the fact, that the instincts of "the people," the judgment of "the people," the sound common sense of "the people," when that people has genuine freedom — of thought, public discussion, and action — furnishes the best available agency, for the selection of the men who are to be the head of the state.

In the next place, this scheme of reorganization will promote public purity, will raise the people's moral standards, in both politics and private life. It will so organize the body politic, as to make honesty and fidelity pay; make them bring large rewards; as they do in private callings. It will make public officials' personal interests coincide with their public duties. Success in public life, as in private life, must be made to depend on faithful service, on good conduct. In order that our public servants may act up to their own highest standards, they must be

free. At the same time, they must have security for permanence of employment. That security must depend solely on the quality of their work. But the man who is always under the necessity of carrying the next election, as a condition of continuing his political life, is not a free man. He is the slave of the election machine. He depends for his tenure of his place, not on the quality of his work, but on his value to the election machine. Every public official, who holds an elective office under our present term system, is well aware that his political existence, and his political advancement, depend on the grace of the politicians. It is seldom that any man who has political aspirations will venture to offend them. By one means or another, he will find a way to do their bidding. Every public official, who shows genuine political independence, is certain, sooner or later, to be barred from public life. It is to-day, in this country, practically an impossibility — for a man in public life to keep his independence, and “stay in politics.” Protestations of devotion to public interest we have in abundance. They are often, if not generally, made with sincerity. But the makers promise more than they can perform. When it comes to the moment of final pressure, almost invariably they succeed in finding some means of working the will

of their masters, while saving outside appearances. The power of the machine politicians is well-nigh absolute. They rule their servants with a rod of iron.

The community's workers, the men who have achieved success by legitimate methods, by honest hard work, find it almost impossible at present to enter our public service. The reason for that fact is found in our term system. Those men will gladly, eagerly, enter the public service, provided they can do so on conditions that will not involve the sacrifice of their self-respect, and will give them the usual securities, for a reasonable money income, and a reputation rightly proportioned to their deserts. Public callings, under present conditions, make it a virtual certainty — that honest, faithful service to public interests will not secure its due reward. Nothing can so demoralize our public service. Nothing can make it so certain, that the community's best men will keep out of that service. The situation is the natural inevitable product of our term system, which causes these perpetual revolutions in the men at the government's head, so that their only chance of continuance in the service depends on the will of the machine politicians. The result is due to the political mechanics. It is as sure as sunrise.

These conditions are not the conditions of democracy. They do not secure the realization of the will of the people, or of the dictates of the people's judgment.

The abolition of the term system, combined with the substitution of a process of popular election, whereby citizens can have genuine freedom of political action, will make two things possible: first, the people will be able to elect to the highest public offices, to the places of supreme control, the men of its own free choice; second, those men, after they are elected, will be free and independent; and, at the same time, they will be under a system of continuous effective responsibility to the people, acting in its popular assembly. They will be able to live up to their own convictions. They will have the possibility of being statesmen. And the people will have the possibility — of genuine democratic government.

In short, with such reorganization as is here proposed, we should secure at least the possibility — of improvement. We should secure at least the possibility — of getting our ablest men at the head of our different governments, local, state, and national; and of giving them a free hand to do their best work. We should not inaugurate the millennium. We should not secure results that would be

perfect. But we should secure the possibility — of decided improvement. We should secure at least the possibility — of getting as good men, and as good practical results, in public affairs, as in private affairs. In my belief, we should get better; for the rewards would be larger; not it may be in money, but in reputation. In every free country, the ablest men have always been eager to enter the public service. And the people, the large majority of the citizens, really wish their public affairs to be managed by such men. But under our present political system, the citizens are prevented from carrying that wish into effect by “party” machinery; by their loyalty to “party” organizations; and by the impossibility of electing men approved by their own judgment, which is due to that loyalty. Loyalty to party organizations has its praiseworthy features. When, however, it is carried to the extent of depriving the citizen of freedom of action, when — in practice — it reduces him to a political puppet, then we are confronted with a condition of affairs which strikes at the foundation of free democratic government.

## CHAPTER III

### THE COST OF MACHINE POLITICS

WE have now reached this point in our study. We have seen, that the necessary inevitable result of our term system, our system of periodic revolution, is "machine politics." "Machine politics" is merely another name for "government by party." "Government by party," whatever it may have been in its origin, has now resolved itself into an annual contest between powerful political organizations, for our public offices, and the control of our public treasuries. It constitutes a most subtle kind of a tyranny, the tyranny of a system; a system of our own creation, formed for the purpose of keeping the supreme power in the community directly in the hands of the citizens. It is an attempt at the impossible. Mass rule, for that is really what we have been attempting, cannot be secured by any known device. It would be undesirable, even if it were practicable. But it is not practicable. It cannot be made an accomplished fact. The attempt to realize it, by any



system of periodic popular election, will always result in the future, as it has already resulted in the past, in "machine politics."

That is the lesson of our experience in the last century.

Furthermore, we have seen, that it is at least possible — to devise a scheme of genuine democratic government; a scheme, under which the entire community will be a single organism; a political unit, with its combined concentrated forces compacted under a single control, that of the popular assembly.

But we must go even further, if we expect to convince this conservative American people of the necessity of a radical fundamental change in the framework of its political institutions. We must show — not merely that our present political system produces bad results — but we must also show, that these results are so large, as to call for immediate action on our part. We must show the magnitude of these results. And, if possible, we must show their magnitude in figures; in dollars and cents. For we must bear in mind that this American people is intensely practical; that practical men always distrust theories and theorists; that government is largely a matter of ways and means, of money; and that bad political

machinery will generally make its evil nature apparent in the public balance sheet.

Consequently, we must at least make the attempt, to show the cost of "machine politics" in money.

The attempt will now be made.

The figures here given will mainly concern the operations of the national government; and will be limited, of necessity, to the operations of a few of its departments. From the figures here given, however, it will easily be possible to deduce general conclusions, as to the money cost of "machine politics" in our different state and local governments.

"Machine politics" on a large scale began with the opening of the Civil War. Prior to that time, the operations of all our governments, national, state, and local, involved the handling of comparatively small amounts of money. Then, for the first time, did the operations of the national government furnish a field for fraud and corruption on a large scale. Then, for the first time, under the administration of Mr. Lincoln, we have the evidence of the omnipotence of the election machine.

In connection with the facts now to be related, we must continually bear in mind, that Mr. Lincoln's purity of purpose — his personal integrity

— and his sincerity and earnestness in using the powers of his office for what he deemed the highest public interests, are universally conceded. Consequently, we are compelled to conclude, that if he was unable to resist the power of the election machine, that power is practically irresistible.

Immediately after Mr. Lincoln's election began the inevitable division of the "spoils," which has been, for well nigh a century, the invariable sequel of the election of a new President.

Mr. Lincoln's nomination, as is well known, was procured by a political barter. It is a well-authenticated fact, that a bargain had been made by Mr. Lincoln's political friends, at the Chicago convention which nominated him, that the vote of the Pennsylvania delegation in that convention should be paid for — by the appointment of Simon Cameron to a seat in the Cabinet. Whether or not Mr. Lincoln knew and approved the bargain before his election, has been questioned. But it is the historic fact, that he carried out the bargain afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts, by making Mr. Cameron his Secretary of War.

Mr. Lincoln did this in opposition to the remonstrances of a number of the most reputable men in his own party. Those men represented to Mr. Lincoln, that the character and reputation

of Mr. Cameron were so bad, that no administration could endure the disgrace of such an appointment.

The story of Mr. Cameron's appointment to be Secretary of War is thus told by Mr. Lincoln's biographer:<sup>1</sup> —

"Cameron had many and formidable enemies, who alleged that he was a man notorious for his evil deeds, shameless in his rapacity and corruption, and even more shameless in his mean ambition to occupy exalted stations, for which he was utterly and hopelessly incompetent; that he had never dared to offer himself as a candidate before the people of Pennsylvania, but had more than once gotten high office from the Legislature by the worst means ever used by a politician; and that it would be a disgrace, a shame, a standing offence to the country, if Mr. Lincoln should consent to put him in his cabinet."

As to Mr. Lincoln's action, the biographer continues the story from the statement of one of the actors — Colonel M'Clure: —

"I do not know that any one went there to oppose the appointment but myself. . . . *Lincoln's character for honesty was considered a complete guaranty* against such a suicidal act. No efforts had therefore been made to guard against it. . . . I hastily got letters from Governor Curtin, Secretary Slifen, Mr. Wilmot, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Stevens, and started. I took no affidavits with me, nor were any specific charges made against him by me, or by any of the letters I bore; but they all sus-

<sup>1</sup> Lamon's *Life of Lincoln*, p. 459.

tained me in the allegation that the appointment would *disgrace the administration and the country*, because of the *notorious incompetency and public and private villainy of the candidate*. I spent four hours with Mr. Lincoln alone; and the matter was discussed fully and frankly. Although he had previously decided to appoint Cameron, he closed our interview by a reconsideration of his purpose, and the assurance that within twenty-four hours he would write me definitely on the subject."

Mr. Lincoln's own opinion of Mr. Cameron was so bad as to make him think that the mere appointment of Mr. Cameron by him to a cabinet position would of itself destroy his own great reputation for honesty. According to his biographer, he said:—

"All that I am in the world — the Presidency and all else — I owe to that opinion of me which the people express when they call me Honest Old Abe. Now what will they think of their *honest* Abe when he appoints Simon Cameron to be his familiar adviser?"

At the time of Mr. Cameron's appointment, we were at the opening of a great war, on which depended the nation's existence. The War Secretaryship was the most important office in the nation. It demanded a man of great ability, and of unquestioned integrity. Success in the war would be largely a matter of money. Upright

and able administration of the War Office was certain to be the most important thing in the entire administration. Nevertheless, Mr. Lincoln gave the headship of the War Office to a man who was notoriously and scandalously corrupt. Of that fact he was fully advised in advance. He was fully warned, as to the necessary and inevitable consequences of his action. Nevertheless, he made the appointment. It may be conceded, that Mr. Lincoln had good intentions. Yet there is the record of his action.

Other cabinet appointments were made in like manner, for like reasons. It cannot be said with accuracy, that a single one of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet appointments was made by reason of the fitness of the appointee for his official work.

As already said, Mr. Lincoln's purity of purpose and earnestness of endeavor are conceded, on all hands. We must assume, that he did everything in his power to insure an honest administration of our national affairs. For he, and every intelligent man, well understood that success in putting down the rebellion was largely a question of money; and that it was of vital necessity that the strictest economy should be used in the management of our Army and Navy, and of the nation's finances.

Bearing all that in mind, let us see what were the practical results of his so-called "political" appointments.

The government was compelled to purchase large quantities of material of all kinds, arms and supplies for the Army, and vessels for the transport service and the Navy. To the ordinary lay mind it would seem natural and reasonable, that vessels to be purchased should be fitted for the use to which they were to be put. The arms to be bought should have been such as could be of service. It was very clear that the men, of all others, who would be the best judges of what was needed by the two branches of the service in the way of ships and arms, would be the officers of the Navy and Army. And the officers of the Navy, in the beginning, had little else on which they could well be employed except these very purchases. For we had no vessels for them to command. Nevertheless, for some reason best known to the men who conducted the affairs of the country at the time, the political friends of congressmen and cabinet members were found, of all men in the United States, to be the only ones having the needed skill and knowledge which fitted them to make purchases for the government.

The purchasing of vessels for the Navy De-

partment at the port of New York was taken from the commandant of the navy-yard there, and transferred to a man of whom a House of Representatives Committee <sup>1</sup> say, that he had

“never had the slightest experience in the new and responsible duties which he was called upon to discharge, either in the naval service, the building or buying and selling of ships, or in any pursuit calling for a knowledge of their construction, capacity, or value, never having spent an hour in either.”

The Committee further say that

“The evidence was abundant before the committee, that if it had been necessary to obtain the services of any gentlemen outside of the navy itself, those gentlemen, combining from experience and education the knowledge most calculated to fit them for this duty, independent of outside aid, could have been secured without the slightest difficulty for a salary not exceeding \$5000 for the year.”

The other points of the affair can be best given in an extract from the Committee's report. They say of this purchasing agent that he

“received as compensation during the period of seven weeks previous to the 6th day of September, when this testimony was taken, the enormous sum of \$51,584, as admitted by himself before the committee. When this

<sup>1</sup> House of Representatives, Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, Report No. 2.



testimony was taken, information of its extraordinary character and import was communicated to the department, in the hope that an abuse so glaring, when pointed out, might be corrected. Yet, notwithstanding the department became thus possessed of the information that its own agent was, by this system of commissions, amassing a private fortune, the committee have been surprised to learn, from a recent communication from the Navy Department furnishing them with the numbers and prices of vessels purchased by Mr. Morgan for the Government since said 6th day of September, that the cost of those thus purchased by him amounts in the aggregate to the sum of \$1,736,992. If he has received the same rate of compensation since as before that date, there must be added to the sum of \$51,584 paid him before that date the further compensation of \$43,424 for services rendered since, making in all the sum of \$95,000 paid to a single individual for his services as agent of the Government since the 15th day of July, a period of four and one-half months."

And the Committee add:—

"The committee do not find in the transaction the less to censure in the fact that this arrangement between the Secretary of the Navy and Mr. Morgan was one between brothers-in-law."

Five thousand carbines belonging to the government were sold to a private individual for \$3.50 apiece, and were immediately repurchased for the government for \$22 apiece, making a difference on this one transaction of nearly \$90,000.

One lot of these carbines went through this process of sale and repurchase twice. They were first sold by the government at a price merely nominal, and were repurchased at \$15 apiece. They were again sold by the government at the price above stated, of \$3.50, and again repurchased at \$22. How many other times these arms did service under the purchase and sale treatment, or whether they ever did service in the field, did not appear.

A certain contractor testified that he furnished supplies to the government to the amount of \$800,000, on which he made a profit of over forty per cent. The purchases from him were made in direct violation of law.

Two politicians in New York, one of them an old personal and political friend of the Secretary of War, had two million dollars of government money placed in a private banking-house, subject to their order for the purchase of supplies, in direct violation of law. Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of this money they spent without ever accounting for any of it. It was in evidence, that of this amount ten thousand dollars was paid for a large quantity of groceries supplied by a dealer in hardware. Another sum of over twenty thousand dollars was paid for "straw hats and

linen trousers." But no one in the Army saw any of our troops decked in this fantastic costume. Two steamers were purchased by a friend of high government officials for about one hundred thousand dollars, and were immediately sold to the government for two hundred thousand dollars. One steamer was chartered to the government for two thousand five hundred dollars a day; and the government paid one hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars for a period during which she lay at a wharf before she was ever once used. One railroad company received for transportation in one year from the government over three million five hundred thousand dollars, being an excess over the company's entire earnings for the previous year of one million three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or about forty per cent. And the rates charged for this transportation were about thirty-three and one-third per cent in excess of the rates paid by private individuals. The brother-in-law of the president of this railroad company was Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of War.

These are merely single instances of the way in which the people's money was wasted by the party leaders and their political supporters.

That was not all. In every war, under any form of government, there has generally been more

or less waste of the public money. It remained for the great republic of modern times, to give to the world one of the most remarkable exhibitions of the wholesale squandering of public funds and public property recorded in history. Not only did we waste our own men and money, but we fed and clothed the army of the enemy we were fighting. The Confederate forces got the very supplies which kept them in the field, by trade carried on through the lines under written permits given by the President of the United States.

The report of a Congressional Committee states: <sup>1</sup>

"The testimony before the committee discloses the shameless and *treasonable character of the trade which has been carried on within the rebel lines with rebel agents, and for the use of rebel armies.* The amount of supplies necessary for the support of rebel armies, which, under the cover of this trade, has been sent through the rebel lines at New Orleans, Memphis, Norfolk, and other places, almost *surpasses belief.* Negotiations have been entered into and correspondence carried on by citizens of the United States *with rebel agents* to deliver for the rebel government provisions and other necessary articles to sustain the rebel armies in return for cotton."

And the report adds: —

"General Canby states that the rebel armies east and west of the Mississippi River have been mainly

<sup>1</sup> Report on "Trade with Rebellious States," Thirty-eighth Congress, Second Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 24.

*supplied for the last twelve months by the unlawful trade carried on on that river."*<sup>1</sup>

But political influence went further than controlling the Treasury and the War and Navy departments. It controlled the appointment of our generals. Machine politicians aspired to the glory of the soldier, for political purposes. They were men without either education or experience. One of them at least had never in his life so much as handled a battalion or a company on a parade ground. Men of this kind were given generals'

<sup>1</sup> Here is a specimen of the permits under which this trade was carried on:—

"An authorized agent of the Treasury Department having, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, contracted for the cotton above mentioned, and the parties having agreed to sell and deliver the same to said agent,

"It is ordered that the cotton, moving in compliance with and for fulfilment of said contract, and being transported to said agent or under his direction, shall be free from seizure or detention by any officer of the Government; and *commandants of military departments*, districts, posts, and detachments, naval stations, gunboats, flotillas, and fleets, will observe this order, and *give the said . . . their agents, transports, and means of transportation*, free and unobstructed passage, for the purpose of getting said cotton, or any part thereof, through the lines, and safe conduct within our lines, while the same is moving, in compliance with regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, and for fulfilment of said contract with the agent of the Government.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Committee Report No. 24, Second Session, Thirty-eighth Congress.

commissions, and the command of armies; and through their ignorance and incapacity thousands of better men than themselves lost their lives.

In all departments, throughout the war, the plunder of the treasury by machine politicians proceeded on true machine principles. The people's offices were used, not for the service of the people, but for the service of the election machine, to reward machine men for machine work.

Let us see what was the cost, in part, to the people of the United States of these methods.

The cost in life of our Civil War, on the Northern side alone, making no account of the losses of the Confederates, according to the official records, was as follows:—

Killed in battle.....	44,238
Wounds and injuries.....	49,205
Suicide, etc. ....	526
Disease .....	186,216
Unknown causes .....	24,184
Total.....	304,369

The number of men withdrawn from their ordinary pursuits, on the rolls of the Northern Army alone, again not taking into account the Confederates, was as follows:—

July 1, '61 .....	186,751
January 1, '62.....	575,917

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March 31, '62 .....	637,126
Jan. 1, '63 .....	918,191
Jan. 1, '64 .....	860,757
Jan. 1, '65 .....	959,460
Mar. 31, '65 .....	880,086
May 1, '65 .....	1,000,516

The money expenditure of the national government alone, occasioned by the Civil War, for the Army and Navy alone, as it partially appears from our treasury records, was as follows:—

War Department ex- penditures, years 1862-1870 inclu- sive,	\$3,351,352,829.15	
Deduct former nor- mal yearly expen- diture for those years,	<u>144,000,000.00</u>	
Gives the War De- partment expendi- tures due to the Civil War,		\$3,207,352,829.15
Navy expenditures, years 1862-1870 inclusive,	\$456,100,149.81	
Deduct normal yearly expendi- ture for those years,	<u>99,000,000.00</u>	
Navy expenditures due to Civil War,		357,100,149.81
Pensions paid years 1862-1899, inclu- sive,		2,436,989,461.35
Interest on public debt, years 1862- 1899 inclusive,		<u>2,741,571,609.71</u>
Total		\$8,743,014,050.02

Aside from these expenditures of the national government, immense sums of money were paid out by the States, and by cities and towns all over the country, for war purposes.

Three hundred thousand lives is far below the fact, as the mere expenditure of life.

Nine thousand millions of dollars is doubtless far below the fact, as the mere expenditure of money, due to the war, by the general government alone.

More than half of that expenditure of life and money was wholly needless; and was due to the ignorance and incapacity of the machine politicians, who were then in control of the national government. At least one half that amount of money, four thousand five hundred millions of dollars, was simply thrown away, or stolen, through the incompetence and dishonesty of our national officials. From the beginning to the end of the war the waste of the people's money continued unchecked. It was a carnival of corruption.

General Schofield, as high authority as could be cited, has written: <sup>1</sup>—

“It is capable of demonstration, to the satisfaction of any average military mind, that our late war might have been brought to a successful conclusion in *two years instead of four*, and at *half the cost in men and*

<sup>1</sup> Cited in “The Army of the United States,” by President Garfield, *North American Review*, May-June, 1878.



*money*, if any one soldier of fair ability had been given the absolute control of military operations, and of the necessary military resources of the country."

At the time of Mr. Lincoln's appointment of Mr. Cameron there was one man, already prominent, who, more than any other, had shown his preëminent fitness for the position of Secretary of War. That was Edwin M. Stanton. He was a man of great ability and large experience. He had already given evidence of unusual administrative capacity, and of his loyalty to the Union cause. Moreover, he had even then made himself a national reputation, by the stand he had taken in President Buchanan's Cabinet against the surrender of the garrison in Charleston harbor. The fitness of the man for the place was so well known, and so universally acknowledged, that not long afterwards Mr. Lincoln found himself under a virtual necessity of appointing Mr. Stanton to be the head of the War Department.

Instead of Mr. Stanton, we had Simon Cameron.

At the same time, a large number of appointments were made to high positions in the Army, of men who had no military experience, and no fitness for high commands, most of them Republican politicians. We had at that time in the country a large number of West Point graduates; men

who were preëminently fit to handle the armies of the United States on scientific military methods. Those men were the ones, evidently, who should have been given all of the high commands in the Army. War should be waged by soldiers, not by politicians; by men who have the knowledge and training of soldiers. We had such men. They were the men who should have had the control of army affairs. Instead of putting the control of army affairs in the hands of those men, it was put in the hands of corrupt party politicians; of men like Simon Cameron.

The manner in which army affairs were managed can be best described by quoting from letters written at the time by Secretary Stanton. The first is one to General Dix:—

“This will be handed you by Mr. Andrews, with whom you are acquainted. He will inform you of the state of affairs here. They are *desperate beyond conception*. If there be any remedy — any shadow of hope to preserve this government from utter and absolute extinction, it must come from New York without delay.”<sup>1</sup>

On March 10, he wrote: “The *scramble for office* is terrific.”

On March 15, he wrote: “The *pressure for office* continues unabated; every department is over-

<sup>1</sup> Gorham's *Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton*, p. 199.

run, and by the time that all the *patronage* is distributed, the Republican-party will be dissolved."

General Sherman, in his Memoirs, gives the following account of a call he made on President Lincoln in March, 1861, when his brother, Senator Sherman, introduced him to the President. The Senator said, "Mr. President, this is my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up from Louisiana, and he may give you information you want."

"‘Ah,’ said Mr. Lincoln, ‘how are they getting along down there?’ I said, ‘They think they are getting along swimmingly; they are *preparing for war*.’ ‘Oh, well,’ said he, ‘I guess *we will manage to keep house*.’ I was silenced; said no more to him, and we soon left. I was sadly disappointed, and remember that I broke out on John, *damning the politicians* generally; saying, ‘You have got things in a hell of a fix, and you may get them out as well as you can,’ adding that the country was *sleeping on a volcano* that might burst forth at any moment."

A letter of General Dix to Mr. Stanton, dated May 28, 1861, reads as follows:—

"Ever since I wrote you last I have been busy night and day, and am a good deal worn out by my labors on the Union Defense Committee and by superintending the organization and equipment of nine regiments, six of which I have sent to the field, leaving three to go to the field to-morrow and the day afterward. The post of Major-General of Volunteers was tendered to me by Governor Morgan, and I could not decline without

laying myself open to the imputation of hauling down my flag, — a thing altogether inadmissible. So I am in harness for the war, although the administration takes it easy, for I have not yet been accepted, and there are rumors that there are *too many Democratic epaulettes* in the field. There seems to be *no fear* at Washington that there are *too many Democratic knapsacks*. New York has about 15,000 men at the seat of war, under Sanford, who has gone on temporarily. How is it, my dear sir, that New York is always overlooked, or nearly always, except when there are *burdens to be borne*? As to this generalship, it was unsought, and I am indifferent about it entirely. I am willing to give my strength and life, if need be, to uphold the government against treason and rebellion; but if the administration prefers some one else to command New York troops, no one will acquiesce so cheerfully as myself."

Another letter of Mr. Stanton, of June 8, 1861, reads as follows:—

"Well, every patriotic heart has rejoiced at the enthusiastic spirit with which the nation has aroused to maintain its existence, and all the speculation and fraud that immediately sprang up to *prey upon the volunteers and grasp the public money as plunder and spoil*, has created a strong feeling of loathing and disgust, and no sooner had the appearance of an imminent danger passed away and the administration recovered from its panic, than a determination became manifest to give a *strict party direction to the great national movement*. After a few Democratic appointments, as Butler and Dix, *everything has been devoted to back Republican interests*. This has already excited strong reactionary feeling, not only in New York but also in the Western States.

"General Dix informs me that he has been so badly treated *by Cameron* that he intends immediately to resign. This will be followed by a withdrawal of financial confidence and support to a very great extent. Indeed, the course of things for the last four weeks has been such as to excite *distrust in every department of the government.*"

Another letter of Mr. Stanton, to General Dix, is as follows: —

"The meeting of the 24th of April, in New York, has become a national epoch, for it was a manifestation of patriotic feeling beyond any example in history. *To that meeting*, the courage it inspired and the organized action it produced, *this government will owe its salvation*, if saved it can be. To the general gratification of the country at your position as chairman of the Union Committee, there were added to my breast a feeling of security and succor that until that time was unknown. No one can imagine the deplorable condition of this city and the hazard of the government, who did not witness the weakness and panic of the administration and the painful *imbecility of Lincoln*. We looked to New York in that dark hour as our only deliverance under Providence, and thank God it came. The *uprising of the people* of the United States to maintain their government and crush rebellion has been so grand, so mighty in every element that I feel it a blessing to be alive and witness it. The action of your city especially filled me with admiration, and proves the right of New York to be called the Empire City. But the picture has a dark side — dark and terrible from the *corruption that surrounds the War Department and seems to poison*

*with infamous breath the very atmosphere. Millions of New York capital, the time, strength and perhaps lives of thousands of patriotic citizens will be wanted to crush a ravenous crew. On every side the government and soldiers are pillaged; arms, clothing, transportation and provisions are each and all subject of speculation and spoil. On one side, the waves of treason and rebellion are madly dashing, on the other is the yawning gulf of national bankruptcy. Our cause is the greatest that any generation of men was ever called upon to uphold. It would seem to be God's cause, and must triumph. But when we witness venality and corruption growing in power every day, and controlling the millions of money that should be a patriotic sacrifice for national deliverance, and treating the treasury of the nation as a booty to be divided among thieves, hope dies away. Deliverance from this danger must also come from New York. Those who are unwilling to see blood shed, lives lost, treasure wasted in vain, must take speedy measures to reform the evil before it is too late.*

*"Of military affairs I can form no judgment. Every day affords fresh proof of the design to give the war a party direction. The army appointments appear, with two or three exceptions only, to be bestowed on persons whose only claim is their Republicanism — broken-down politicians without experience, ability or other merit. Democrats are readily repelled or scowled upon with jealous and ill-concealed aversion. The western democracy have already become disgusted, and between the corruption of some of the Republican leaders and the selfish ambition of others, some great disaster may soon befall the nation. How long will the democracy of New York tolerate these things?*

*"The navy is in a state of hopeless imbecility and*

is believed to be far from being purged from the treachery that has already occasioned so much shame and dishonor."

So much for the administration of Army and Navy affairs.

Let us turn to that of our foreign relations.

From the outset, it was apparent to all men of intelligence, that the point of most serious danger was England. No doubt, for many years we had heard the expressions of English horror over the evils of African slavery. Intelligent men, however, were well aware, that the action of England would be determined almost entirely by considerations of the pound sterling; or, in the words of Tennyson, by the "jingling of the guinea."

All that was required in order to enlist the moral sympathies of England on our side, was for us to furnish them with cotton; keep their mills busy manufacturing arms and clothing for our Army and Navy; employ their shipyards in the construction of ships for us, instead of for the Confederacy; and pay them lavishly in our government bonds bearing a high rate of interest. With our immense superiority in men and money, this policy was one of comparative simplicity and ease.

Thereupon, all England would have resounded with pæans in praise of freedom. Wilberforces would

have arisen in every constituency declaiming on the iniquities of slavery, and the duty of the English people to support the cause of individual and national liberty. Professor Freeman's monumental work, "The History of Federal Governments from the Formation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States," would have been entitled "The Evolution of Democracy." Mr. Gladstone, instead of proclaiming that Jefferson Davis "had made a nation," would have exulted over the fact that President Lincoln had saved one, and had destroyed slavery.<sup>1</sup> The hands of John Bright would have been strengthened, and he would have been able to dominate the policy of England in reference to our struggle to enforce the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws.

Obviously, therefore, England should have been the objective of our most able and adroit diplomacy; and should have had the most careful

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Morley in his life leaves this episode precisely where it was before Mr. Gladstone, in July, 1896, attempted to explain his famous utterance. But the explanation goes only so far as to apologize for the indiscretion of such an utterance by a cabinet minister. It leaves Mr. Gladstone where he was before — in the matter of sympathy. And Mr. Gladstone adds, with charming naïveté: "It illustrates vividly that *incapacity* which my mind so long retained, and perhaps still exhibits, an incapacity of *viewing subjects all round*, in their extraneous as well as in their internal properties, and thereby of *knowing when to be silent and when to speak*."



thought at the hands of the Washington authorities.

Let us see what was the fact.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister at the Court of St. James, has left in his Diary an account of his interview with President Lincoln and the Secretary of State, when he went to Washington, to receive his appointment, and his instructions for the duties of his mission. His son gives it as follows:

“The secretary introduced the minister to the President, and the appointee of the last proceeded to make the usual conventional remarks, expressive of obligation, and his hope that the confidence implied in the appointment he had received might not prove to have been misplaced. They had all by this time taken chairs; and the tall man listened in silent abstraction. When Mr. Adams had finished, — and he did not take long, — the tall man remarked in an indifferent, careless way that the appointment in question had not been his, but was due to the secretary of state; and that it was to ‘Governor Seward’ rather than to himself that Mr. Adams should express any sense of obligation he might feel; then, stretching out his legs before him, he said, with an air of great relief, as he swung his long arms to his head: ‘Well, governor, I’ve this morning decided that Chicago post-office appointment.’ Mr. Adams and the nation’s foreign policy were dismissed together! Not another reference was made to them. Mr. Lincoln seemed to think that the occasion called for nothing further; as to Mr. Adams, it was a good while before he recovered from his dismay; he never recovered from his astonishment, nor did

the impression then made ever wholly fade from his mind. Indeed, it was distinctly apparent in the eulogy on Seward delivered by him at Albany twelve years afterwards."

The war was managed, precisely as the so-called "war" with Spain was managed, by party politicians, for party purposes. It is not intended, that President Lincoln intentionally betrayed his trust. Simply, he was out of place. He was a great orator; a man with the large views, and high purposes, of a statesman. But he had no appreciation of the men and methods needed for the conduct of a war. The government then needed at its head a man with the gifts and training of an executive. We wanted — a leader. We had — a millstone.

The results of this kind of administration were only what were to be expected. The success of the Union arms depended upon the wise and economical handling of men, material, and money. The superiority in resources of the North over the South was vast and overwhelming. The result of the contest never ought to have been doubtful. It never would have been doubtful, with an honest and efficient administration at Washington. But the corrupt and needless expenditure of life and money, that continued from the very outset of military operations through the very last campaign,

was such as to make the result of the war doubtful up to the end.

As to this fact, let us hear General Schofield. In his "Forty-six Years in the Army," he says:—

"In a great and prolonged war it is not possible for a people to contribute all the means required at the time. The amount of taxation would be greater than any people could bear. Hence the government must borrow the necessary money. This cannot be done without national credit. If credit declines, rates of interest and discount on securities increase until the national debt reaches its limit and no more money can be borrowed. In short, the nation becomes bankrupt.

"This was the condition of the United States before the close of the late Civil War, with a *million of men on the muster and pay rolls*, including several great armies of veteran troops in the field, while the *Confederate army was reduced to a very small portion of that number*. The Union was on the very *verge of failure*, because Government could no longer raise money to pay its troops, purchase supplies or make any further use of its magnificent armies. This astounding fact was confided to the Generals of the army in the Winter of 1864-1865, by the Secretary of War, who then said the Rebellion *must be suppressed in the coming Spring campaign or the effort abandoned because the resources of the Treasury were exhausted.*"

In view of these facts, it will be interesting to read General Schofield's further comments on the financial policy of the administration. He says:—

"In a great country with unlimited resources like the United States, resort to loans would seem to be

entirely unnecessary. However this may be, and whatever may be the necessity in any case, a forced loan without interest is simply robbery to the extent of unpaid interest, even if the principal is paid. And a robber cannot be expected to have much credit left after his robbery becomes known to the world.

"The issue of legal tender notes during the Civil War was of this character. The country received a deadly blow to its financial credit when that policy was adopted.

"It is now perfectly well known to all who have taken the pains to study the subject that this false and practically dishonest policy, however innocently it may have been conceived, cost the United States many *hundreds of millions of dollars* and came very near bringing disaster upon the Union cause. One of the most astounding spectacles ever presented in the history of the world was that presented by this country. It went into the war practically free from debt, and came out of it with a debt which seemed very large to be sure, and was in fact nearly twice as large as it ought to have been, yet so small in comparison with the country's resources that it could be paid off in a few years. It went into the war practically without an army, and came out of the war with its *military strength not even yet fully developed*. It had *more than a million of men, nearly all veterans*, in the ranks and *could have raised a million more*, if necessary, without seriously interfering with the industries of the country. Yet, *in four short years*, a false financial policy destroyed the national credit, *brought its Treasury to bankruptcy*, and thus *reduced a great people to a condition in which they could no longer make any use of their enormous military strength*."

The end of the war came. The result was military success for the government, though at a heavy

cost in life and money, largely needless. The armies of the Confederacy had been worn out. Their supplies had been exhausted. The strategy of attrition, for it was nothing else, had finally brought the conflict to a close.

With the end of the war, the waste of the national resources ought to have come to an end. Corruption in the affairs of the treasury connected with the war ought then to have ceased.

There was, however, a still further field for plunder, yet to be discovered by the machine politicians. It was in the matter of pensions.

The expenditure by the national government for pensions in the year 1860 was \$1,100,802.32. Previous to that year, from the year 1845, there were only two years in which the expenditure for pensions exceeded two millions of dollars. Those two years were 1851 and 1852, shortly after the war with Mexico.

Thereafter, the annual expenditure for pensions was as follows:—

For the year 1861.....	\$1,034,599.73
For the year 1862.....	852,170.47
For the year 1863.....	1,078,513.36
For the year 1864.....	4,985,473.90
For the year 1865.....	16,347,621.34
For the year 1866.....	15,605,549.88
For the year 1867.....	20,936,551.71

For the year 1868.....	\$23,782,386.78
For the year 1869.....	28,476,621.78
For the year 1870.....	28,340,202.17
For the year 1871.....	34,443,894.88
For the year 1872.....	28,533,402.76
For the year 1873.....	29,359,426.86
For the year 1874.....	29,038,414.66
For the year 1875.....	29,456,216.22
For the year 1876.....	28,257,395.69
For the year 1877.....	27,963,752.27

In other words, for the year 1877, twelve years after the end of the Civil War, the annual expenditure for pensions was only slightly over \$27,000,000.

Beyond any reasonable doubt, at that time there had been ascertained the full number of all persons, of every kind and description, whether men who had served in the Army or Navy, or their widows, or their children, or persons dependent upon them for support, who had any legal or moral claim upon the nation, by reason of injuries or diseases suffered in our Civil War. It is a virtual certainty — that the expenditure for pensions in the year 1877, already stated from the official records at a little over twenty-seven millions of dollars, was high-water mark, for any rightful payments by our national government to any and all persons, by reason of disease or disability of any kind, incurred in the military or naval service.

From that time, however, there began a large

increase in the expenditures for pensions. Most of this increase was undoubtedly fraudulent, created by the corrupt action of our national officials at Washington. The figures for the period subsequent to the one already given are as follows:—

For the year 1878.....	\$27,137,019.08
For the year 1879.....	35,121,482.39
For the year 1880.....	56,777,174.44
For the year 1881.....	50,059,279.62
For the year 1882.....	61,345,193.95
For the year 1883.....	66,012,573.64
For the year 1884.....	55,429,228.06
For the year 1885.....	56,102,267.49
For the year 1886.....	63,404,864.03
For the year 1887.....	75,029,101.79
For the year 1888.....	80,288,508.77
For the year 1889.....	87,624,779.11
For the year 1890.....	106,936,855.07
For the year 1891.....	124,415,951.40
For the year 1892.....	134,583,052.79
For the year 1893.....	159,357,557.87
For the year 1894.....	141,177,284.96
For the year 1895.....	141,395,228.87
For the year 1896.....	139,434,000.98
For the year 1897.....	141,053,164.63
For the year 1898.....	147,452,368.61
For the year 1899.....	139,394,929.07
For the year 1900.....	140,877,316.02
For the year 1901.....	139,323,621.99
For the year 1902.....	138,488,559.73
For the year 1903.....	138,425,646.07

The magnitude of the fraud perpetrated upon

the United States Treasury, in this matter of pensions, will appear more clearly from the following figures: —

In the twenty years from 1879 to 1898 inclusive the total amount paid by the government on account of the pensions was.....	\$1,928,352,000.00
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The amount paid out for pensions in the year 1877 was, as already stated, \$27,963,752.27.

Payments for the twenty years succeeding 1878 at that rate would have amounted to.....	<u>546,683,441.40</u>
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The difference between these figures, which difference will give us the figures of the fraud perpetrated in this single matter.....	\$1,381,668,558.60
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Practically the whole of this large amount of money has been stolen from the United States Treasury, by fraud on the part of the officials of our national government, who were charged with the protection of our public treasury.

This position will appear more clearly, if a short statement is now made of the different stages of pension legislation.

Under the Act of July 14, 1862, which granted pensions for disabilities contracted in the War of the Rebellion, the persons primarily entitled to re-



ceive pensions were those who had been "*disabled by reason of any wound received or disease contracted while in the service of the United States and in the line of duty.*" Widows during widowhood, and children under sixteen were entitled to the same pension, in case of death resulting from wounds or disease received or contracted. If there were no widow or children, any dependent mother was entitled to a pension. If there were no dependent mother, any dependent sisters were entitled to a pension. This last right was extended to dependent brothers by an act passed June 6, 1866.

High-water mark, under a just and reasonable pension law, had been reached in 1874; nine years after the close of the war. After that year, the figures decreased gradually, until in 1878 they amounted to only \$27,137,019.08. According to the natural course of events, this decrease should have continued down to the present time, when the pension list would have been comparatively slight.

But in 1879 the tide was turned in the other direction by new legislation. By the acts of January 25, 1879, and March 3, 1879, arrears of pensions were awarded so as to cover the period intervening between the date of the disability and

the time when the application was granted. Prior to this time, the pension, reasonably enough, ran only from the time of the grant (unless applied for within the first five years after the disability occurred).

The result was that the pension list jumped from \$27,137,019.08 in 1878, to \$35,121,482.39 in 1879. And in 1880, when the new law had had time to produce its full effect, the annual expenditures for pensions amounted to \$56,777,174.44.

The following figures show the effect of that change in the law, during the period from 1880 to 1890:—

Total amount paid in nine years, from	
1880 to 1889, inclusive.....	\$657,101,000
Yearly average.....	65,710,000
Yearly average for preceding period	
from 1865 to 1879, inclusive.....	26,648,000

But the greed of the politicians was by no means satisfied by this astounding result.

By a still later Act of June 27, 1890, an entirely new class of pensioners was created. The former groundwork of the pension system was swept away. Under this last Act, any soldier of ninety days' service, who became disabled from manual labor, no matter how long after quitting the service, whether as a result of that service or

not, no matter what the nature of his necessities, became entitled to a pension.

The result was immediate and overwhelming, in its effects upon the public treasury. In 1890 the annual figure of the pension list rose at once to \$106,936,855.07 from \$87,624,779.11 in 1889. In 1893, it had reached the figure of \$159,357,557.87.

The Act of March 3, 1873, had revised and consolidated the existing Pension Laws. Pensions were granted for every disability, occasioned while "in the service" and "in the line of duty."

So the law remained until the Act of June 27, 1890. So it should have remained forever. It was as liberal as the largest generosity could dictate. No person who had any meritorious claim upon the bounty of the people of the United States by reason of disease or disability contracted in "the service" in the Army or Navy in the Civil War could fail to get relief under the laws then existing.

But then came the Act of June 27, 1890, which awarded pensions of from \$6 to \$12 a month to all persons who served ninety days or more in the Army or Navy, who "are sufferers from a mental or physical disability of a permanent character not the result of their own vicious habits, which incapacitates" them from earning a support.

That Act further allowed pensions to dependent widows and minor children without regard to the cause of the soldier's death.

On the face of it, it is evident no honest purpose could possibly have caused the passage of that Act. The Act was a fraud from beginning to end. Its purpose was a fraud. The result has been to legalize the abstraction of many hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States Treasury, and to constitute a gigantic scheme of public plunder.

But now we come to still more recent action of our public authorities in this matter of pensions, contained in Order No. 78, issued from the Department of the Interior on March 15, 1904, under the direct act of the President of the United States.

Order No. 78 reads as follows:—

“Whereas the Act of June 27, 1890, as amended, provides that a claimant shall ‘be entitled to receive a pension not exceeding \$12 per month and not less than \$6 per month proportioned to the degree of inability to earn a support, and in determining such disability each and every infirmity shall be duly considered and the aggregate of disabilities shown to be rated;’ and Whereas *old age is an infirmity*, the average nature and extent of which the experience of the Pension Bureau has established with reasonable certainty; and

“Whereas thirty-nine years will have elapsed on April 13, 1904, since the Civil War, and there are *many survivors over sixty-two years of age*, now, therefore:

"Ordered (1) In the adjudication of pension claims under said Act of June 27, 1890, as amended, it shall be taken and considered as an evidential fact, if the contrary does not appear, and if all other legal requirements are properly met, that when a claimant has passed the age of sixty-two years, he is disabled one-half in ability to perform manual labor and is entitled to be rated at \$6 per month; after sixty-five years at \$8 per month; after sixty-eight years at \$10 per month, and after seventy years at \$12 per month.

"(2) Allowance at higher rate not exceeding \$12 per month will continue to be made as heretofore where disabilities for age show a condition of inability to perform manual labor.

"(3) This order shall take effect April 13, 1904, and shall not be deemed retroactive. The former rules of the Office fixing the different minimum and maximum at sixty-five and seventy-five years respectively, are hereby modified as above."

The statement was made by the Acting Commissioner of Pensions, in a letter dated the 21st of March, 1904, that, "there are supposed to be living to-day about 875,000 ex-Union soldiers of the Civil War. Of these there are pensioned under the Act of July 14, 1862, known as the General Law, about 265,000; and under the Act of June 27, 1890, about 428,000, aggregating 693,000; which deducted from the whole number of survivors, leaves 182,000, who have not applied for pensions. To state definitely how many of this number failed to serve the required

ninety days and received honorable discharge would be impossible. One fourth seems a fair estimate, and reduces the number to 136,500. To say that 75,000 of these have reached the age of sixty-two, and will apply, seems a reasonable estimate. If these 75,000 are all placed on the roll at \$6 a month or \$72 a year, *the output for pensions will be increased \$5,400,000 annually.*"

The action of the President in making this increase of pension burdens, was an undoubted violation of law. Moreover, every well-informed man in Washington has known for years, that this entire pension business was honeycombed with fraud from top to bottom. The action of the President had no possible justification.

But it may be said, these are matters of ancient history. They happened, when the machinery of our national government was undeveloped; when it was subjected to a new and severe strain, for which the people were wholly unprepared. No such thing, it may be said, could happen to-day, with our long experience in the administration of large affairs.

Let us come, then, to more recent history. Let us examine a few of the facts from the events of the late "war" — so-called — with Spain.

In the war between Russia and Japan we have

had an object lesson, on a large scale, of the necessity of thorough preparation and honest administration. No doubt, there may be cases, where war will be forced upon a people, without the opportunity for making due preparation. A wise and discreet government, however, will almost always be able to avoid war. Or, if not, they will postpone it to the latest possible moment, until due preparation has been made.

Before making our recent assault on Spain, it would have been quite easy, with our vast resources in men and money, to delay the so-called "war," at least until our Army and Navy should have been got in a state of comparatively complete preparation. Our resources in men, money, and material, were practically inexhaustible. A slight delay, we know, would have ensued peace, and avoided war altogether. But assuming that we were to be driven into hostilities, by demagogues and contractors, delay would at least have given time for preparation.

Let us examine the facts.

Secretary Alger, in his book entitled, "The Spanish-American War," begins chapter 24, at page 455, with the following statement:—

"It is doubtful if any nation rated as a first-class power ever entered upon a war of offense in a condi-

tion of *less military preparation than was the United States in 1898*. At that time there were *not sufficient reserve supplies* in the possession of the War Department to fully equip 10,000 men in addition to the regular army as it then stood."

"In discussing the unpreparedness for war in another chapter of this book, it has been shown that a small number of Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifles and carbines — and the small arm was the only element of equipment of which there was a reserve — was barely sufficient to meet the needs of the increase in the regular army to 61,000. The entire body of volunteers outside of the three volunteer cavalry regiments were at first furnished with single-loading Springfield 45-hundredths calibre rifles, because there were no other weapons in the possession of the War Department.

"We saw also that the Government of the United States *did not provide smokeless powder* for the Springfield rifles nor for the field artillery in the early part of the war, simply for the reason that *it had none to provide*. *No type of smokeless powder had been adopted even* for either of these important adjuncts of war. The issuing of smokeless powder was subsequently dependent upon the output of the few plants in the United States capable of manufacturing it. We have seen that the *War Department did not even own or control a single transport*, and there was *no troop ship on the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans available to the United States*; that many elements of *field, siege and sea-coast artillery were in a transitional state*; that the military establishment was palpably *deficient in trained artilleryists*; that the regular army had not been mobilized since the Civil War, — one-third of the century since the army as a whole or any great part of it had been brought together; that there was no strategic staff, and no large number



of officers who were experienced in the concentration of troops, or in battalion, division, or corps manœuvres; that there was no place in the United States especially adapted or prepared for army mobilization, and that neither the army nor any officer in it had any experience in moving or operating under the new conditions incidental to a campaign in the Tropics. When the *crisis so often predicted by military experts at last came*, it found us *totally unprepared for war*, and with problems to be met at home and abroad, which were both *unusual* and *difficult*."

These general statements by the Secretary of War, it will be well to reinforce with evidence of details.

The following is an extract from an official letter written to the Commissary-General of Subsistence, dated at Siboney, Cuba, July 7, 1898, which appears in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, vol. I, part 1, page 568:—

"You are already acquainted with the loading at Tampa that I hoped to straighten out, when we unloaded somewhere on the Island, but the opportunity has not come, although we landed on the 22nd of June, at Daiquiri first. *The troops were run ashore without rations*, and I was directed to open depots, 200,000 rations at each, and feed soldiers, civilian employees, Cubans, etc. *To do this was simply impossible*, but not so to try, and we pegged away night and day, meeting demands.

"At Daiquiri there is a pier to which our transports could not go, but I took a lighter, transferred from

transport thereto, ran in and unloaded, succeeded in obtaining *not more than about 60,000 rations* on shore, and these were issued rapidly. But we kept right along. Siboney, being about seven miles nearer to Santiago, with a bad road, became the base, although furnishing no advantage beyond propinquity, as it was in the open, *no landing, everything depended upon the calm of the surf, which was uncertain.* Here I would proceed as before, running in the lighter as far as I could, then *transferring stores into a small boat, about ten tons, borrowed from the Navy, and pulled ashore by hand.* To supply an army in this way was severe, but when new regiments came without a ration, and increasing my work, the job looked insurmountable. I worked day and night, men getting sick, stevedores striking, new hands insufficient and inefficient, supplemented by a rough sea, until I got down to 1,000 rations ashore. *I got through, but the Lord knows how."*

Imagine the situation. An army of nearly twenty thousand men dependent for all its supplies on a single rowboat. It is difficult to find imbecility even remotely approaching this in all military history.

The report of Captain J. G. Newgarden, Assistant Surgeon of the United States Army, with the Third United States Cavalry, which appears at page 813, of the same volume, contains the following, among other statements:—

"We arrived at Daiquiri, Cuba, on June 22nd, and went into camp on the side of a hill about one mile from the landing place. I was unable to take any supplies

along, not having any transportation for the same. I succeeded in obtaining an emergency case from Major McCreery while in camp; a mackintosh and a woolen blanket constituted my protection from the elements. The brigade surgeon offered me for use with the regiment a medical and surgical pannier, but *no transportation having been provided* for them I was obliged to refuse them with regret. On June 25th, I made personal and thorough effort to secure transportation and supplies, but without success. I applied personally to the Major-General commanding on board the Seguranca and requested a mule for a mount, but was refused."

The report of the Surgeon-General contains the following statement:—

"The landing of the Fifth army corps on the 27th of June, at Daiquiri, was accomplished in a *brilliant manner. The escapes from death by drowning were many.* That there were only two casualties of this nature is really remarkable, all of the circumstances being considered. As is well known, the troops went on shore with *only such rations, shelter tents and cooking apparatus as they were able to carry on their persons.* But the same is true of all medical officers and men of the Hospital Corps assigned to duty with the several organizations. This prevented the transportation of any medical supplies beyond what could be carried in the hand."

The Surgeon-General makes the following further statement on page 788:—

"Concerning the medical officers and men of the hospital corps who were with the expedition, I cannot

peak too highly. They shared all the hardships that came to the Fifth Army Corps, not only during the assault and siege of Santiago de Cuba, but in the far more trying *battle with disease, which day after day ravaged our camps and threatened annihilation as a fighting force* to the gallant troops who had won *one of the most splendid victories of history.*"

The lack of preparation in our United States service in the year 1898 came from precisely the same causes which were responsible for the lack of preparation in the Russian Army; that is, the wholesale fraud and corruption, which had then permeated the entire administrative force at Washington. That fraud and corruption still continue in full force.

We had for many years been spending enough money on both the Army and the Navy, to have both in a condition of complete preparation, for such a petty affair as the assault on Spain. If the money spent on our Army and Navy in the last twenty-five years had been spent honestly, with reasonable discretion, in ways approved by competent officers of the Army and Navy, we could have easily put into the field, on short notice, an effective fighting army of one hundred thousand men.

So, too, our Navy, with an honest expenditure of the money actually laid out, could have been

in the highest degree of efficiency, of ships, guns, and men.

What is to be said, then, of the conduct of the men, who, holding high public positions at Washington, did all they could to drive this country into a conflict, for which its preparation was such as has here been stated? If the conflict had been forced upon us, something could be said in their behalf. If all the resources of diplomacy had been exhausted, there might be something to be said in their defense. There is every reason to believe, that a courteous continuance of diplomatic negotiations would have accomplished in no long time the liberation of the Cuban people, which has always been given by the politicians as the reason for this so-called Spanish War, together with every just and legitimate end desired by the people of the United States.

But that was not the purpose, of the men who promoted the attack on poor old Spain. They were simply determined to have a "war," in order to acquire cheap military notoriety and fat government contracts. It was a war for public plunder and private gain. As was the case with the Russo-Japanese war. As is the case with the large majority of wars.

Getting into a war is a thing of great ease. Get-

ting out of it may be, and generally is, a thing of great difficulty. At all times, under modern conditions, war requires thorough elaborate preparation; organization, drill, discipline; large supplies; and above all, adequate transportation. The larger the forces engaged, the more helpless they are, without organization, discipline, supplies, and transportation. An army, under such conditions, becomes a mob. The larger it is, the greater is its helplessness.

But a prevalent impression exists that since the Spanish affair of 1898 a great advance has been made in this matter of preparation; in the matter of organization and equipment, of both Army and Navy.

Such is not the fact. No doubt, we are at present engaged in the construction of a considerable number of battleships. No doubt, we are manufacturing, and purchasing, large quantities of guns, ammunition, and war supplies. There is no doubt, ample employment for the contractors.

Naval designers of the present day seem to have quite forgotten our experiences in the Civil War, which settled for a long time to come many of the most important problems of naval construction. Those experiences, too, furnish most valuable les-

sons, of the possibilities of speedy construction, to meet new emergencies, or new naval conditions. It will be well to recall a few facts gathered therefrom.

At the opening of the Civil War, in one field of our naval operations, the opening of the Mississippi River, and the rending in two of the Confederate land forces, it became necessary to construct a fleet of iron-clads. The construction of those iron-clads was placed in the hands of Captain Eads, who had already won high distinction as an engineer, and who afterwards achieved an international reputation as the first living authority in many branches of his profession.

Eads was employed to construct seven gunboats, which according to his contract were to draw six feet of water, carry 13 heavy guns each, to be plated with  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -inch iron, and have a speed of nine miles an hour. The boats were 175 feet long, with  $51\frac{1}{2}$  feet beam. Their sides sloped at an angle of about 35 degrees. They were propelled by a stern wheel, which was entirely covered by the armor at the rear. They were designed to have three bow guns, eight broadside guns, and two stern guns. Before these seven gunboats were completed, Captain Eads also engaged to convert the *Benton* into an armored vessel. The *Benton* had originally been a snag-boat.

She became the most powerful iron-clad of the fleet. She had been originally built with two hulls, about 20 feet apart, braced together. She was converted into a war vessel of about 75 feet beam, a greater width than that of any war vessel then afloat, and she was about 200 feet long. She carried 16 guns, seven 32-pounders, two 9-inch guns, and seven army 42-pounders. Captain Eads's contract was signed on the 7th of August, 1861. It bound him to construct the seven vessels first contracted for, ready for their crews and armament, in *sixty-five days*.

The engines to drive that fleet were yet to be built. The timber to form their hulls was uncut in the forest. The rollers and machinery that were to forge their armor were not yet constructed. They required twenty-one steam engines and thirty-five steam boilers. Within two weeks, not less than four thousand men were engaged in the various details of their construction. On the 12th of October, 1861, the first of those iron-clads, at first named the *St. Louis*, afterwards the *De Kalb*, with her boilers and engines on board, was launched in Carondelet, Missouri, forty-five days from the laying of her keel, Ten days afterwards, the *Carondelet* was launched. The *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Cairo*, and *Pittsburgh* followed in quick succession. The eighth



vessel, the *Benton*, was undertaken before the hulls of the first seven had fairly assumed shape. Within one hundred days Captain Eads completed a squadron, of eight steamers, aggregating five thousand tons, capable of steaming nine knots an hour, each well armored, fully equipped, and all ready for their armament, which was to comprise one hundred and seven large guns.

Meantime, there were hindrances, nearly fatal, by the administration officials at Washington. On one pretext or another, stipulated payments for the work were delayed by the War Department under Simon Cameron. The default of the War Department assumed such magnitude that nothing but the assistance rendered by Captain Eads's friends, after he had exhausted his own large private means, enabled him to complete the fleet. The consequence was, that the vessels were not completely finished until January 15, 1862. That involved a loss of time, under extremely critical circumstances, of at least three months. That loss of time was caused by the inefficiency and corruption of the War Department.

The story of the *Monitor* is quite similar.

Her keel was laid in the shipyard of Thomas F. Rowland in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, in October, 1861. She was launched on the 30th day of Janu-

ary, 1862. She was commissioned on the 25th day of February, 1862. Nine days later she left New York for Hampton Roads, where on the 9th of March occurred her contest with the *Merrimac*. Her crew was made up largely of men from Delamater's Iron Works.

Her preliminary history is interesting.

At the very opening of hostilities, Norfolk and the navy-yard were abandoned by the United States authorities. This was early in the spring of 1861. Norfolk was only about twelve miles from Fort Monroe, which was then held by a considerable force of regulars. A few companies of those regulars, with a reasonable force of artillery, could have occupied and commanded the town and navy-yard, and kept open the channel. At the time of the abandonment, a large number of ships that were there were burnt. There were left at the navy-yard, at the time of its evacuation by our forces, upwards of twelve thousand heavy guns. These guns were distributed through the different points in the Confederacy, and subsequently served as the armaments for the Confederate fortifications all the way from the Potomac to the Mississippi River. They were used to fortify Norfolk, and the batteries on York, Potomac, James, and Rappahannock Rivers. They were also put in service at

Richmond, Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, and Vicksburg.

The *Merrimac*, which was thereafter converted into an iron-clad by the Confederate naval authorities, was among the vessels abandoned by the Washington administration at this Norfolk navy-yard. The South had in its entire territory only one place where guns or armor could be manufactured. That was the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. The Southern States were altogether deficient in material, mechanics, and money.

Commodore Tattnall, formerly in the United States Navy, took command of the Norfolk navy-yard on the 29th of March, 1861. The *Merrimac*, in the mean time, had been put in the dry dock for repairs. Steps were taken immediately to convert her into an iron-clad. It was early in June, 1861, that Mr. Mallory, Confederate Secretary of the Navy, decided to reconstruct the *Merrimac*, and convert her into an iron-clad. The reconstruction was immediately begun, with the result that she was ready for action before the 8th of March, 1862, a period of eight months.

The possibilities of speedy construction which then existed at the North have been already evinced by the account of Captain Eads's operations in the construction of the iron-clads on the Mississippi

River. At the East, means and facilities for naval construction were vastly superior to any then available in the West. In the city of New York alone were several large establishments for the construction of marine engines and steam vessels. Living at that time in the city of New York was Ericsson, who had designed the *Princeton* for our government, the first ocean-going man-of-war propelled by a steam propeller, with her machinery wholly under the water line. Ericsson had had a large experience in engineering work of all kinds. He had years before designed the locomotive Novelty, which competed in England, in the year 1831, with Stevenson's Rocket, and at that time accomplished its mile in fifty-three seconds, although the prize of the competition was by the liberal-minded English authorities awarded to Stevenson. Ericsson's genius as an engineer had been made prominent in many other ways. At this time he already had an international reputation.

A armor-plating, too, was no new thing. It had been used in 1858 in the French steam frigate *La Gloire*. The English admiralty had also promptly begun the construction of armored war vessels with the *Warrior*. The *Warrior* had been finished and equipped for a considerable time before the opening of our Civil War.

While Mr. Welles, our Secretary of the Navy, and his advisers, were considering the question of naval armor, it was reported at Washington that the *Merrimac* had been raised, cut down to her berth deck, and that a very substantial construction of timber was being made on that deck, evidently with a view to covering it with armor.

Our Navy Department thereupon waited until the month of August, 1861, before they advertised for plans or offers for iron-clad steam batteries. Ericsson was already master of the subject. He submitted at once proposals to construct vessels. Those proposals were rejected. Thereafter, however, the Secretary of the Navy did accept Ericsson's proposal to build an iron-clad steam battery, and instructed him to commence its construction. The result was the *Monitor*.

As before stated, the *Monitor* was a special construction for a special purpose. The work on the *Merrimac* had already progressed so far that it was impossible to provide any vessel of large dimensions in time to meet her. The sloping sides which the *Merrimac* was to have, which were covered with two thicknesses of bar iron, very ingeniously combined, were well calculated to resist spherical shot, the only kind of solid shot then in use in our navy. The shallow waters of the coast in the South-

ern States required craft of very light draft. Other conditions existing at the time practically compelled special features in the construction of the *Monitor*, which would not have been adopted by Ericsson in war vessels constructed for general purposes. The turret, which was the main feature of the *Monitor*, was not a new device, but dated back almost as far as the first introduction of artillery. Ericsson was familiar with all the learning upon the subject. He has stated that about 1820 he had been taught by his instructor in fortification and gunnery, that a position assailable from all sides should be defended by mounting the guns on a turn-table. Ericsson has published an engraving of the side elevation of a floating, revolving, circular tower which was brought out in the year 1807. The raft, on which the turret was mounted, and which caused the *Monitor* to be named a "cheesebox on a raft," was simply Ericsson's device for the construction of a floating battery, to be used in shallow inside waters. It was not his intention that the *Monitor* should be constructed for an ocean-going man-of-war.

The Confederate authorities, as we have already seen, took steps for the conversion of the *Merri-mac* in June. It was August before the Washington administration took any steps of any kind, so

far as the records show, to meet the conditions that were then developing, conditions which threatened the existence of our Navy, and of our commerce all over the world; and it was not until October, 1861, in spite of all Ericsson's efforts, that the keel of the *Monitor* was laid in Rowland's shipyard at Greenpoint, in Brooklyn. It was the 30th of January, 1862, that she was launched. Thereafter she was commissioned on the 25th of February, and turned over to the government. Nine days later, she left New York for Hampton Roads, and on the 9th of March, she had her battle with the *Merrimac*, the result of which is a matter of familiar history.

If Ericsson's efforts had been properly seconded by the Washington administration, the *Monitor* could have been ready for sea, fully armed, equipped, and manned, within a little more than a hundred days from the commencement of her construction.

It is easily seen from the foregoing statement that it was the most gross imbecility on the part of the Washington administration that in the first place permitted the possibility of the *Merrimac* being used by the Confederate authorities; and in the second place delayed the construction of armor-clad vessels on our part to a time so late as

to make it easy for the Confederate naval officers to destroy the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*, at a great loss of life, and to threaten seriously for a considerable time the operation of the land forces under General McClellan against Richmond.

The difference between Richmond and Washington at that time was simply this: At Richmond military operations both by land and by sea were controlled and conducted by military men — by soldiers and sailors, who had been trained and experienced in their respective professions. At Washington, the control of both the War and Navy Departments was in the hands of incompetent and corrupt politicians. Here was the secret of the fact already stated, that the Civil War was protracted to a period at least double what was needed for its successful prosecution, and at an expenditure of life and money much more than twice anything that was requisite.

The result of the engagement between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* was such that the London "Times" made this declaration:—

"Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149 first-class war ships, *we have now two*, those two being the *Warrior* and her sister *Ironsides*. There is *not now a ship in the English Navy* apart from those two that it would not be *madness to entrust to an engagement with that little Monitor.*"



The English Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct their navy, cutting down their largest ships, and converting them into turret and broad-side iron-clads. The same course was taken in France, which had at that time only one sea-going iron-clad man-of-war. The Emperor Napoleon at once appointed a commission to devise plans for rebuilding his navy. So did all of the other maritime powers. The United States took the lead in this movement of naval reconstruction, and at the close of our war led all other nations in the numbers and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. Naval warfare experienced a revolution.

Our present large annual expenditure on our Army and Navy is wholly needless.

We do not need a large regular Army. We do need organization, drill, and discipline, after regular methods, of our militia. The militia, properly organized, equipped, and thoroughly drilled, can be, and should be, always have been, and always will be, our mainstay and our security, for conditions of war.

Similarly, it is not expedient at the present time, that we should go to a large expenditure in the construction of modern battleships. The modern battleship is an extremely intricate machine, which thus far has never stood the test of continuous

accurate fire from heavy guns. Thus far, whenever exposed to such fire, it has collapsed. Witness the results with the Spanish ships in our encounters in 1898; the Chinese ships in the battle of Yalu; and the Russian ships in the recent engagements with the Japanese. The vessels of the Japanese Navy, and of our own Navy, escaped with comparatively little loss almost solely by reason of the lack of skillful fire on the part of their adversaries. The large battleships have demonstrated themselves to be unwieldy, slow, and extremely vulnerable. We already know, that they are failures.

The reason of their being failures is not hard to ascertain. The modern battleship violates all the fundamental principles of naval construction, as advocated and practiced by the greatest naval engineers of the last century, Eads, Ellet, Ericsson, and Coles.

Those well-established principles of naval construction require, in every war vessel, the three following features:—

I. Minimum of surface above the water line exposed to fire.

II. Maximum of speed and fuel-carrying capacity.

III. Maximum of gun power, comprising length of range and power of penetration.

Our heavy battleships, those now in existence, and those in process of construction, are constructed in absolute defiance of these well-established principles.

They have almost a maximum of exposed surface above the water line. They have, considering proper standards, a very low rate of speed. They have very far from the maximum of gun power. In each one of these three fundamental essentials of naval construction they are known to be utterly wanting.

War vessels need always to be constructed with reference to the particular conditions under which they are to be used. In our Civil War, Ellet and Eads in a marvelously short space of time improvised fleets of gunboats, largely from river steamboats, which were well fitted for the particular work they were to accomplish, and which accomplished that work with great success. The *Monitor* was a special construction, to meet a special need. She was finished inside of a hundred days from the time her keel was laid. Two Staten Island ferry-boats, which had their machinery largely above the water line, were converted into extremely serviceable craft, for operations on the southern bayous. At all times, ships constructed for a special purpose, like our heavy battleships,

even if they do not possess the highest degree of vulnerability, may turn out to be almost entirely useless. Moreover, the large battleship of the present day requires such a long period of time for its construction, that it may almost be said to be obsolete before its completion. Apart from other objections, the intricacy of its machinery alone is well nigh a complete condemnation of the wisdom of its designing.

Naval problems, and naval conditions, are always in a state of transition. This is the case, even in times of peace. But in any and every war, naval problems and conditions are special, and need to be met with special means and devices.

Another fact becomes at this time most material. It is this. We may now be on the eve of a new revolution in the matter of fuel and motive machinery for ocean-going steamships. Recent experiments by naval authorities would seem to indicate that there is at least a large possibility, that we shall find it wise, in the immediate future, to substitute petroleum in some of its forms for coal, as the fuel of our war vessels. The turbine propeller may at a very early date supplant the present form of the screw. Under these circumstances, it is most unwise for us at the present time to go into a large expenditure for a fleet of

large war vessels, which may turn out, when constructed, to be entirely useless. It is quite needless.

We may now consider further facts as to the management of the Navy.

For the year ending June 30, 1903, the expenditure for the Navy Department was \$82,618,034.18. That was an increase over the corresponding expenditure for the year 1902 of \$14,814,905.94.

But the administration is making still further large increases in the expenditure for naval construction.

That being so, it becomes interesting and pertinent to make a short review of the figures as to our naval expenditure during the Civil War, and in the period subsequent thereto, down to the present time.

The expenditure on the Navy for the years just preceding and during the Civil War was as follows:—

For the year 1860.....	\$11,514,649.83
For the year 1861.....	12,387,156.52
For the year 1862.....	42,640,353.09
For the year 1863.....	63,261,235.31
For the year 1864.....	85,704,963.74
For the year 1865.....	122,617,434.07
For the year 1866.....	717,629,808.56
For the year 1867.....	31,034,011.04

For the year 1868.....	\$25,775,502.72
For the year 1869.....	20,000,757.97
For the year 1870.....	21,780,229.87
For the year 1871.....	19,431,027.21
For the year 1872.....	21,249,809.99
For the year 1873.....	23,526,256.79
For the year 1874.....	30,932,587.42
For the year 1875.....	21,497,626.27
For the year 1876.....	18,963,309.82
For the year 1877.....	14,959,935.36
For the year 1880.....	13,536,984.74
For the year 1886.....	13,907,887.74
For the year 1889.....	21,378,809.31
For the year 1894.....	31,701,293.79
For the year 1897.....	34,561,546.29
For the year 1898.....	58,823,984.80
For the year 1899.....	63,942,104.25
For the year 1900.....	55,953,077.72
For the year 1901.....	60,506,978.47
For the year 1902.....	67,803,128.24
For the year 1903.....	82,618,034.18

Thereupon, in the year 1904, we find ourselves confronted with the probability of an expenditure for the Navy for the next fiscal year of nearly a hundred millions of dollars, with the probability of a very large increase of even that figure in the near future.

We are at peace with all the world. There is not the slightest necessity for this large expenditure. If we should unavoidably and necessarily become involved in a war with any foreign power

in the course of the next twenty-five years, which is an extreme improbability, we could at the beginning of the war, with our present resources and facilities for construction, bring into existence inside of two months a large fleet of vessels, of almost any kind that would be required for either offensive or defensive purposes, that would be adapted to then existing needs. The money which we are now spending on large battleships is thrown away. Its results, in the shape of armored vessels, will, in all probability, go into the scrap heap before there is any opportunity to use them, provided we conduct ourselves towards other nations with common decency and common courtesy. Utterly unnecessary, a mere wanton waste of money, labor, and materials, is this forty or fifty millions of dollars a year which we are now spending in the construction of these top-heavy vulnerable craft, with defective speed and defective gun power. Taking them at their best, they are inferior for effective work to the vessels that we could provide inside of sixty days, by the mere purchase of the fastest ocean-going steamships at any particular time, and their conversion into war vessels upon the ideas of Eads and Ericsson. In a recent trial by the Navy Department of the *Columbia* and the *Minneapolis*, presumably our

two fastest armored cruisers, the highest speed reached by either was twenty knots. The maximum speed of the *Rhode Island* battleship in smooth water is nineteen knots. Ocean steamships almost without number make now a speed approximating twenty-five knots. A modern whaleback ship, with an overdeck of steel, with low revolving turrets on Ericsson's methods, carrying two or three rifled guns of the longest range and the highest power, would sink our entire fleet of battleships. The case would be merely that of a skillful boxer, who is able to conquer an antagonist of much heavier weight by superior rapidity of movement, hitting and getting away. In short, our large battleships are nothing more nor less than large floating targets.

It is easily seen, that the present time is, of all times, one when we ought by every possible means to avoid war. All that we need to do, to accomplish that end, is to mind our own business, and treat other nations with common decency and common courtesy. Although our military power is not to-day developed or organized, nevertheless it is evident to all nations that we are the strongest nation on the face of the earth. Every people wishes our friendship. None will venture to make an unjustifiable attack upon us. Wherever the



rights of the United States or its citizens come in question, there can be no reasonable doubt that those rights can be fully secured by peaceful means. The possession of large armaments for this country is quite needless. It is, moreover, a standing incitement to lead us into hostilities without adequate reason. Every one agrees that this country should at all times be properly prepared for war. But proper preparation for war, with us, does not mean the construction of large naval armaments, or the maintenance of a large standing army.

Let us now turn to another case of needless and useless waste of public money now in progress, the Panama Canal.

The construction of the Panama Canal carries with it three certainties: *First*: An enormous money expenditure; *Second*: A long period of time before its completion, during which the interest on the investment would be entirely lost; *Third*: A large increase over the estimates of the cost of construction.

The purpose to be attained by the construction of the Canal is, of course, the transportation of freight and passengers from the Atlantic to the Pacific in large ocean-going ships, without transfer, or breaking bulk. Of course, too, time is of the

utmost importance. Communication from the Atlantic to the Pacific should be accomplished at the earliest possible time, and at the least possible cost.

Now, it happens to be the fact, that two methods of transit for large ocean-going vessels, propelled either by sail or steam, have already been examined, and approved, by the highest engineering authorities, either one of which gives us the largest degree of certainty, of speedy means of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific within a very short period of time, and at a very low figure of money expenditure.

Those two routes are, *First*: the route over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, by means of a ship railway; *Second*: the route to the east of the Isthmus of Panama, called the Darien route, using the river Atrato from the Gulf of Mexico as a canal for upwards of one hundred miles, with a short cut at the head of ship navigation on that river to the Pacific Ocean.

Singularly enough, both these routes, whether intentionally or otherwise, have been quite disregarded, during all the recent discussions of the question of interoceanic transit. It was evidently for the interest of the parties who were attempting to negotiate a sale to our government of the French

rights, that both of these other routes should be kept out of consideration. No criticism is here made on account of that fact against the persons who were engaged in negotiating that sale. Nevertheless the fact remains, that there are these other two routes for interoceanic transit; that they are far less expensive than the Panama route; that either one of them can be constructed in a much shorter period of time; and that each of them has been approved by the highest engineering talent in the civilized world.

A very short statement of facts will lay the whole situation before the reader.

The scheme for inter-oceanic transit by the Tehuantepec route was originally developed and elaborated by the great engineer, Captain Eads. Eads's scheme was for a ship railway. He urged a ship railway at Panama in preference to the scheme of a canal. In a letter to the New York "Tribune," on June 10, 1879, after the completion of his great work on the jetties at the mouth of the Mississippi, Captain Eads said:—

"My own studies have satisfied me of the entire feasibility of such transportation by railroad, and I have no hesitation in saying that for a sum not exceeding one-third of the estimated cost of the canal, namely, about \$50,000,000, the *largest ships which enter the Port of New York can be transferred when fully loaded with abso-*

*lute safety*, across the Isthmus on a railway constructed for the purpose, within twenty-four hours from the moment they are taken in charge in one sea until they are delivered into the other ready to depart on their journey."

Briefly stated, the transportation of ships by ship railway consists in floating the ship into a cradle or dry dock in the port of one ocean, raising that cradle or dry dock by machinery, and placing it on a car propelled over a six-rail railroad, equivalent to the ordinary railroad of three tracks. In the construction of such a railroad it is necessary to eliminate curves. The elimination of the curves is accomplished by the use of turn-tables, where it becomes necessary to change the direction of the track. Eads's entire scheme was elaborated by him with full specifications and working models; and his estimates were worked out with minute detail. The practicability of his enterprise was approved by the leading engineers of both England and the United States. His plans and preliminary preparations had the approval of over fifty prominent naval architects, shipbuilders, navigators, and engineers in the United States and Europe. He expended about \$500,000 in surveys and engineering work on this scheme. If he had lived, the probability is very strong, that his genius and energy

would have been able to carry through the construction of the railway according to his designs. But his death, in 1887, removed the necessary motive power.

The route contemplated began in the Gulf of Mexico, in the harbor of Goatzacoalcos. On the Pacific coast, the railway was to have its terminus near the city of Tehuantepec. The advantages of the Tehuantepec route over the Panama and the Nicaragua routes, in the opinion of Captain Eads, were very great. They were fully detailed by him, but it is unnecessary to go into those details here. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to say, that Eads's estimate of the entire cost of construction of his ship railway complete, including harbors, docks, railway, and general plant and machinery for transporting vessels of 5000 tons gross weight, was less than \$75,000,000.

It may be added, that the general outline of Eads's scheme was communicated by him orally to the British Association of Engineers at its meeting at York, England, in 1881. The Committee of Commerce of the United States Senate between that date and August, 1884 (the precise date I am not now able to give), made by unanimous vote a favorable report to the Senate, recommending that a bill should be passed to promote the construction

of Eads's ship railway. A concession for the construction of the railway was obtained from the Mexican government by Eads in 1881, which extended over a period of ninety-nine years from its date. An article published in the London "Times," used the following language in relation to the enterprise: —

"All the points we have advanced, and the general feasibility of the scheme, are successfully demonstrated by a large working model, of the whole of the appliances which were recently inspected in operation at 127 Long-acre, London. . . . As it is intended to construct the line for profit, the works would not be of such proportions, either in the docks, cradles, or railway, as to carry the *Great Eastern*; although if in the future the transport of such large vessels should be required and promised to be profitable, it would be practicable to carry them by increasing the width of the roadbed, the size of the cradles, and the floatation powers of the openings and turn-tables. Ships of 5000 tons gross weight will include ninety per cent of the present tonnage of the world; and the ship railway will be constructed to accommodate this as the maximum-sized vessels. The single track is considered to be capable with only the five turn-tables that are necessary to change the direction of the road in difficult parts of the line, to permit of ten or twelve ships starting from each end of the line to pass each other daily, and to accomplish the trip in from fifteen to eighteen hours without any difficulty. If these vessels averaged fifteen hundred tons each, they would amount to at least one-fourth more than the Suez Canal is accommodating to-day. In regard to the cost of the ship railway complete,

it is stated, that from the careful estimates based upon the survey, the entire project, including harbors, docks, roadway, and general plant and machinery for transporting vessels of 5000 tons gross weight, will be about £15,000,000."

Full details as to this Tehuantepec route, and its great superiority from a commercial point of view over the Panama and other routes, are contained in United States Senate Document No. 34, of the 54th Congress, First Session, ordered to be printed by the Senate, December 20, 1895. That document is a reprint of a lecture by Elmer L. Corthell, one of the most eminent living railway engineers.

We now proceed to give a statement of some of the facts relating to the Darien route, by the river Atrato.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy, for the year 1873, contains the following statement as to the canal to be constructed by what is termed the Darien route: —

"Briefly stated, the route selected by Commander Selfridge includes one hundred miles of river navigation of the Atrato, which has been carefully sounded, and found to be fully capable of being navigated by the *largest class of ocean steamers*. Between the River Atrato and the Pacific, a canal or artificial cut is made but *twenty-eight miles* in length. The canal for twenty-two miles of its distance passes through a plain with a gradual rise of ninety feet. There will then remain six miles

to the Pacific, of which three are a moderate open cut and three miles of tunnelling. It is estimated that the work will cost between fifty millions and sixty millions of dollars, and that it can be completed within ten years."

Commander Selfridge's report, which appears in the printed volume of Report of the Secretary of the Navy, for 1873, at pages 164 to 181, contains the following statements: —

"That the Atrato is entirely and wholly capable of ship navigation to the point at which we wish to leave it, is a fact that no longer admits of any doubt.

"From ocean to ocean, then, the only barriers are the half mile of sand bar at the Atrato's mouth, and the twenty-eight miles intervening at the mouth of the Napipi, between the Atrato and the Pacific, through which an artificial cut or canal must be made."

The length of the Atrato River available for ship navigation, as above mentioned, is upwards of 100 miles. There can be little doubt, that the twenty-eight miles of continuation from the head of navigation on the river Atrato could be completed with great speed, and economy of construction, by incorporating in the Darien scheme the use of the ship railway on the general designs of Captain Eads. Moreover, with the increased speed of construction under modern mechanical methods, it would seem highly probable that the Darien route could



be completely finished for use within one or two years.

The cost of construction by the Darien route was estimated by Commander Selfridge on two different methods. The most expensive one, after making due allowances of twenty-five per cent for contingencies, was \$90,000,000. Selfridge's estimates were approved by Benjamin H. Latrobe, Esq., the distinguished engineer of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

The statements here made are taken from official documents, now on file in the proper departments in Washington, and are all based on schemes and estimates approved by the highest engineering authorities in the world.

The practical result, which will be accomplished by pursuing the construction of a ship canal over the Isthmus of Panama in accordance with the present plans, or, speaking with more accuracy, with the present absence of any plan, will be the expenditure of upwards of two thousand millions of dollars, extending over a long period of years, with the appointment of a large number of public officials. In other words, managed as nearly everything else has been managed by our national government, the construction of the Panama Canal as now contemplated will constitute another huge corruption fund.

So far as to the uses of money for the purposes of corruption.

Corruption, however, on the part of our public officials, however bad it may be, is not to-day our chief difficulty. The worst feature of our present system is, that it destroys the possibility of selecting men with a view to their fitness for the special work which they are to do in their special offices. At every turn, in the selection of men for high public office, we practically ignore the question of fitness for their work. We make the pretense — of selecting our highest national officials by reason of their “party principles.” But what connection is there between the administration of the War Department, or the Navy Department, or the State Department, or any of the departments, and “party principles”? As matter of practice, “party principles” concern nothing but the distribution of “the spoils,” the payment for the work of operating the election machine.

We are all doing our best, with our present machinery. Our present results are the best that are possible, under our present system of perpetual revolution. People and politicians, we are all doing as well as we can under our present political system. The citizens have not sufficient time — for the operation of the great election machine.

Public officials have not the time — to learn their work, and to do their best. No official is free — to give us his best service. We, the people, are not free — to select our best men. Our present term system, and any conceivable term system, whether the term be long or short, is utterly irrational and unpractical. It is unpractical, because it is irrational. Men do not ripen and decay in one, two, or four years. They are not beets or pumpkins. They require time — to learn how to do their best work. Instead of a term system, we must have a time system.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that under our present political system we put a premium on inefficiency and corruption. As matter of fact, we make it for the interest of our public servants to be unfaithful to their public duties. We make infidelity in our public service pay — and pay better than fidelity. To our public servants we hold out no prospect of continuance in our service, or of advancement, as the reward for faithful and efficient public work. In any private calling, men who do work of the best kind are virtually sure of advancement. They rise to the top. But a man has no such possibility as that in our public employment. The Civil Service reformers are most earnest in their efforts to secure men

who can pass examinations, at the bottom. But what we need is competent men at the top; men of brains and experience; not talkers, but workers; not men who are profuse in professions and protestations, but men who give quiet, efficient performance.

Quite apart, however, from the mere losses in money which result from our present political system, the most serious consideration is to be found in the demoralization of our entire public service, that comes from the supremacy of the machine politicians. The supreme power in the body politic is money — money which is used corruptly. These great political organizations, which we term “parties,” are maintained by money. It is impossible to maintain them otherwise. Every candidate who gets a nomination at their hands, has to pay for it in money. Our so-called popular elections are carried largely by money. Practically — nearly all the highest places in our different governments, local, state, and national, are bought and sold, for money.

It is not intended that the transactions are such in form. It is not often the case that an express agreement is made in so many words, that a nomination, or appointment, is to be paid for at a specific figure in dollars and cents. But when Mr.

Lincoln's friends made the agreement that Mr. Cameron should have a cabinet appointment in payment for the votes of the Pennsylvania delegation, it was perfectly well understood, by the parties to the transaction, that Mr. Cameron would use his powers as he afterwards did. His subsequent course of action was precisely what was to be expected, and what was expected; expected by Mr. Lincoln. When Mr. Lincoln carried out the agreement made by his friends, by putting a man whom he knew to be notoriously corrupt and dishonest into his most important cabinet position, he knew perfectly well, that the appointment meant the loss of many thousands of lives and many hundreds of millions of dollars, to the people who were struggling to support the government. He knew perfectly well, that success in the war would be largely a matter of money; and that it was almost an impossibility for him to do anything so dangerous to our cause as to appoint Mr. Cameron. Is it possible to conceive anything more demoralizing to the entire force of government employees, and to the people, than such an appointment? In substance, in its practical effect, the transaction was neither more nor less than the sale of a cabinet position for money. Only a few years ago, the statement was often repeated in the public press, and, so

far as my knowledge goes, it has never been denied, that a high cabinet position was given in return for the contribution of four hundred thousand dollars to the "campaign fund" of one of the two "grand old parties." It is seldom the case that the candidate for our high elective offices does not pay a large amount of money to his party "campaign fund." No doubt, we do not call this bribery. No doubt, under the letter of the law, it is not bribery. But what can be more ruinous to the honesty and efficiency of our public service? We have, no doubt, become accustomed to these transactions. They are every-day affairs. Indeed, that is the worst feature of the entire situation. The parties to such transactions consider that they are doing nothing to which exception can be taken. It is the fact, that our present political machinery cannot be operated in any other way. The money must be had. In the first instance, it must be paid by the candidates or their friends. Considering the entire situation, however, the practical working of the machinery is, that our highest offices are bought and sold for money; and the action of our highest public officials is thereby placed under the control of money.

The facts and figures here given, as was stated in the beginning of this chapter, concern only

the administration of the national government. Under the national government alone, the losses in money, to say nothing of the needless loss of life in the Civil War, have gone into the thousands of millions.

But losses of the same kind, due to the same cause, are the regular daily result of "machine politics" in our state and local governments. The aggregate of these losses is beyond the possibility of computation. We have been in the habit of thinking that corruption in our public affairs was mainly restricted to the governments of our large cities. But that is an error. The largest losses take place in the operations of our national government. But thereto we must add the fact, that losses of the same kind take place under every state government, and to a greater or less extent, under every local government. Everywhere those losses are in proportion to the size of our public treasuries. It has been impossible here, and it is needless, for the purpose of our present study, to go into the figures of the losses to the American people, due directly to our present political system, in our state and local governments. It is easy to see, that those losses must of necessity go each year into the hundreds, and probably thousands, of millions.

But the money loss alone does not represent the largest part of the injury to public interests, which is due to "machine politics." The greatest evil from which we suffer is in the non-enforcement of the laws. During the last year, this entire people has been stirred more deeply than at any time since the period of the Civil War, by the disclosures of corruption among our highest public officials. Disclosures of abuses in the conduct of the affairs of large moneyed institutions were bad enough. But the worst feature in the situation is, that those abuses were ever possible. They were made possible by the connivance of high public officials. There is even a worse feature in the situation than that. The abuses go unpunished. Fine words, fine speeches, as to the excessive accumulations of wealth in the hands of individuals and large corporations, those we have in abundance, from the highest sources. But here have been many instances of offenses against both the civil and criminal law, and the chief offenders are not brought to justice. Occasionally some inferior subordinate goes to prison. But the men at the head, the chief offenders, in some mysterious way, all escape. Laws we have in abundance. But the laws are not enforced. That is, they are not enforced against the rich and strong. Indeed,



the chief occupation of some of our highest prosecuting officers at the present day would seem to be to devise reasons for the law's non-enforcement. In former times, when grave crimes were committed, we had indictments by grand juries, followed by convictions, and appropriate sentences. But in these modern days, when there has been a homicide, or an embezzlement of trust funds, we have a sensational procedure before a petty magistrate, in order to discover, in advance, whether evidence shall be laid before a grand jury. Every opportunity is given for delay, for the purchase or removal of witnesses by guilty parties. And the result is, that time passes by, some new sensation occupies the public attention, and persons guilty of the gravest crimes known to the law go unpunished. In our great metropolis, in the very worst days of a notorious political organization, criminals were indicted, convicted, and punished, in due course of law, with reasonable promptitude. But to-day homicides almost without number are reported in the daily press, with no effort, so far as one can learn, on the part of our public prosecutors to enforce the law, and secure protection for human life. The same is true as to the protection of property. The same conditions exist throughout the country. Crime goes unpun-

ished. Apparently, no serious attempt is made to enforce the criminal law.

This condition is due directly to "machine politics." Prosecuting officials, and high officials of all kinds, are largely under the control of the election machine, which, in its turn, is under the control of our large modern masses of men and money — the one as much as the other. The professional politician is dependent, for his existence, and his substance, on two things — money and votes. He must have money to control votes. He must have votes to control money. However good may be his wishes, or his purposes, he is always a dependent. He is not a free man. He is the slave of the election machine; and the election machine is the slave of votes and money.

Mr. Lincoln, to take the highest type of a "machine politician," was never a free man — was never free to act on his own best judgment of what would really serve the highest public interests. His use of the powers of his office was always largely dominated by "party considerations;" which is only another way of saying that the interests of the nation were sacrificed to the needs of his own part of the election machine.

So, too, to-day, the fact that these recent abuses in large financial institutions have been possible,

and that they go unpunished, is due to "machine politics," and to nothing else.

Evidently, then, it is an impossibility to make any full, or even proximate, computation of the "cost of machine politics." It is infinite.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NECESSITY OF REORGANIZATION

ESCAPE from these conditions is an impossibility so long as we maintain the supremacy of the election machine.

The supremacy of the election machine will continue precisely so long as we continue the system of tenure by election, under the form of any term system. To escape the result, we must do away with the cause. No system of laws can be devised, which will at once abolish the corrupt use of money in politics. But it is easily possible to devise changes in our present political system, which will make the power of money in politics much less than it is now.

Money ought to be a great power in the state. Indeed, we might almost go so far as to say, that any system of laws which gives the highest degree of security to money will, at the same time, give the highest degree of security to life, liberty, and property of all kinds.

But money must not be the supreme power in

the state. It must not be a power above the law.

What we should endeavor to accomplish, and what it is possible for us to accomplish, is to abolish the present supremacy in our practical politics, not merely of large masses of money, but also of large masses of men — of large and powerful combinations, of both capitalists and laborers, if we are to use those names. For, if we give things their right names, we must remember that every capitalist is a laborer, and every laborer is a capitalist; and the interests of the two are, in the long run, completely harmonious. The protection of each requires nothing more than the constant impartial enforcement of the laws.

Now can any thinking man really continue to be of the opinion, that it is possible to secure the constant impartial enforcement of the laws, under a continuance of our present political system of "machine politics"?

"Machine politics" has for its very essence the leadership of demagogues, and the supremacy of money. Our large political organizations, which we term "parties," are, at all times, dominated by money. Also, at all times, they use for stalking-horses, for political bell-wethers, the men who happen for the time to be "popular" — men who are

fluent, and often eloquent talkers — men who are talkers, rather than doers. As a rule, the efficient workers are not prolific talkers. They have not the time. Indeed, we may almost go so far as to say, that the men who are at any time “popular,” are unfit for any high place in our public service. To a great extent, that has always been the case. But it is more so to-day than ever. The men who are effective workers are generally quiet men, men of few words, who have neither the time nor the inclination, to make themselves “popular.”

Quite aside from that, however, we have the further fact, that the most efficient public service requires such a use of official power as will certainly make a man “unpopular.”

Here we strike political fundamentals. We had hoped, by making our highest public servants periodically dependent on a popular vote, to enforce responsibility to “the people.” What we really secure is responsibility to the election machine. That is a very different thing. As we have already seen, the rule of the election machine is the most subtle foe to free democratic government. For the time, it has made free democratic government an impossibility.

The only possible avenue of escape from the tyranny of the election machine is in its abolition.

The only possible means for the abolition of the election machine is the abolition of the cause of its existence.

The cause of its existence is our system of tenure by election. That one cause has invariably produced that one result. Until recent times, it has worked the wreck of every attempt to establish democratic institutions.

It has almost passed into a political truism, that no political régime, and no political institution, can long continue its existence, in opposition to a deep-seated, well-founded conviction in the community, that its continued existence will work serious injury to the public interests.

Nevertheless, the fact remains, that every intelligent, thoughtful people is conservative. It may almost be said, that its conservatism is in proportion to its intelligence. There is generally a strong inclination, especially in any community where there is a large accumulation of wealth, to let well enough alone; to avoid new experiments; especially, to avoid experiments that are fundamental and radical.

That is reasonable, and right. Experiments that are fundamental, and radical, should, no doubt, be avoided — in general.

But what are we to do, when existing evils are

fundamental, and radical? What are we to do, when the existing political system, in its fundamental, essential features, is such as to make it a practical impossibility, that public opinion, or rather the public judgment, should be the supreme controlling force in the state? The very essence, the very purpose, of democratic institutions, is the supremacy of the will of the people. But what are we to do, when the institutions are so framed as to make it an utter impossibility that the will of the people should be supreme, that is, supreme as the force of regular daily control?

Yet that is our condition to-day. The will of the people is suppressed, and blocked, at every turn, by the impossibility of getting any substantial improvement under our present political institutions.

Naturally, rightly, we are averse to making new experiments. But what are we to say to the policy of continuing an old experiment, which has already failed in the past, and which we know will continue to fail in the future; when, in addition, we know that the injurious results of that failure in the future will steadily increase? For here we have another certainty: that, with our continued increase in population and wealth, there will be



a continued increase in the power of the machine politicians, and their abuse of that power.

If the positions hereinbefore stated are sound, there would seem to be no room for doubt or argument, as to the overwhelming necessity of a fundamental reorganization of our political system.

But then, how is the situation as to its practicability? Is it feasible? Does it admit of actual accomplishment? For practical men, men of affairs, always avoid, or intend to avoid, the impossible. Therefore we are confronted with the question of practicability.

That depends, in my opinion, on the answers to these three following questions:—

I. Is there to-day a general conviction, through the entire community, of a need of reorganization?

II. Is such reorganization demanded, by the community's financial and industrial interests?

III. Is it possible, to-day, to combine all the forces of the community, both the politicians and the people, in an effort for reorganization?

For, if reorganization must be had in face of the united opposition of the machine politicians, the present problem would be even graver than it is. Yet it would not do to concede, even then, that the situation was desperate.

These questions will be considered in the order in which they have been stated.

First: Is there to-day a general conviction, through the entire community, of the need of reorganization?

My answer to this question is in the affirmative.

That does not imply, that the entire community is as yet agreed as to the precise form, which should be given to the measures of reorganization. Such an agreement would take time and careful deliberation; deliberation of such a character as went to the framing of our National Constitution in 1787; such deliberation as then went to the framing of our different State Constitutions. It would be expecting altogether too much, even with our rapid modern processes of thought and action, that this American people should be agreed in advance, as to the form and details of the reorganization which we require. But the evidence is to my mind very clear and conclusive, that the need of reorganization of some kind, thorough and fundamental, has already become a matter of general conviction.

Whenever a people invents, and adopts, a phrase, a name, then we may be certain that that people realizes the practical existence of the thing for which the name stands.

This American people has now long used the name "machine politics." It has now long recognized the fact, that the fundamental practical difficulty, which always stands in the way of the honest and efficient doing of public work, is "machine politics." The ordinary daily expression is, that in order to have any piece of public work really done well, it must be "taken out of politics."

Moreover, it is the common conviction of that fact, among intelligent men, that constitutes to-day the force which keeps the most valuable men in the community "out of politics." They are well aware, that they cannot go into the public service on the same basis on which they stand in private callings. In the private callings, as a rule, in the long run, honest, efficient work of the highest kind brings a man reasonably large rewards, in money and reputation. But more than that, work of the highest order brings promotion. That condition does not exist in public life. In public life, any man who wishes political advancement must do the bidding of the machine politicians. To the people he can give fine phrases, "sounding and glittering generalities," protestations of devotion to all that is respectable and reputable. But he must not be independent. He must be submissive to the election machine.

This condition of affairs exists to-day in this country everywhere, through our entire political life; throughout our local, state, and national governments. It is the general consciousness of that fact, which is indicated by the phrase "machine politics."

Therein is the answer to the first of our three questions.

Second: Is such reorganization demanded by the community's financial and industrial interests?

All business interests are more or less exposed to the action of public officials. Taxation, alone, affords the means of striking every large property interest in the community. The tariff, our system of duties on imports, affords the means of striking the large majority of our large commercial interests. The question of the currency, in its main features, seems at last to have been put on a basis secure against assault. But questions of taxation, and of the tariff, have now been used for many years as the regular daily means for compelling large money payments to the machine politicians. The payments are veiled under the form of voluntary contributions to the "legitimate expenses" of the two political parties. But as matter of fact and substance, these contribu-

tions are forced levies, to pay for official action, which will inure to the benefit of favored private interests. Capitalists and business men, the large majority of them, do not wish conditions of corruption. They do not wish to be compelled to purchase protection against the action of legislative and other officials by the payment of money. But they are compelled to submit to existing conditions. The machine politicians control legislation and the action of taxing officials; and they use their power to compel the payment of large revenues. The amount of those revenues no one can know. But the figures are very large. They are of many millions.

But there is still another feature of the situation; that is, the element of uncertainty and distrust that is brought into the business world by these quadrennial presidential elections, arising from the possibility of large changes in the financial policy of the national government, which may come from changes in the personality of the houses of Congress, and our chief administrative officials.

Once in four years we have a national revolution. No business man can tell what will be its result. For aught he can know, there may be injected into our national councils a mass of new, ignorant, untrained men, who will inaugurate a

volume of crazy, crack-brained legislation, which will involve a complete disarrangement of existing business conditions. The result is a feeling of doubt and uncertainty in the business world, for several months before each presidential election, which has at times operated almost as a complete stoppage of trade and commerce in many branches.

A few years since, one of our leading newspapers printed a series of interviews with leading New York business men, on the money damage to the country's business interests caused by these periodic presidential elections. A few extracts will be given from them.

The President of one of our largest railroads said:

"The cost to the country of the Presidential election is almost incalculable. It has *far exceeded anything ever dreamed of by the founders of the constitution, and accumulates with each election.*

. . . . .

"Here are figures for you.

"It is an underestimate, that the national committees will spend a half million of dollars each, and individuals as much more. This money goes in the direct work of the canvass, printing, speakers, workers, and the aged and infirm voter business. Then the uniformed companies, with their music, halls, transportations, and so on will use up not less than four million dollars more.

"There are frequent suspensions of various industries and a *general check upon expansion and enterprise.* Mill

owners and merchants keep close within necessary demands, waiting for the policy which the result may determine. *New enterprises halt and partially completed ones go slow.* The internal business of the country which would be done in the four months of the Presidential campaign would amount to about \$5,000,000,000 under normal conditions. *Ten per cent of this is stopped* owing to the uncertainty as to the effect upon trade of the different policies of the parties and the doubt of the result.

“The Presidency of the United States is a business, like every other thing. If the President has not had sufficient opportunities for study and experience, I should say that for the first three years of his term he is going to school, and as he must act while he is learning, the country and its commercial interests are necessarily the victims of his experiments.”

The then President of the New York Chamber of Commerce said:—

*“The agitation consequent upon a Presidential campaign always decreases and disarranges commerce; and if commerce suffers, every pursuit and profession, with the single exception of the newspapers, is similarly affected, and it is perhaps a question if what the newspapers gain by an increased circulation in a general election is not lost by the lessened ability of commercial men to support their ordinary amount of advertising.*

*“Aside from the absolutely necessary and what should be unnecessary expenses incident to a general election, which probably exceed a million of dollars in a city like New York, it is a moderate estimate to conclude that merchants in general are subjected to a loss of ten per cent*

*upon the profits of the six months' business during the Presidential campaign, and this takes no account of the loss of valuable time which every good citizen now gives or should give to political affairs.*

"Besides, what commerce demands is stability; uncertainty is disastrous. *Revolutionary changes are fatal to business*; even salutary reforms in business matters should not be sudden or violent. *Festina lente* should be the motto."

The President of another large railroad company said:—

"I am no man at figures, and therefore I can't tell you what is the actual cost to the country of a Presidential election. But I will tell you that the loss to business interests is very large. No matter which party eventually is successful, the preparations for the struggle and the doubt and anxiety surrounding the result are sure to have a deleterious effect upon the affairs of the entire community. A Presidential election occurring every four years does a great deal of harm, from which it takes the country a long time to recover."

The President of the Western Union Telegraph Company said:—

"I have repeatedly said during the last twenty years, that I believed it *cost the country more to make a President than it costs to run the government during a four years' administration*, leaving out of account, of course, the item of interest on the public debt. This may be a large estimate, but, when all the estimates of cost to the country are taken into consideration, I still believe that it would be fully sustained.

. . . . .



"This year was the first time that I have seen an election for President, a Governor and State officers, for Mayor and city and county officers, all coming on the same day and the votes for all deposited at the same time. The necessary effect of all these elections coming at the same time *is to increase the power of machine politics and paralyze independent voting. The number of officers to be elected, and the number of voters who are looking for favors from some one or other of them, give power to the machine to hold a strict rein on party lines, and mark and punish every bolt in the direction of independence. We have here, in our telegraph system, the best barometer in the world as to the effect of Presidential elections upon business. We know of the disturbance they occasion throughout the entire mercantile community better than any one else, and I can tell you the effects are tremendous. With ourselves it does not make so much difference, for we largely make up from political sources and the newspapers the falling off in the volume of commercial business done over our wires. The mass of telegraphic political correspondence and press despatches is enormous. But it is vastly different in commercial life. In many branches of business there is almost complete stagnation for a long time before and for quite a while after Presidential elections. Even now trade is only beginning to show signs of returning animation in many quarters.*"

These opinions cannot be successfully controverted. They are statements of actual existing conditions, from practical business men. These conditions are due to our system of perpetual periodic revolution.

These revolutions inflict severe money loss not on the capitalists alone, but on the entire community. Whatever interferes, periodically and permanently, with the conduct of our large business enterprises, touches the income and earnings of every workingman, whether he works with his hands or his head. The capitalist, the employer, may be the one who feels the injury most directly in the first instance. But the injury does not stop with him. In the end, those who suffer most are the poor and weak. The rich and strong can endure their losses. The most severe sufferers are the employees, so-called, who are dependent on their regular wages for their daily support.

As to this point, then, there can be no doubt, that reorganization is imperatively demanded by all the financial and business interests of the community.

We come, then, to our next question.

Third: Is it possible, to-day, to combine all the forces of the community, the politicians and the people, in an effort for reorganization?

That depends, mainly, on the answer to another question: Is it for the interest, for the mere money interest, of the entire community, of the politicians as well as the people, that we should have such reorganization?

My answer to this question is, that it is most decidedly for the common interest, for the mere money interest, of the entire community — of the “machine politicians” as well as the people — to put an end, at once, finally and forever, to this system of perpetual periodic revolution.

The “machine politicians” are themselves the greatest sufferers from present conditions. They would be the men who would be most directly, most immediately, and most largely benefited by the proposed reorganization. The reorganization can, too, be easily given such a form, in my opinion, as to enlist their earnest support.

Let us see how this is.

Let us take first the case of the national government. Suppose we were to make our reorganization take this form: Consolidate the two houses of Congress, with their existing membership, in a single popular assembly. Abolish the term limitation for those present members; give to the resulting popular assembly, the power of removal of the President by a two-thirds vote. Take away at the same time their power over appointments. Have subsequent elections of new members, and of a President, whenever there shall be vacancies, and not otherwise.

There is at least a possibility, if not a probab-

ity, that such a scheme would secure the support of the existing members of Congress of both parties. For it would practically secure them their present places for a considerable, and indefinite, period. The present members of Congress comprise the most powerful men in both the great "parties," from all parts of the nation. The power of such a combination of men is beyond estimate.

We may at once assume, that even the power of such a combination of men would be unequal to the accomplishment of so great a change in our political system, unless the change were really for the best interests of the entire people. If, however, the change were, in fact, for the best interests of the entire people, then there would be a strong possibility—to say the least—of carrying it through, with such combined support.

The final question then is, would a change of our national government, *in that form*, be for the best interests of this entire people?

My answer is, that it would.

The first and chief point would be, that we should at once make those members of Congress free and independent. We should at once make it possible for them to give us their best work without fear of the election machine. That would be, of itself, an immense advance.

This plan would have another great advantage. It would meet the views of the conservative element in the nation, by removing all danger of any sudden revolutionary interference with existing financial and industrial conditions. The Senate, with its existing membership, would be a component part of the newly organized Congress. That would be an ample security against any violent or sweeping interference with large vested financial and industrial interests.

This plan, too, would proceed on the basis heretofore indicated, of accomplishing a revolution in methods, and not in men.

Whenever such a change should be made, we must take our chances with men. We have to take those chances now. Even now, the regular daily control of national affairs is in the hands of those men who are now in Congress.

Such a change would give us a great improvement over existing conditions. The men now in power are, upon the whole, a better body of men with whom to begin our new experiment, than any other body whom we could reasonably expect to get. For they already have considerable knowledge of public affairs, and have experience. This will always be the case. Certainly our present system of popular election does not from

year to year tend to give any improvement in the quality of our representatives in Congress. But after all is said, our chief practical difficulty in obtaining honest and efficient administration, even under existing conditions, lies in the control of our members of Congress, and our chief executives, by the machine politicians. Our present congressmen — practically all of them — are men of ability decidedly above the average. A large number of them are men of really large capacity, who would be able to give us excellent work, if we only gave them time, and freedom. The thing which we must accomplish, is a change of methods. Perpetual periodic changes of men — that we have tried now for many years. We have now made a prolonged and thorough test of the process of continuous periodic revolution. We have learned by actual experience its outside practical possibilities. We no longer need to depend on theory. The men in power to-day are as good as any that we have any reasonable chance of getting under our present system. It is a virtual certainty, that these men will give us better work, if we give them time, and freedom, than will be possible under present conditions. It is a virtual certainty, that a change of system, retaining these men now in office, will give us bet-

ter practical results than these repeated changes of men, which constitute our outside possibility under our present form of governmental organization.

Sooner or later, we must make a change in methods. We cannot long permit existing conditions. The drain on all the community's forces, on its time, its labor, its money, is wholly needless, and is fast approaching the limits of endurance. We had best make the change at once, even if we take some chances of partial failure. The men now in power in our national government, if they are made secure in their places, will have the largest possible inducement to give us their best work. The bad work that we get from them, even now, is due rather to their lack of freedom, than to any bad intentions on their part. Those same men will do better under new conditions, than new men under conditions now existing.

Freedom, independence, coupled with responsibility, is the essential condition of faithful and efficient public service. If we make our public servants free, and independent, at the same time having adequate security for the enforcement of official responsibility, the able men in our national legislature, of whom there are many, will speedily come to the front, will take control of the situation, and will purify our national admin-

istration. We cannot get purity from stagnation. Nor can we get healthy, vigorous action from men in fetters. In any event, we must trust men. We can trust them all the better, if we give them a free head, and a free hand.

A like method of reorganization could be used for our different state and municipal governments. In every case our effort should be, to effect a permanent revolution in methods, in the place of these perpetual revolutions in men; and to enlist, so far as we can, the support of the machine politicians in accomplishing that revolution.



## CHAPTER V

### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

GOVERNMENT is the agency, on which we depend for the security of life, liberty, and property; for all that makes life worth living; for the safety of the individual; for securing to the individual the possibility of developing himself, on his own lines, working out his own career, making the most of his own powers, in short, living his own life.

In the last century we have heard much of individualism; of individualism as opposed to authority; especially the authority of government. It has been hastily assumed, that there was a necessity of opposition between the two.

That is an error. Individualism cannot exist, that is, it cannot exist in full force and virtue, without the authority and protection of government. Moreover, the authority of government must be backed by force — by the power of the entire community. That force and power must be exercised by the community's wisest heads.

So, too, as to freedom. Freedom cannot have

an existence, without the protection of the law. That protection it cannot have without government. Government cannot do its whole duty, cannot adequately serve its ends, unless it be strong — unless, too, it acts with vigor and speed, and at the same time, with wisdom. It must embody the force of the entire community in a single hand. That hand must be guided, and controlled, by a single brain, and a single will — the brain and will of the entire people.

We must abandon, finally, the primitive idea, that “government by the people” means government by everybody; or government by average ordinary men taking turns, rotatory government. Rotatory government is not democracy. Neither is democracy mass rule. Mass rule is mob rule. Rotatory government is “machine politics.” No sane man advocates the rule of the mob. But that is what we must have, in a greater or less degree, unless we have genuine government by the people, acting through men carefully selected. Selection, selection of the fittest, is the essence of wise and efficient government — the essence of democracy.

Democratic institutions have come into existence for practical reasons. They have been the result of the efforts of practical men; of efforts

to devise political machinery which will give us better practical results than can be attained from any hereditary system. Hereditary systems have been tested in many forms. They always have been, and always must be, failures. Especially, they are quite inadequate to deal with our large modern social forces.

Democratic institutions, however, as before stated, have not yet been made a final success. They are still in their experimental stages. Prior to the experiment in our own great political laboratory, initiated in 1787, they had never been tried on any large scale. Up to that time, efforts at popular government had in the main been limited to single cities, to small separate communities. Our experiment of 1787 was the first in the world's history, wherein the attempt had been made to weld together in one democratic organism large independent communities, with large territories, and large populations.

The men who inaugurated that experiment were far from sanguine as to its results. Some of them were pessimistic to an extreme. They feared, that the attempt to establish a supreme national government would result in a new tyranny.

Time, however, has now demonstrated the possibility of operating democratic institutions

on a large scale, governing by their agency large territories, and large populations.

Nevertheless, this first experiment in democracy on a large scale has developed working defects in the forms of political machinery hitherto in use. Especially, it has developed defects in the machinery for securing the formation, and the supremacy, of the will, and the judgment, of the people. We thought to have government, of the people, by the people, for the people. Our practical result — thus far — is tyranny, of the people, by the election machine, for the election machine.

Organization is as much a necessity in governments, as in all collections of men, wherein combined common action is to be taken by men in large numbers. The larger the numbers, the greater the necessity of organization. Without organization, a "people" becomes a mob.

We are to-day confronted with an alternative, between a continuance of our futile attempt at mass rule and the establishment of organized democracy. From that alternative there is no escape.

Our experience has now taught us, that the practical result of any system of periodic popular election is to put government in the hands of a body of men who make vote hunting and place hunting

a trade; who buy and sell votes, offices, and official action, as articles of merchandise, for money. The theory is, that the supreme power in the state is the will of the people. The actual practical result is, that the supreme power in the state is money.

Our existing conditions can be obviated, and avoided, only by right organization. That organization must take such form as to make it possible for the people to select fit men to be the head of the body politic, and to keep them there; to train them in the school of experience; to give them time to accomplish substantial results, to show the stuff they are made of; to use them so long as they are individually and separately fit for their individual separate work; to change them singly, as such changes become necessary; to promote men from the ranks, as they show themselves fit for promotion; to retire and pension our public servants, when they have served us faithfully for a sufficiently long time. In short, we must so reorganize our political system as to bring the people's brains to the top; to give free play to the normal natural political forces, to the forces of mental gravitation. Gravitation, in things of the mind, works upward. Brains are like cream. They rise to the top. But perpetual stirring of the political

caldron makes it impossible for the cream to rise. In short, conditions of perpetual revolution make impossible the operation of the regular political forces, after normal natural methods. We must put an end to this process of perpetual periodic revolution. We must establish the supremacy of the judgment and the will of the people. We must put an end to the supremacy of the election machine.

That is a thing quite within our political possibilities, with the new light that we have acquired from our experience in the last century. It is quite practicable for us, to-day, to install a new form of political machinery; or, to speak with more accuracy, to do a work of reconstruction, and reorganization, in the development of democratic institutions.

The tendency in democratic development is, distinctly and unmistakably, towards the adoption of the popular assembly as the organ of supreme control in the body politic; an organ having its own continuous life; with a steady continuous outflow of old blood; a steady continuous sloughing off of old fibre; and a corresponding continuous inflow of new blood, and growth of new fibre in place of old.

A really representative popular assembly, selected by a free process of popular election, is now

easily within our political possibilities. Give us a process of really free popular election, allow the citizens in each constituency to have the use of that process in the selection of the individual members of the popular assembly, and we shall have as near to a certainty as we can get in human affairs, that that assembly will be composed of men, each one of whom will be a man of exceptional ability, of exceptional integrity, of sound judgment, and closely in touch with the interests of his own district. We shall have as near to a certainty as we can get in human affairs, that that assembly will be composed of men of all shades of opinion, on the important questions of the day. Such a body of men, while its action will not be perfect, will be the best body of men available, for forming wise judgments on the management of our daily public interests.

In trusting the supreme control of public affairs to such a body of men, we shall not place our dependence on the ability and integrity of any single man, or of any small number of men. Our dependence will be on the ability and integrity of the entire body, composed of men selected by the severe process of the deliberations of an electoral college or convention — reënforced and supported at all times by the sunlight of publicity. Of course,

we must assume, that at times single individuals, even if selected by this most careful of processes, will prove false to their trusts. But we must also assume, that it will seldom happen, that any large number of such men will betray the interests committed to their charge. It is now an old truth, that the possession of power brings the sense of responsibility. When the possessor of power is free, is free to act on his own best judgment, if he is placed in the focus of the public gaze, we have the strongest security practicable for wise action. In a representative popular assembly, of reasonably large numbers of men, whose tenure of office does not depend on money or votes, we shall find our strongest security, not for action that will be perfect, but for action that will be the best available from merely human agencies. It will be action of a far higher order than any that we can get from any assembly of men who are selected and controlled by the election machine.

The superiority of the practical results obtainable from such a body of men to anything that it is possible for us to get from our present state and national legislatures, with all the agencies and influences procurable from our present political system, is beyond calculation. The power on which we must depend, as the great motive power



in democratic government, is the power of free thought. That power is destroyed by the election machine. That power we can get, and use, as the regular motive force in the body politic, only when we give to our public servants full and complete freedom — while, at the same time, we insure full responsibility to the people, directly or indirectly, on the part of every single public official.

The term “representative,” when used in this connection, under any correct theory of democratic government, means, not that the “representative,” so called, is to “represent” his constituents’ opinions; or that he is to act on his constituents’ opinions; but that he is to act for them, as their attorney or agent, on his own best judgment; that he is to take part, on their behalf, in the joint deliberations of their general assembly; that he is to contribute his part, in the shape of his own best thought, to those deliberations; that his thought is to be free; his action is to be free; to the end, that the thought and action of the entire assembly may be free. So, only, will it be possible, to get that assembly’s wisest action. So, only, will it be possible, to get the wisest practicable action of “the people,” whom that assembly “represents,” for whom it acts. The citizens of each constituency must select their represen-

tative, not because he "represents" the present opinions, of a majority of the citizens, on some few public questions, which have a deep public interest at that particular time. They must select him by reason of his own personal qualities; his individual calibre and character; his ability to do good practical work in the deliberations of the popular assembly; to do good service in enabling that assembly to form the people's wisest judgment on the large public questions of the future.

"Issues," and "platforms," always, of necessity, largely concern questions of the past. Or, if they concern questions of the present, they concern those questions in relations already known. Moreover, they are always vague and valueless. But the questions on which our popular assemblies are to act are the new questions of the future. Those new questions of the future, when they come up for action, will present new relations. They will arise in new forms, not yet known and understood. Those questions must be decided, under the new conditions of the future. They must be decided by the popular assembly's free thought, by its best judgment.

Democracy's chief essential feature should be the supremacy of the people's brain, the popular assembly; a single organ, brought into being by

the process of natural selection, the selection of single men, by reason of their special fitness for their special work.

The practical result, which will be accomplished by democracy in that form, that is, which will be accomplished more nearly and surely than under existing conditions, will be the supremacy of free thought, the thought of the whole people. What we shall get will be, not the hasty prejudice of the moment, even though it be the prejudice of a majority of the entire multitude; but the calm, deliberate judgment of the entire people, thinking as a unit, judging as a unit, acting as a unit.

We have been losing sight of the fundamental nature of the process of joint united deliberation, by a people, as a people. We have been confusing that process with the other process, of making a mere enumeration of the individual prejudices, or, if you please, opinions — of a mere majority of the citizens in mass. The processes are essentially different. The one has little or no practical value, as a power for the steady, wise control of the forces of a large community. The other is the best process that can be devised, so long as human nature remains what it now is, for forming and uttering the judgment, and the will, of a people,

thinking and acting as a people, and not as a mere aggregation of individuals.

The present prevalent idea as to the nature of democracy is, that it means, to some extent, a lack of authority, a lack of control; in fact, that it means a greater or less degree of license.

Even at the risk of repetition, let it be said, democracy means something far different. It means, that there must be in the state a supreme authority; a power of supreme control; which will have greater wisdom, greater strength, and greater stability, than anything practicable under any other form of government. At the same time, democracy, rightly organized, will give a more perfect security for genuine freedom, than government in any other form. Freedom, in any correct sense of the word, cannot exist without governmental control, a control which is strong, firm, and irresistible. If every man is free to do as he wishes, the result will be constant interference with the freedom of others. Freedom can have no real existence, unless it be freedom for all the individual members of the community; and unless that freedom for all be equal. In order to secure freedom of that kind, there must be laws; made, and enforced, by some common supreme authority. That authority must be the government. Govern-

ment, whenever necessary, must use force, all the force that is necessary, to compel complete obedience to those laws. Without force, which can be so used, government has no practical value. Democratic government, in its more finished form, will be a government wherein the judgment of the people is the final supreme authority, and in which that authority is backed by the united forces of the entire community, consolidated under a single will, the will of the people, a stronger will than the will of any one man, or any few men. Democratic government implies a higher authority, and a higher degree of strength, than government of any other form.

Good government is the fundamental essential of the world's healthy life; of the life of every people, and every individual. The functions of government are constantly growing; they are becoming, if not wider, at least more complex. Education, the care of the poor and the weak, the management of the public highways, the regulation of commerce, the protection of all the relations of life, upon which each individual depends for his fullest individual development, and the fullest enjoyment of his individual rights and liberties — all these fall within the sphere of government. The full development, and the most complete

happiness, of every individual, depend on having the work of government in the hands of able, wise, and experienced men. It cannot be left in the hands of professional politicians, who have neither the capacity, the knowledge, or the training, which are absolutely requisite, if these large public interests are to be handled with wisdom.

Democratic government, rightly organized, will give us greater efficiency of administration than government in any other form. It has, no doubt, not yet been fully developed. When, however, it is fully developed, its administrative results will be as much superior to anything previously accomplished, as the performances of the steam engine, the telegraph, and the telephone, are superior to the mechanical results of the earlier centuries. We can make as great advances in politics, as we have in our industries. Our industrial progress, even now, is the marvel of the world. Our political progress can be no less so. For the same reasons.

The reason for our wonderful industrial progress is mainly to be found in our conditions of industrial freedom; in the ease with which men find their right places; the ease with which men of merit rise to the top. No doubt, we owe much to our large areas of rich virgin soil; to our variety

of climate; to our stores of iron and coal; to our lakes and rivers, which have so facilitated our solution of the problems of transportation. Much, too, is due to blood, to the mental and physical vigor of what we call the Anglo-Saxon race, still in this country the dominant race. Nevertheless, the combination of all these great advantages is not sufficient to account for our industrial results, which are to-day the marvel of the civilized world. Their main cause is to be found in our conditions of industrial freedom. In our private business callings, every individual has a full opportunity of rising to that place in the world for which he is fit; to a position as high as his abilities can take him. The entire industrial world is open to him. The possibility of rising to the top, the possibility of achieving a large success, is the spur in the side of the young men, who are seeking their fortunes in the industrial world. The certainty, that industrial brains will bring industrial leadership, there is the great stimulus to our industrial activity, and the chief cause of our industrial success.

In the world of industry, too, we have, not only freedom of development, and movement, but we have freedom of industrial thought. Old methods are compelled to face new ones; to vindicate their right to survival, in the free competition of indus-

trial ideas. In our industrial world, barring the tariff, freedom of thought and action are practically without limitation.

For a time we had the same kind of freedom in our political world. Until the later and more perfect development of the election machine, there was always the possibility — that any young man of large mental capacity, who “went into politics,” as the phrase is, would get legitimate advancement, by a legitimate use of the same methods that would secure him advancement in any private business or profession; that is, by honest hard work in the line of his special calling. To satisfy one of the accuracy of this statement, it is only necessary to read the biographies of our statesmen of the earlier half of the last century. Brains then brought to their possessor the same kind of preferment in public life, that was gained by the use of brains in the private callings.

No doubt, brains, such as they are, are still required in the profession of “politics” as it exists to-day. But it would hardly be contended, that the conditions which insure success in “politics” to-day are the same with those which insured that success a hundred years ago. Money was no doubt a power in politics in the earlier half of the nineteenth century. But it was not such a power as it is now.



Democracy has, for its first fundamental essential, political freedom. Every individual citizen should have the full and free opportunity of rising to that place in the public service to which his abilities entitle him; and of rising to that position by the use of legitimate methods, by faithful public service. Not only is that opportunity the right of the individual. It is also for the interest of the people. The people needs for its service its best brains. It needs its best men. It is absurd in the extreme, to suppose that our vast public interests can be well handled by men of only ordinary capacity, and ordinary experience. The men for the people's service must be its best. The best brains in the community must have the possibility of rising in our public service to the highest places.

There we strike the essential fundamental vice of our present system of machine politics. Men cannot rise to the highest places in the state by the legitimate use of their brains. The supremacy of brains and character in the state is an impossibility — with any system of machine politics. The practical difficulty is, that, with machine politics, we do not, and cannot, have free elections; the people cannot make its own free choice of the men who are to hold the places at the head. Many thoughtful men have come to distrust the process

of popular election, as a process for getting men of ability and character in the public service. But our elections to-day are not free. The process of popular election, even in its present faulty form, has abundantly vindicated the right of the process to our confidence, if used in the right form, and within its right limits. This American people, to-day, the citizens in our large cities, as well as the citizens in the rural districts, the vast majority of them, are agreed on one thing: they wish their public affairs to be in the hands of men of capacity and character. They wish something more than mere ordinary, average men. They wish the best. They will elect the best, if they have a process of really free popular election, whereby they can put their heads together; can confer, deliberate, and finally form their own common judgment, upon the merits of candidates, and put that judgment into effect in their choice of their public servants.

Freedom, in the process of popular election, with the limitation of that process to its legitimate function, the function of original selection, discontinuing its use, or rather its abuse, in the futile attempt at the enforcement of responsibility to the citizens in mass, that is almost the sum and substance of our present political needs. That is the chief feature of the reorganization here suggested.

But in order to secure freedom in the process of popular election, we must abolish the secret ballot and the term system. We must substitute in their place the public meeting. We must substitute tenure at the will of the people, for tenure at the will of the election machine.

It is hopeless to take refuge in any less fundamental measure, in anything less than fundamental organic reconstruction. We must deal with causes, not with surface symptoms. We must have a rational, common sense, practicable political system.

The election machine is a very perfect contrivance for carrying elections. And if we continue to turn government into one vast election machine, then it may be conceded, that we already have nearly as good an apparatus as can be devised — for that purpose. Our American fertility of inventive genius has here stood us in good stead. It has constructed the best possible machine — for the work to be done.

If, however, government is to be something more than an election machine, if it is to be an organized body of men who are fitted to handle large public interests with wisdom, in such a way as will best serve the highest interests of the entire people, then we must have something far different. Then we must have, at the head of each body poli-

tic, men who are carefully selected for their work, doing that work under the constant supervision and control of the popular assembly, the people's brain, an organ composed of the people's best fibre, selected by the people's own judgment, by the process of popular election, which is, for this purpose, the process of nature. Nothing less will meet our needs.

But it may be said, that the change here suggested would create an aristocracy.

So it would.

Every government should be, so far as is practicable, an aristocracy; a government by the people's best men. Democracy, rightly organized, will be an elective aristocracy. By this it is not meant, that the process of popular election is absolutely certain, in every instance, to select the very best man who might possibly be found in the community by the use of infinite knowledge, and infinite wisdom. Even the process of popular election is human. It uses imperfect human beings. Its results will be imperfect. My meaning is, that, in the long run, in the large majority of instances, the process of popular election, if used in the right form, and within right limits, is more certain than any other human process, to give us the best men at the time available, for the highest classes of

public work. In other words, the judgment of any community, as to the fitness of men for the highest classes of public work, in communities such as ours, with their large intelligence, with all the modern machinery for acquiring knowledge, with the modern press for full and free public discussion, is the best judgment available, for the selection of the men who are to be the community's head. The judgment of the community will almost invariably be based on reputations. Reputations are almost invariably accurate indices of calibre and character. Reputations are character barometers. The process of popular election, selecting men on their reputations, will seldom go wrong.

At this point of our study, we may gather some instructive lessons from what is termed "parliamentary government," as it exists in England. In the first place, it illustrates most forcibly the safety of the concentration of the power of general supervision and control in a single popular assembly, even if that assembly be not completely "representative." No practical evil has ever resulted from this concentration. So far as my reading goes, there are few instances on record, of hasty, ill-considered action on the part of the British House of Commons, in its entire history. Political narrow-

ness, excessive conservatism, mainly due to class prejudices, there have been, no doubt, in abundance. But there are few instances, so far as my reading goes, of action that has been hasty, ill-considered; and no instance within my recollection, of action that involved any danger, or evil, which resulted from the concentration of the power of supreme supervision and control in the hands of a single popular assembly.

In the next place, there could be no evidence so conclusive, as to the safety of the people's liberties in the hands of a popular assembly whose members are free from the direct control of the mass of citizens. The British House of Commons has never been really "representative" of the entire people. Its members never have been selected by a process of free popular election. It has always been, and still is, representative — in the main — of the landed gentry. Its members never have been, and are not now, chosen by the free voice of the entire people. Laying quite aside, for the moment, the point of any property qualification for voters, a large majority of the members of the British House of Commons, even now, hold their seats, not by anything that can be properly termed a popular vote, but by reason of their ownership of the land, and their family influence. Until recently,

the large majority of those members have almost owned their seats, as part of their landed property. A large number of them, for all practical purposes, are still in that situation. In other words, a large proportion of the members of the British House of Commons have at all times been quite independent of any control by voters; have been free to act on their own independent judgments, without regard to the opinions, or the votes, of any so-called constituents. The result has been, in the main, highly beneficial to the large majority of public interests. No doubt, there has been a large weight of class prejudice to overcome. But the class prejudice has been overcome, not, in general, by reason of the fears of any popular vote, or of unpopularity, but by the mere legitimate exercise of the power of free thought among free men. Making all allowance for some slowness of movement, arising from the ignorance and incapacity of many of its members, we shall still find the fact to be, that no other legislative assembly can show so long a record of wise legislation, and of legislation so uniformly in the direction of securing full protection for the lives, liberties, and property of the entire body of citizens, as is to be found in the history of the British House of Commons. Its individual members, the large majority of them,

have not been in sympathy with progress, or with new ideas. Yet they have been compelled to yield to progress, and to new ideas. Progress has come. New ideas have worked their way, have conquered opposition. Property in House of Commons seats, inherited with their land, for such it has been in practice, has been the means of giving to the English people the service of many of its greatest statesmen, under what has been practically a tenure for life. To its "pocket boroughs," the English people is largely, if not mainly, indebted, to-day, for its present stage of political progress; for its present degree of advance in the direction of free political thought, as embodied in its legislation, and for its present position in the great march towards democracy.

There could be no more clear and conclusive object lesson, as to the needlessness of the term system, as a protection for the people's liberties, and the people's rights. Such is the power of free thought and free speech, that almost any body of men, of reasonably large numbers, elected by a process of free popular election, who are free to act on their own judgments, are virtually certain to take wise action for the protection of public interests. Free thought — and free speech — those are the securities, and they are adequate securi-



ties, for the rights and liberties of the people. It is in the practical suppression of free thought and free speech, that we find the conclusive condemnation of our own present political system. If the members of the supreme popular assembly really "represent," fully and fairly, all classes and interests in the community, all shades of opinion, as they will do, if they are selected by a process of really free popular election in the different election districts, we shall have the strongest security possible, with mere human agencies, for the wise and efficient administration of public affairs, and the protection of the people's liberties and the people's rights.

Political systems must be judged by their capacity to produce practical results. So judged, any and every hereditary system is fatally defective. Inheritance does give a good practical system for the transmission of property. But the people's offices are not property. They are places for hard work, to be filled by able, well-trained servants, who are to be selected by reason of their fitness for the public service. Any political system, whereunder the headship of the state passes by inheritance, is an unsound system. It is founded on false principles. It produces a condition of unstable equilibrium.

At this point, it will be well to consider briefly the part played by what is termed "parliamentary government" in the development of democratic institutions.

What is termed "parliamentary government" is a temporary device, to accomplish the double purpose, of retaining the hereditary principle, and yet evading its unavoidable evils. It is a forced concession to the demand for democracy. It is a device of transition. It cannot long endure. It stands condemned, by the laws of political dynamics; by its lack of capacity to produce satisfactory practical results. It is a passing stage in the development of democracy.

So, too, with the election machine. It, too, stands condemned, by the laws of political dynamics; by its lack of capacity to produce satisfactory practical results. It gives us talkers instead of workers; demagogues instead of statesmen; "platforms," and "issues," instead of practical administrative results. It must give way to democracy, to genuine "government by the people."

In every nation, at every period, there have been men of large ability, of high integrity, of broad, generous public spirit, who have been eager to enter the service of the people. The term system, with every people that has ever made use of it for

any considerable time, has always been a fatal barrier, which has in general kept such men apart from the control of public affairs. Periodic voting, by the citizens in mass, by the secret ballot, always furnishes a ready and easy means, whereby cheap, noisy demagogues can overpower wise, working statesmen. The combination of those two pieces of political machinery has never been tested with so great thoroughness as by the people of these United States in the last half century. Political machinery and political processes, like industrial machinery and industrial processes, sometimes require to be used on a large scale, before their working results become fully apparent. It was necessary that the combination of the term system and the secret ballot should be put into operation on a large scale, before there could be satisfactory proof of their pernicious practical results. We have experimented with that combination on a large scale. We now know — to a certainty — its actual practical results.

There is a tendency at the present day to under-rate the importance of political institutions. An idea widely prevalent is, that every people has as good political institutions as it deserves; that the practical operation of government, under institutions of any form, depends mainly, almost wholly

on the character of the people; and, that any people can get nearly as good working results under institutions in one form as another. The position is seldom stated in this extreme form. But practically, this is an accurate statement of a widely prevailing belief.

This belief involves a great error.

Political institutions are the tools, the machinery, of politics, of government. They are as important, in matters of government, as they are in our industries. Man's possibilities of performance, in any and every direction, are limited by his tools, his machinery. "The man behind the gun," to use a phrase of the day, is of vital importance. The gun, in the hands of the man, is of nearly as great importance. Man cannot go beyond the limitations of his implements.

Our men are of the best. But our political tools, our political machinery, are susceptible of great improvement.

We must have the best institutions. The industrial well-being, the moral and intellectual well-being, of the entire community, and of every one of its individual members, depend largely on our form of government, on the character of our political institutions.

Still another belief has a wide vogue in the polit-

ical discussions of the day. It is, practically, that political institutions develop of themselves, without the agency of man; that we inherit them; that we must accept them, and submit to them. This belief, too, is not often stated in this extreme form. But the statement here made gives its real force. The belief is an offshoot, a corollary, from the current doctrine of "evolution," so called. Life and institutions, political and other, are vaguely assumed to be a necessary, inevitable result of pre-existing causes; to be something from which we cannot escape, of our own independent volition, and independent effort.

Directly the reverse is the fact. We make, and change, our own political institutions. In these modern times, as soon as any intelligent people reaches the conviction that its political institutions are unsatisfactory, that those institutions do not give satisfactory working results, that people will, in time, change its institutions. The change may be slow or quick; it may be violent or peaceful. But as soon as any people becomes an intelligent, thinking people, whenever the working results of its form of government become unsatisfactory, that people certainly will, in time, begin to think of the reasons for those results, of their causes. In time, it will try to find remedies for working defects, and

will try to put those remedies into practical operation.

This has been the real reason for every political revolution that the world has ever seen — the dissatisfaction of a people with actual working results.

Of course, with most peoples, inasmuch as most of them are slow and ignorant, the processes of revolution will be slow, and ill-advised. Those processes will often be the results of ignorant impulse, rather than of sound political thought and judgment. The reason is, that few peoples have as yet given careful study, and thorough thought, to the science of politics, to the science of political dynamics. The materials for such study and thought have not long been in existence.

But this American people is extremely conservative. It is difficult, almost impossible, to induce it even to take into consideration any suggestion of a fundamental change in its fabric of government. In order to induce such consideration, we must present a case of pressing necessity.

Is there, then, such a necessity?

My answer to this question is, that there is such a necessity; and that it is pressing and overwhelming.

The reasons are these: —

Destruction of the election machine is the absolute essential, if we are to secure any genuine political freedom; either for the people in the choice of their public servants, or for their servants in the discharge of their duties to the people. Genuine democracy, genuine "government by the people," cannot be secured without the destruction of the election machine.

Especially, a radical reorganization of our political system is an absolute necessity, if we are to put an end to the present political supremacy of money. By no possible means can we entirely destroy the power of money in politics. It is not desirable that we should do so. Money ought to be a great power in the state. It always will be. What we should attempt, however, is to take from money its present overwhelming political supremacy.

That supremacy cannot be destroyed, without a thorough reorganization of our political machinery. So long as we continue our present system of perpetual periodic term elections, so long it will continue to be necessary to furnish these immense amounts of money, for the maintenance of our standing armies of machine politicians. Plutocracy must give way to democracy, if we are to have either public purity or governmental efficiency. Plutocracy will continue, however, precisely so long

as we continue to turn government into an election machine.

Let us go one step further.

The political life of a community, like the life of an individual, of any human organism, must be one of steady, continuous growth. It should not be a series of revolutions. Healthy growth, for the body politic, as for the single individual, consists in a process of steady, gradual renovation of all the tissues; of the different cells, organs, and members, of the entire body politic; by the gradual and continuous substitution of new fibre for old. The process of perpetual periodic revolution, of perpetual periodic decapitation, for that is the real essence of our present term system, is not a process which conduces to a continuous healthy growth.

It is an organic necessity, that each body politic, each separate political community, should be under a single supreme authority; the authority of a body of men carefully selected, representative, whereby all the subordinate organs and members shall be controlled and regulated; under which the operations of all those organs and members shall have unity, and harmony. Concentration — and consolidation — are the methods of the modern industrial world. They must be the methods of our new political world. Unity of political control, unity



of political action, stability, with the continuous steady development of public policies — these are the requisites to the healthy life of any large modern community. They are possible only under a democracy; under a single head, under a single brain; under the rule of the representative popular assembly, of which the fibre and forces will be constantly and continuously renewed by the steady, continuous change of its individual members. In no other way is it possible to have a healthy, vigorous, political life.

Democracy has hitherto generally been considered to be government by aggregations of the masses; through periodic votes of majorities of individuals.

Government in any such form can — by the utmost possibility — be nothing but a series of revolutions. Those revolutions may be free from violence. They may be had under the strict letter of the law. Nevertheless, they will be revolutions. They will prevent the possibility of a steady, healthy, organic growth. Hitherto, they have caused disaster to nearly every experiment in the installation of democratic institutions.

Democracy, with our large modern masses of wealth and population, must be something far different. Democracy must be the government of a

people by its best available mind and thought. Democratic government must secure a continuous organic life, under continuous organic processes. It must secure the consolidation, for all public purposes, of the forces of the entire community, under a single will, controlled by the community's best judgment.

In short, democracy must be government by the people's brain.

Government by the people's brain is an impossibility, under the supremacy of the election machine. It is an impossibility, under any system of periodic revolution; even if we assume, contrary to the fact, that at each revolution we are to get a true and accurate expression of the individual opinions at that time of a majority of its citizens. An expression of a mere majority of opinions of individual citizens is not an expression of the judgment of the entire community.

At the end of the first century of our national existence, we find ourselves confronted with the necessity of another contest for liberty; another struggle for free democratic government; another revolution.

But it will be a revolution of a new kind; a lawful, peaceful revolution; not against any one man, or combination of men; but against a political

system; and not against a system which has been forced upon us by a foreign power, but against one of our own creation. Strangely, too, the very features in that system, on which we have depended for securing the people's liberties, and the supremacy of the people's will, are the ones which have turned out in the end to be the destroyers of both; of the people's political freedom, and the people's political power. It is those features, which have, for the time being, destroyed democratic government. Actual experiment — an experiment of more than a century — has now clearly demonstrated, that certain pieces of our political machinery have been put to abnormal and excessive uses. The machinery has broken down. It served well enough for small communities, and small political forces. It will not serve the needs of large communities, using the large political forces of the present day. It is as thoroughly antiquated, as completely out of date, as the old corduroy road, or plank turnpike.

Emancipation is the end to be accomplished; emancipation of the citizen, and of the people, from the thralldom of machine politics; from the tyranny of an institution—a tyranny which has become, in its practical results, a more complete obstacle to political progress than could be the tyranny of any foreign foe. The tyranny of a for-

eign foe would rouse instant armed revolution. But the tyranny of an institution, especially of an institution of our own creation, is so subtle, so difficult of appreciation, that it seems at first almost impossible to convince the community of its nature and its dangers.

What we have now to accomplish is, the achievement of full political freedom : freedom of political thought; freedom of political speech; and freedom of political action.

Outside of the sphere of practical politics, our freedom of thought, speech, and action may be conceded to be reasonably complete. Even within the sphere of practical politics, it is not restricted by the letter of the law. So far as concerns the letter of the law, every citizen is free to think, and vote, as he may see fit ; he is free to speak, and print, anything he may see fit, in the way of legitimate criticism on public men and their action.

But in actual practical politics, the individual citizen has nothing that can be correctly termed freedom. The very essence of the citizen's freedom, under any form of government that can be rightly termed democratic, is that the citizen, in the choice of public officials, shall be free to act, within reasonable limits, on his own judgment. No doubt, he must act in combination with other men. In so

doing, he must, to a considerable extent, be willing to surrender complete freedom of individual action. But the citizen must have far greater freedom of action, especially of combination, than he gets, or can get, as matter of practice, under our present political system; whereby every citizen is virtually compelled to become the blind follower of one or another group of machine politicians; under which he becomes, practically, a mere attachment to the election machine.

When, too, we consider the action of our public officials, we shall find that there, too, genuine freedom of action has practically disappeared. Fifty years ago, when a public measure of importance came up for consideration in one of our legislative assemblies, we were reasonably certain, that it would receive a free public discussion, and a fair public consideration, on its merits. Public measures were — in the main — decided by the use of the natural, normal process of public thought.

To-day, however, free public discussion, free public deliberation, upon the merits of important measures, is a process that has for the time almost fallen into disuse. Well-informed men no longer expect, that an important public measure is to be fully and fairly considered on its merits, in any one of our many popular assemblies. The action

of our popular assemblies, on the large majority of large public questions, is secured in advance, by the virtual purchase of their members, through the payment of money, or other valuable considerations, to powerful machine politicians. Indeed, when we consider the extent to which both citizens and public officials are under the control of the machine politicians, and how completely the machine politicians are under the control of money, it is hardly an overstatement to say, that under our present political system, instead of establishing the supremacy of the will of the people, we have established the supremacy of corruption. It is hardly an exaggeration to say, that the body politic is thoroughly permeated with political pyæmia.

The subtlety of the disease, with its slow and gradual development, has blinded us to its real nature. It has been a gradual growth, the result of our great increase in population and wealth. Our increase in population has been the cause of the increase in the volume and intricacy of our election machinery, with the consequent increase in the use of money, in carrying our annual elections. Our increase in wealth has been the cause of the increase in the money value of the control of government officials. The two causes in combination

have operated to take the selection and control of our public officials and public affairs out of the hands of the citizens, and vest it in a large body of men, who "go into politics" to serve their own personal ends; oftentimes for the reason that in the natural course of affairs, on their own merits, or their demerits, they have fallen into the ranks of the unemployed.

The magnitude of the result, the completeness of the tyranny which we have established, is beyond calculation. The reason is, that our growth in wealth and population has been so phenomenal. Our election machine has become a monstrosity. In ancient and mediæval times, we have seen tyrannies of single men, or of single classes. But their power has had comparatively narrow limits; for the populations and resources under their control have been comparatively poor and weak. But here in this twentieth century, the most intelligent people on the face of the earth, the richest people, in some ways the freest people, lives under a despotism, which works a virtual destruction of the people's freedom of choice in the selection of its public officials, and of the freedom of action of those officials after they are chosen. The large majority of our citizens are virtually disfranchised. They number to-day nearly eighty millions. The public officials

who are selected, and therefore controlled, by the election machine, comprise the entire body of our local, state, and national officials. Their numbers go into the hundreds of thousands, if not already into the millions. The public treasuries, which are under the control of our self-appointed despots, make an annual expenditure of thousands of millions. No Roman emperor, and no king, tsar, or kaiser of modern times, has ever had the control of such immense masses of wealth and population, as our machine politicians of the present day.

The overthrow of their power is a mere impossibility, through these annual rotations of men, by means of our present periodic process of so-called popular election. Whenever, at one of our annual elections, we work the overthrow of one set of public officials, all that we accomplish is to put in their places another set of men, of practically the same kind, who are in their turn the creatures, and the puppets, of the machine politicians. No doubt, we do occasionally compel the machine politicians to nominate candidates of fairly good repute. But, in general, the men so nominated are men who can be controlled, and used, with or without their knowledge, by the skillful men who pull the political wires. These occasional elections, of very respectable men, on very respectable "platforms," as they



are termed, give no substantial improvement in practical results. In general, in the long run, however great may be our efforts, however often we may make a change in men, it is quite beyond our power to accomplish any substantial improvement in methods. So long as we maintain this system of perpetual rotation, by the annual election machine, so long we shall maintain its results. We shall make no substantial improvement in the administration of public affairs, so long as we maintain our present system of rotatory politics.

It is frequently said, and it is generally believed, that the power of the machine politicians, and the resulting abuses, are limited to local municipal politics.

But this is a great error. The power of the machine politicians is even larger, and more complete, in the national government, than in our local and state politics. The petty local political organizations are of slight political importance, in comparison with the great moneyed organization, which has for a long time been the power of supreme control of our national government.

This organization had its origin at the time of the Civil War. Then began the growth in our national government of what may be accurately termed the great Senatorial Trust.

It came into existence in this way. Our heavy war expenditure made it necessary to make large changes in the tariff, and impose heavy duties on imports. No revenue bill, and no appropriation bill, could pass without action by the Senate. Thereby resulted the Senate's power over the national finances. But the most important power of the Senate lay in the matter of appointments to public offices. No appointment to a high administrative office could be made, without a vote of the Senate. This fact soon resulted in a nearly complete control by the Senate of all such appointments. Very early the custom arose, of submitting to the respective Senators of the different states the appointments to office in those states. This gave to the members of the Senate a power beyond calculation, in both state and local politics. The control of the tariff, and its frequent revision, with the control of the currency, and the pension fund, the monumental fraud of the nineteenth century, together with the control of the appointments to all the federal offices, have enabled one organization of machine politicians to retain for forty years an almost unbroken dominance in the national government; and thereby to compel the payment to their party treasuries of very large amounts of money, from all the business and industrial inter-

ests affected by tariff and financial legislation. The sums of money so paid have gone into the hundreds, and probably thousands, of millions. Where any local political organization has taken dollars by the thousands, or tens of thousands, the great national "machine" has taken its millions, and hundreds of millions. The plunder of the public by our local political organizations is a thing quite inconsiderable, in comparison with the enormous amounts that have been paid to the politicians who have had the control of the national government. The pension frauds alone have been the means whereby plundering politicians, of both the "grand old parties," have stolen from our national treasury more than a thousand millions of dollars.

Senatorial combination — the great Senatorial Trust — constitutes the foundation, and the binding strength of the great national election machine, in its two parts, its two so-called "parties." Its members, belonging to each of our great parties, are admitted into all manner of large industrial and financial enterprises, by reason of their power, not only in the national government, but in the state and local governments. Coal companies, iron and steel companies, sugar companies, tobacco companies, companies for the mining of metals, companies for the development of industries of

all kinds, for the use of electrical power, for the virtual ownership of our public highways — nearly all the largest business enterprises of our modern industrial world, find themselves virtually compelled — to admit these political magnates to a share in their financial results. Thence come the immense fortunes, which are amassed by the members of our national Senate, accumulated, not from their salaries, not as the result of their individual lawful business labors, but as the price of their political power and influence.

In nearly every state in the Union, the political power of the United States senators is overwhelming. Every local organization, no doubt, has its own "leaders," its own commanding officers. But in state politics, and in national politics, the supreme power is vested in the great Senatorial Trust. Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York — what is the limitation that any intelligent man would set, to the possibilities of accomplishment, by a combination of the senators from those three states? Even so far back as 1860, it was the combination of the machine politicians from Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York, which gave the presidency to Mr. Lincoln, by bargain and sale. Every President since Mr. Lincoln, with the exception of the Vice-Presidents who have become Presidents by the

death of the elected President, has obtained his nomination, and consequently his election, from the national election machine—virtually by power of appointment. In the exercise of that power of appointment, the controlling element has been money.

No doubt, it is an impossibility to frame any system of government which will be automatic; or which will give us an absolute security against the corrupt use of money. But it is a possibility, and a possibility easily within our reach, to frame a political system, under which the power of money used corruptly shall be less, and much less, than it is with us to-day. But such a system must be one, under which free open public discussion, the normal, natural processes of free thought and free speech, resume their places as the fundamental processes in the selection of our highest public servants, and the control of public affairs. We must have such a form of government, as will make it possible for us to use the people's best judgment, the people's best thought, in the selection of the men at the head of our different governments. But when those men are once selected, we must give them our confidence. We must give them a free hand.

No government can be operated, except on the basis of confidence in men. First, we must have

confidence in the people; in its ability to make a wise selection of the men who are to be its chosen rulers. Thereafter, we must have confidence in those chosen rulers. We have made an experiment quite long enough on the constitutional basis of distrust.

We must revise our ideas of democratic government from the very foundation. We must finally and completely abandon the idea, that democratic government means government by the citizens in mass, in any form. Only by the representative popular assembly, by no other organ, by no other means, so long as human nature remains what it is, is it a possibility for any community, for any large number of human beings, to form and utter their united common judgment, as to either measures or men. We must altogether abandon the idea of getting action by a people, through any mere collection of the separate votes of individuals; through any aggregated action of the citizens in mass, acting directly in their own separate individual persons. The people's judgment must be the product of the people's united common thought. Such thought can be had only in a deliberative popular assembly.

The fundamental "issue," it is seen, in the ultimate analysis, resolves itself into one between

the establishment of organized democracy and a continuance of our present futile attempt at mass rule. The changes, here suggested, though fundamental, involve nothing new or untried in the way of political machinery. They involve the adoption only of methods which have been thoroughly tested; and found by actual experience to be the only practicable methods, for handling men and affairs on any large scale. Single-headed administration — every practical man knows that it is absolutely essential, and indispensable, to administrative efficiency. Individual responsibility — of the single administrative head, to some body of men, which has a continuous existence, which can meet, deliberate, and act, as one body, which is capable of forming an intelligent reasonable judgment — is absolutely indispensable, if our public affairs are to be administered with wisdom and efficiency. Vesting the supreme control of public affairs, subject to necessary constitutional restrictions, in a carefully selected body of able, experienced men, is evidently the only practicable means of securing wise control.

Periodic mass work, in any form, is hopelessly inadequate; and is in conflict with the fundamental principles of democratic government; indeed, of all rational government. Democratic government

must be a government in which the power of supreme control is the judgment of the people, not an enumeration of the opinions of single citizens, even if it were practicable to get such an enumeration by this machinery of annual election. But as matter of actual fact, these annual elections do not give us even as much as that valued result.

The final question for us to consider, after all is said, is this: Is it really necessary, for the permanent health of the body politic, that we should now make a thorough reorganization of our political system?





**The Riverside Press**

*Electrotyped and printed by H. O. Houghton & Co.  
Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.*











